| Council of the EU | ||
|
Today, the Council adopted a sweeping 19th package of further 69 individual listings and numerous economic restrictive measures targeting key sectors which fuel Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, including energy, finance and the military industrial complex. The Council is also strengthening control over the movement of Russian diplomats across the EU and taking further measures against those responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children. As part of the package, the Council also imposed further measures on Belarus to restrict the latter’s support for the Russian war effort. Today’s package comes in response to Russia’s escalating aggression against Ukraine, in particular the recent brutal military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including energy, water and health facilities. These attacks, which have inflicted severe suffering on the civilian population, further underscore Russia’s unwillingness to pursue peace.
EnergyToday’s package introduces a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) into the EU, starting January 2027 for long-term contracts, and within six months for short-term contracts, and tightens the existing transaction ban on two major Russian state-owned oil producers (Rosneft and Gazprom Neft). The EU is also listing a Tatarstani conglomerate active in the Russian oil sector. In parallel, the EU is taking measures against important third country operators enabling Russia’s revenue streams. This involves sanctioning Chinese entities - two refineries and an oil trader - that are significant buyers of Russian crude oil. Furthermore, the EU is imposing additional sanctions across the shadow fleet value chain. Specifically, the 19th package includes the listing of Litasco Middle East DMCC, Lukoil’s prominent shadow fleet enabler based in the United Arab Emirates. Other listings include maritime registries providing false flags to shadow fleet vessels, allowing their continued operation by creating a fraudulent impression of compliance with certification requirements. Today’s measures also target the largest port container operator in the Russian Far East, and a leading shipbuilder for Sovcomflot. An additional 117 vessels have been made subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport, bringing the total number of designated vessels to 557. These measures target non-EU tankers that are part of the shadow fleet circumventing the oil price cap mechanism, which otherwise support Russia’s energy sector, or transport military equipment for Russia or stolen Ukrainian grain. The 19th package also introduces a ban on reinsuring vessels belonging to the shadow fleet, further constraining their ability to operate. Financial measuresRecent activity has evidenced Russia’s increasing use of crypto in circumventing sanctions. In this context, the stablecoin A7A5 – created with Russian state support – has emerged as a prominent tool for financing activities supporting the war of aggression. Therefore, today’s package introduces sanctions on the developer of A7A5, the Kyrgyz issuer of that coin, and the operator of a platform where significant volumes of A7A5 is traded. Transactions involving this stablecoin have also been prohibited across the EU. As of today, eight banks and oil traders from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE and Hong Kong that circumvent EU sanctions are subject to a transaction ban. Five additional Russian banks – Istina, Zemsky Bank, Commercial Bank Absolut Bank, MTS Bank, and Alfa-Bank – are targeted using the same measure. Four banks from Belarus and Kazakhstan are also put under a transaction ban, due to their connections to Russian financial messaging and payment systems. Additionally, the EU is prohibiting its operators from engaging with the Russian National Payment Card System (‘Mir’) or the Fast Payments System (‘SBP’). Significant restrictions are also imposed on maintaining economic relationships with entities active in nine Russian special economic zones. These zones are central to Russia’s industrial and technological capacity, hosting enterprises engaged in the production or development of goods contributing to the Russian war effort. Russian diplomatsWhen travelling across the Schengen area beyond their country of accreditation, Russian diplomats will be obliged to inform in advance the relevant EU member state. This obligation aims at ensuring the awareness of member states, against a backdrop of increasingly hostile intelligence activities that support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, EU member states may impose an authorisation requirement on Russian diplomats for traveling to their territories, based on visas or residence permits issued by another state. ChildrenSince the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Ukrainian authorities estimate that Russia has deported and forcibly transferred nearly 20 000 Ukrainian children into Russia or into Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia. Those children, many of whom are from orphanages or separated from their families, often face forced adoption and efforts to erase their Ukrainian identity through forced assimilation and indoctrination. Therefore, the EU is reinforcing accountability of those involved in such activities by listing 11 additional individuals. In order to streamline future sanctions on persons responsible for the abduction, forced assimilation and militarised education of Ukrainian minors, the Council is also introducing a new listing criterion. MilitaryThe EU is targeting businesspersons and entities forming part of the Russian military-industrial complex, and operators from UAE and China producing or supplying military and dual-use goods to Russia. Today’s listings also include a senior DPRK military commander deployed to Russia in support of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, and an individual responsible for the inhumane treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war. TradeThe Council has identified 45 new entities directly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex by, inter alia, enabling the circumvention of export restrictions on computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools, microelectronics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other advanced technology items. These entities will be subject to tighter export restrictions with regard to dual-use goods, as well as items which might generally contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence sector. 17 of these entities are located in third countries other than Russia (12 in China, including Hong Kong, three in India and two in Thailand). The EU has also agreed to expand the existing export ban, to include electronic components, rangefinders, additional chemicals used in the preparation of propellants and additional metals, oxides and alloys used in the manufacturing of military systems. Salts and ores, articles made of rubber, tubes, tyres, millstones and construction materials will also be subject to more stringent export restrictions. Finally, the 19th package introduces a prohibition to purchase, import or transfer all acyclic hydrocarbons due to the importance of such materials in generating significant revenues for Russia. Additionally, the EU is listing Russia’s largest gold producer, further constraining its revenue sources. ServicesToday’s package makes prior authorisation mandatory for all services provided to the Russian government. Furthermore, it restricts the provision of AI services, high-performance computing services and commercial space-based services to Russian entities, including the Russian government. Today’s measures also prohibit European operators from providing services directly related to tourism activities in Russia. BelarusToday’s package includes five new listings related to the Belarusian military-industrial complex and the Lukashenka regime. Moreover, it further mirrors Belarus’ trade measures with the ones imposed on Russia. Additionally, the agreed measures target crypto-related payment services and expand the prohibition on providing certain software, including for banking, finance, commercial space-based services, technical testing and analysis, AI and quantum computing. BackgroundIn its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council reiterated its resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter, and reaffirmed its continued support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The European Council also reconfirmed the EU’s unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed. Russia must not prevail. The European Council reaffirmed its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, in line with the key principles and objectives of Ukraine’s Peace Formula, and underlined the principle that no initiative regarding Ukraine be taken without Ukraine. To this end, the EU and its member states will maintain their intensive global outreach efforts and will participate in the discussions affecting Europe’s security. The European Union remains ready to step up pressure on Russia, including by adopting further sanctions.
|
| 23/10/2025 16:27 | CONCLUSIONS | | |
European Council conclusions on European defence and security, 23 October 2025 | |
III. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY
12. Further to the presentation by the Commission and the High Representative of the European Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, the European Council calls for Member State-led work on all the priority capability areas identified at EU level to be operationalised, with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and on the basis of a coherent overall approach, building on the Strategic Compass, so that Europe develops the full spectrum of modern capabilities needed, in full coherence with NATO. The European Council acknowledges the work already undertaken by Member States, and calls on them to finalise the process of setting up capability coalitions in all the priority areas by the end of the year and to advance on concrete projects to be launched in the first half of 2026. 13. In doing so, the Union will reduce its strategic dependencies, address its critical capability gaps and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base accordingly throughout the Union so that it is in a position to better supply equipment in the quantities and at the pace needed. This will also contribute to boosting European industrial and technological competitiveness, including for SMEs. 15. In addition, considering the threats on the rest of the EU borders, the European Council stresses the importance of their defence. 16. In the light of Russia’s and Belarus’ intensified hybrid attacks and the recent violations of EU airspace, the European Council underscores the importance of close cooperation among Member States to comprehensively strengthen their defence and security capabilities. In this context, enhancing the resilience, security and protection of critical infrastructure, including energy, digital and undersea infrastructure, is also essential. 17. The European Council considers that, to respond to the most immediate needs and threats, work should focus in particular on concrete projects to reinforce Member States’ joint efforts to enhance their anti-drone and air defence capabilities, in a coordinated manner, in particular making full use of the SAFE and EDIP instruments and other relevant existing financial instruments. 18. The European Council calls for accelerated joint development of space assets and services that serve security and defence purposes, as well as for the protection of existing assets, including dual-use assets, given their importance for Europe’s strategic autonomy. 19. In order to ramp up the European defence industry’s capacity, the European Council calls on Member States to increasingly gear defence investment towards joint development, production, and procurement, with the support of the EDA, as demand aggregation on the basis of standardised requirements and economies of scale are key to providing predictability to industry, lowering costs and fostering interoperability. The SAFE and EDIP instruments should be fully mobilised to that end. The European Council stresses the importance of the proper functioning and further integration of the European defence market across the Union, including cross-border access to defence supply chains, especially for SMEs and mid-caps. 20. The European Council underlines the importance of close cooperation with Ukraine and of its integration with and contribution to the European defence industry, notably as regards defence innovation and cutting-edge defence technology. 21. The European Council stresses the need to ensure effective political oversight and coordination to keep track of progress and to intensify work by defence ministers in the Council on Europe’s defence readiness. This work will be informed by an annual defence readiness report, to be prepared by the EDA with the support of the Commission and the High Representative, and presented to the European Council. The report will take stock of progress towards closing the existing capability gaps, building on the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). 22. The European Council calls on the Council to strengthen the European Defence Agency so that it can fully play its role in the field of defence capability development, research and acquisition and to report on the necessary measures by the end of 2025. 23. Recalling the commitment to substantially increase expenditure on Europe’s defence and security, the European Council reviewed work on the relevant financing options and on cooperation to invest more efficiently in the field of defence. It welcomes the progress made since March 2025 with regard to the activation of the national escape clauses, the mid-term review of the EU cohesion policy, and the SAFE and EDIP instruments. 24. The European Council acknowledges the progress made on the Defence Readiness Omnibus, welcomes progress on the proposal on incentivising defence related investments in the EU budget and looks forward to a swift agreement by the end of 2025. It calls on the Commission to present new proposals on simplification as soon as possible. 25. The European Council also welcomes the efforts made by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to step up, simplify and accelerate its support for European security and defence capabilities. It encourages the EIB Group to further explore ways to finance industries and companies, and help start-ups to scale up in the security and defence sector in Europe. 27. The European Council reiterates its invitation to the Commission and the High Representative to present further proposals to strengthen military mobility throughout the Union. 28. The European Council recalls the importance of working together with like-minded partners, who share the EU’s foreign and security policy goals. 29. The European Council recalls that a stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains, for those States that are members of it, the foundation of their collective defence. 30. The above is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, and takes into account the security and defence interests of all Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. 31. The European Council will continue to provide strategic guidance and review progress on the implementation of the defence readiness objective.
|
|
|