U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin

Sanctioning Hungarian Official Antal Rogan
01/07/2025
Sanctioning Hungarian Official Antal Rogan
01/07/2025 10:45 AM EST

Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Sanctioning Hungarian Official Antal Rogan
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Sanctioning Hungarian Official Antal Rogan

Press Statement
January 7, 2025



The United States is today designating senior Hungarian government official Antal Rogan under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program for his involvement in corruption.


During his tenure as a government official, including as Minister in Charge of Orban’s Cabinet Office, Rogan has reportedly orchestrated schemes designed to control strategic sectors of the Hungarian economy. Minister Rogan has played a central role in enabling a system in Hungary that has benefitted himself and his party at the expense of the Hungarian people. Rogan’s activity is emblematic of the broader climate of impunity in Hungary where key elements of the state have been captured by oligarchs and undemocratic actors.


Today’s action implements the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption, which identifies state capture as a specific typology of concern. The United States has a national security interest in the vitality and continuity of the democratic institutions of our Allies as well as in protecting democracy globally. This designation is intended to ensure the U.S. financial system plays no role in facilitating the corrupt activities of Antal Rogan.


We continue to urge Hungary’s leaders to address corruption proactively, unequivocally, and decisively. A more transparent Hungary will contribute to a stronger Transatlantic Alliance and a more prosperous Europe.


The Department of the Treasury’s sanctions actions today were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implements and builds upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. For more information, see Treasury’s press release.



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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Combating Drugs and Crime Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Hungary Office of the Spokesperson


Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia
01/07/2025

Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia
01/07/2025 12:54 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia
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Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia


Media Note





January 7, 2025



Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma will travel to Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia January 7-11. In Tirana, he will discuss Albania’s democratic progress, defense capabilities, and deepening economic ties with the United States, and thank the Government of Albania for its ongoing support to our Afghan allies.


In Kosovo, he will discuss normalization of Kosovo’s relations with Serbia through the EU-facilitated Dialogue, strengthening governance and rule of law, and fostering economic growth and energy security for the benefit of all Kosovans. He will also thank the Government of Kosovo for its strong support of Ukraine and for its assistance to Afghans in need.


In Serbia, the Deputy Secretary will highlight the growing U.S.-Serbia strategic partnership on energy and other economic issues. He will offer support for Serbia’s integration into European institutions, normalization of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo, strengthening the rule of law, and closer bilateral cooperation on military and security issues.


He will also reaffirm the United States’ commitment to the countries of the Western Balkans as they pursue Euro-Atlantic integration and deeper regional cooperation.


Follow Deputy Secretary of State Verma on Instagram and X: @DepSecStateMR



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Albania Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Kosovo Office of the Spokesperson Official International Travel Serbia


United States and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Sign Agreement to Enhance Power Sector Resilience and Climate Adaptation
01/08/2025
United States and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Sign Agreement to Enhance Power Sector Resilience and Climate Adaptation
01/08/2025 09:36 AM EST



Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…United States and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Sign Agreement to Enhance Power Sector Resilience and Climate Adaptation
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United States and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Sign Agreement to Enhance Power Sector Resilience and Climate Adaptation


Press Statement





January 8, 2025



The United States welcomes the signing of a landmark $27 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program agreement with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. MCC and the Mauritanian government designed this program to build Mauritania’s capacity in inclusive power sector planning, grid operations, and electricity regulation. The Threshold Program will provide debt-free grants to develop fundable environment resilience projects and to incorporate climate change and social considerations into the environmental impact assessment process.


This Threshold Program represents a critical step in our ongoing partnership with Mauritania. By enhancing the power sector and improving environment adaptation, this program will contribute to Mauritania’s long-term economic prosperity and environmental sustainability. This significant U.S. government investment will support the development of critical infrastructure, attract greater private sector investment, and create prosperity for the people of Mauritania.


The United States remains committed to supporting Mauritania’s efforts to foster inclusive growth and build a resilient future for its people. We look forward to working closely with our Mauritanian partners to implement this program and achieve meaningful progress in these vital areas.



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Bureau of African Affairs Bureau of Energy Resources Climate and Environment Mauritania Office of the Spokesperson


Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye
01/08/2025


Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye
01/08/2025 09:50 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye
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Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye


Media Note





January 8, 2025



Under Secretary of State John Bass will travel to Ankara, Türkiye January 9-10. In Ankara, Under Secretary Bass will meet with senior Turkish government officials to discuss the ongoing situation in Syria and will continue to emphasize the importance of a peaceful, inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. He will also participate in meetings on the importance of regional stability, preventing Syria from being used as a base for terrorism, and ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS.



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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs International Security Office of the Spokesperson Peace Treaties and International Agreements Turkey Under Secretary for Management


Secretary Antony J. Blinken and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot at a Joint Press Availability
01/08/2025

Secretary Antony J. Blinken and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot at a Joint Press Availability
01/08/2025 02:44 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Paris, France

Quai d’Orsay



FOREIGN MINISTER BARROT: (Via interpreter) Secretary of State dear Tony Blinken, a warm welcome to Paris. This is your eighth visit here at the Quai d’Orsay, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as your mandate as Secretary of State come to an end. And like I said on the occasion of the meeting we just had, I’d like to tell you that you embodied the face of America in the way we like it: America, the service of which young Lafayette at the time decided to provide all of his support when he joined, at the age of 19, a vessel on his way to victory; the America that we celebrated as well in June to commemorate D-Day in Normandy; America, which thanks to its views and values and attachment to freedom, contributed to building, on the ashes of the Second World War, an international order based on the law. And I’d like to say that during this – all of this mandate that was yours, you’ve done a lot. You contributed a great deal to solving many international crises.

And I’d like to commend your action in the Middle East in particular – in Lebanon, where, thanks to our combined efforts, we managed to put an end to the hostilities with a ceasefire agreement that’s been implemented thanks to a Franco-American mechanism which is yielding results, given that Hizballah is being dissolved in the south of the country, and now it’s almost one-third of the Israeli forces who withdrew from the south of Lebanon. We joined our efforts to contribute or facilitate the election of a president. The vote will be taking place tomorrow, and we very much hope that a president will be elected in Lebanon so that Lebanon can continue with its institution in full place.

And we also work together to help Ukraine resist the Russian aggressor. And we agree that no solution can be found to this conflict without the Ukrainians. There can be no discussion regarding European security without the Europeans, and no solution can be found to this crisis if the solution were to be – not to be in the interests of Ukraine. So from a financial point of view, when it comes to the sanctions, for three years almost now we’ve been providing Ukraine with the support that it so much needed to preserve, to defend, its freedom, its territorial integrity, of course, but also at the same time to protect and defend the interests – the security interests – of Europe.

And beyond everything you did in the Middle East, for Ukraine, and in many other places, we talked together, for example, about Sudan where there is the worst ongoing humanitarian crisis at the moment. And we’re both extremely mobilized in this respect. But I could see you act, saw how much of a seasoned diplomat you are. You are very human, and you know – over these past years you knew how to act and what to do for peace and security to gain ground.

So thank you for all of this. Thank you for your actions. And like to commend as well the work undertaken by the American ambassador in Paris. She will soon be leaving Paris, but we’d like to thank her for everything she’s been doing. I wish you all the world, and this is not a farewell, it is simply an au revoir, and we’re only saying goodbye because I’m sure we’ll be seeing each other very time soon.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: (Via interpreter) Jean-Noel, allow me first on a personal basis – and on a professional basis as well – to tell you how deeply I appreciate our partnership, our friendship, and what we’ve been able to accomplish together. I am delighted that you will continue carrying the torch over the next months on these crucial issues for our two countries. I had a wonderful colleague with you, Jean-Noel. Thank you.

(In English) To the foreign minister, to President Macron, I also have to say how grateful I am for the extraordinary partnership that the United States and France have enjoyed these past four years that we’ve been in office – obviously a partnership, a fraternity, that goes back many, many years. I think it’s fitting that my last trip as Secretary of State brings me back to France. We know, both of us, that this is a world that we have to face together that is more complex, more competitive, more contested, than at any time in recent memory. But we have a shared determination – our two countries – to advance our shared interests and values, and to do it together. We have an enduring belief that this partnership is essential to trying to build a world that’s a little bit safer, a little bit more secure, a little bit more prosperous for the people in both of our countries and well beyond.

As Jean-Noel said, I think we’ve seen manifestations of that partnership and what it can produce in Lebanon. Together, France and the United States produced a ceasefire in Lebanon that is holding, that’s moving forward, and that is creating the possibility for a much different and much better future for the country as well as for its relationship with Israel. Together, we put together an oversight mechanism to address concerns about ceasefire violations, and it is working. Challenges remain, but so far the mechanism is functioning well and we’ve seen, as recently as yesterday now, the withdrawal of about more than a third of Israeli forces in Lebanon. I think the ceasefire can be a bridge to a durable peace that allows people on both sides of the border – Israel and Lebanon – to return to their homes, to return to their lives, and to move forward in greater peace and security.

In Syria – where Jean-Noel just made a very important visit along with our friend the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock – we see as well a genuine hope for the future after five decades of Assad regime that brutalized the Syrian people. Now they have an opportunity for a future that’s not under the thumb of a dictator, not under the thumb of a foreign power, not under the thumb of a terrorist group, a future in which a sovereign Syria respects the rights of all of its people, and the country’s not used as a base for terrorism or other bad things that we’ve seen affect people well beyond its borders. So there as well, France and the United States are fully united in what we want to see, what we expect, and the work we’re doing to help achieve that.

On Ukraine, as Jean-Noel said, France has been, from day one, one of the staunchest supporters of a free Ukraine, one that can resist and overcome the ongoing aggression that Russia is posing. Global support for Ukraine – that France and the United States have helped bring about together – is one of the strongest examples I’ve ever seen of burden-sharing. And we see that in particular in France’s leadership, from training more than 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers, to signing a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine earlier this year, to French firms boosting production to strengthen our transatlantic defense industrial base. I think in the months to come France’s leadership will be essential for ensuring that Ukraine has what it needs to be in the strongest possible position to defend its democratic independence, whether that’s on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.

One of the things that the foreign minister and I discussed is the fact that Ukraine is maybe the best example of a proposition that security in Europe is intertwined with security all around the world. If you look at what’s happening in Ukraine right now, what is allowing the Russian aggression to continue? Support from North Korea with artillery, with ammunition, and with troops; and everything that China’s doing to support Russia’s defense industrial base – the machine tools, the microelectronics, all flowing into Russia from China, from Hong Kong, that are allowing Russia to keep manufacturing weapons, munitions, and other things essential for its ongoing aggression.

So that’s just a demonstration of, increasingly, the indivisibility of security, the fact that actors far away from Ukraine, from Europe, are having a big impact on what is the biggest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. In response, our two countries have worked to deepen Euro-Atlantic and Atlantic-Pacific convergence – notably, on the threat posed by the PRC to our shared security and to our shared values. We welcome France’s expanded engagement with Indo-Pacific partners and hope it will continue, including by strengthening, for example, freedom of navigation in the region.

We’ve also worked to forge together a common vision for the global economy, one that is governed by rules of the road. We’ve invested in our collective productive capacity. We’ve stood up against Chinese over-capacity and unfair trade practices. We’ve diversified our supply chains to reduce reliance on Beijing.

In these and so many other ways, this partnership between us is producing results – results that matter, that will make a difference in the lives of our people. And I’m convinced that in the years to come, our countries will continue to work together and to lead together on the world stage – not out of convenience, not out of charity, but because the challenges we face demand our engagement, demand our partnership, demand our cooperation. We’ll confront a changing world as we always have, guided by shared commitment to bring greater freedom, greater opportunity, greater security to the people that we’re entrusted to represent.

So for that, for the work that we’ve been able to do together, for the work I know our countries will continue to do together, let me simply say thank you, to share my gratitude and to share my conviction that when our countries are working in common cause to common effect, there really is nothing we can’t accomplish.

Thank you.

MODERATOR: (Via Interpreter) Ministers will take a few questions.

QUESTION: Thank you. Michael Birnbaum —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Michael.

QUESTION: — from The Washington Post. Secretary Blinken, I wanted to – we’ve been on this trip with you. We first went to South Korea, where the former ally, President Yoon, is holed up, resisting arrest. We visited Tokyo where leaders are rather annoyed about the decision on blocking the purchase of U.S. Steel. We’re here in Paris where – apologies – but the far right is on the rise. The government is a little chaotic. And we’re going to Italy next, where the prime minister is close with Elon Musk.

So I wanted to ask – you’ve talked about your legacy. You’ve said that you’re handing over a set of alliances that’s in better shape than when you inherited it. But looking at this pattern, what would you tell the United States people about the challenged relationships that you’re facing.

A quick question about Greenland – what did you tell Minister Barrot about Trump’s interest in taking over European territory? How worried are you about a conflict between the United States and Europe on that front? And lastly – apologize – Elon Musk, what should U.S. allies make of his eagerness to support far-right leaders in Europe and around the world given his closeness to President-elect Trump and his global business interests?

And Minister Barrot, I just wanted to ask: What is France prepared to do to defend Greenland and Denmark if Trump continues to press forward in his attempt to takeover Greenlandic territory? Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Michael, thank you for covering the waterfront. Let me take these out of order. Greenland first – I think one of the basic propositions we’ve brought to our work over the last four years is that we’re stronger, we’re more effective, we get better results when we’re working closely with our allies, not saying or doing things that may alienate them. Having said that, it’s – the idea expressed about Greenland is obviously not a good one, but maybe more important, it’s obviously one that’s not going to happen, so we probably shouldn’t waste a lot of time talking about it.

On the question of where we are with all of our allies and partners, I’d say two things. First, as you’ve heard me say many times before, what President Biden entrusted me with doing from day one was to re-engage, re-energize, in some cases re-imagine these alliances and partnerships because he and we are convinced that, to do what we need to do to advance the interests of the American people, to actually solve this incredible multiplicity, complexity, interconnectedness of challenges that we face more than at any time in the 32 years I’ve been doing it, we’re so much better off working with others than going it alone. And I think in ways that we’ve just talked about, we’ve demonstrated how much more we can get done when we’re working closely with our allies and partners.

Now, most of the countries that we’re working closely with, our base – is our democratic base. That doesn’t mean that we’re not working with countries that don’t neatly fit our definition of what a democracy is. The challenges that we face demand that we work with any country that is interested in solving a problem, but we’re always starting with our base of fellow democracies.

And one of the hallmarks of a democracy – and we talked about this when we were in Korea – is that when we have challenges, when we have issues, including internally, what sets us apart is the fact that we engage them, we confront them, we deal with them directly, we deal with them openly, we deal with them transparently, we don’t pretend they don’t exist, we don’t sweep them under the rug. And sometimes that’s not particularly pleasant to look at. It can get ugly; it can be painful. But that’s exactly what we do. We talked in Korea about the fact that the Koreans are dealing with their own challenge right now pursuant to their constitution, pursuant to the rule of law, and doing it peacefully. And I fully expect that they will emerge stronger on the other side.

With Japan, do we have a difference over a particular business deal? Yes. But seen in the context of the fact that we are each other’s largest investors, one deal does not a relationship make. And on the contrary, the partnership, the alliance with Japan is stronger than it’s ever been, including economically.

Here in Europe – I talked about this already – the work that we’ve done together with our core allies and partners in support of Ukraine has been nothing short of historic and also the best example, as I said, of burden sharing that I’ve ever seen in my 32 years. So I could go down the list.

But maybe what’s most important is this. As we transition, as we work to hand off to the Trump administration, what I’ve been animated by these past couple of months is making sure we give them the strongest possible hand to play in dealing with all these challenges. The world doesn’t stop because we have a transition. There are so many things happening in real time that I want to make sure the administration that’s coming in is fully prepared to engage from day one, and that’s exactly what we’re doing and what we’ve been doing, and it’s why I’m continuing my work for these next however many days it is, right until noon on the 20th of January.

And I believe in area after area, we’re handing off in some cases things we haven’t been able to complete but that create real opportunities to move things forward in a better way. In the Middle East, we’re very close to a ceasefire and hostage agreement. We’ve talked about this too in recent days. I hope that we can get it over the line in the time that we have left, but if we don’t, then the plan that President Biden put forward for a ceasefire-hostage deal will be handed over to the incoming administration. And I believe that when we get that deal – and we’ll get it – it will be on the basis of the plan that President Biden put before the world back in May.

We’ve done an incredible amount of work of what follows a hostage-ceasefire agreement in terms of the necessary arrangements for Gaza’s security, its administration, its reconstruction – a day-after plan. We talked about this with the foreign minister as well. There too, we’re ready to hand that over to the administration so it can work on it and run with it when the opportunity is there.

And more broadly, the work, the investment we’ve made in transformative arrangements for the Middle East, starting with the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, all of that is ready to go if the opportunity presents itself with a ceasefire in Gaza as well as understandings on a pathway forward for the Palestinians. So there’s tremendous opportunity there.

Similarly, with Ukraine, everything we’ve done to make sure that Ukraine would survive – and not only survive, have an opportunity to thrive in the future – is ready to be carried forward. Putin tried to erase Ukraine from the map. He’s failed. He’s endured, I think, a heavier and heavier strategic setback in everything that he’s done in Ukraine. Now, we’re at a point in the coming year where it may be that the parties will choose to negotiate. We want to make sure – and I think we are making sure – that the incoming administration will be able, if it’s going to oversee such a negotiation, to make sure it’s doing it from position of strength and that President Trump could get the strongest possible deal.

I can go down the list, but the point is this. We’re handing over a lot of positive opportunities, initiatives, work, and if the next administration chooses to carry it forward, I think that will be clearly in the interests of the United States.

QUESTION: Musk.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Private citizens can – in our country can say what they want, what they believe, and everyone else can draw their own conclusions and take their own positions on the matter. So I’m not going to comment beyond saying he, like any American, has the right to express his views, his opinions.

FOREIGN MINISTER BARROT: (Via interpreter) As far as I’m concerned, first of all, let me tell you that the French Government is working the matter what you said, and regarding the French foreign policy, its line has been expressed once again very strongly by the president on Monday on the occasion of the meeting of the French ambassadors.

Second, the friendship in between France and the United States goes back more than two centuries ago. I mentioned Lafayette. I talked about D-Day, which Presidents Macron and Biden commemorated together. And I’d like simply to tell you that we survived some 59 American elections, and of course we’ll survive the 60th American election.

Then let me tell you about a year – and tell you that – remind you where we stand today, where more specifically Tony Blinken and myself are standing. This is exactly here in front of this chimney that some 75 years ago, almost to the day, Robert Schuman made a 90-second statement that launched the political institution on the origins of the European Union. That was on the 9th of May, 1950 – at the time the European organization for steel and coal.

So like Tony, I will put a question to you. Do we believe that the United States will take Greenland? (Laughter.) The answer is no, no invasion of Greenland. That being said, is – are we entering a period of time where the false is present everywhere? The answer is yes. If you look at what Europe has been doing in terms of competitiveness, and in many respect Europe has been strengthening up. We are expressing who we are, and like once again President Macron said on Monday, Europe has to wake up and continue to do so.

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Good afternoon. A question from LCI to both of you. What do you make of these expansionist statements made by Donald Trump regarding Canada and Greenland? And could you – and second, what is the – what are the American guarantees to provide support to Ukraine beyond January?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: (Via interpreter) I can only repeat what I said a moment ago. Quite frankly, why are we dwelling on this question? It’s not going to happen, so let’s not waste time discussing it.

As far as American, U.S., support, what I can tell you is that during the Biden administration, we will continue providing our support to the Ukraine, including during the upcoming days. At the same time, we have an exceptional support from our partners. During the – some two years of the aggression of Russia against Ukraine, we’ve brought some $100 million to – of support to Ukraine. Our friends from Europe and outside, in Asia, have brought $150 million. So we know that our partner are doing what needs to be done, and I’m sure that they will continue to do so for the Ukraine.

MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Thank you, ministers. One more question.

QUESTION: Thank you so much. Alex Raufoglu from news agency Turan. Secretary, I want to take my chance and follow up on Ukraine again. President Zelenskyy gave an interview early this week, and he said that in his view there can be no meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine if the United States is not part of it. Do you think Europe alone can do it?

And Mr. Foreign Minister, same question, but differently: Given the incoming administration’s viewpoint, can you see there, being there, in a coalition of European countries that would be willing to provide guarantees to Ukraine which would be enough for lasting peace? And – or do you just think that willpower is not there? Is America still a key on this?

If I may very quickly follow up on concerns across the continent over Russian interference directly in the election processes in Europe, what can Europe do to bear – vaccinate, if you want – against that problem?

And finally, Mr. Secretary, final one goes to you on Georgia. President Macron this week backed protesters in Tbilisi, and he said that new elections could be a way out of the current political crisis. Already have taken some measures – sanctions – but want to give you a chance to expand on that. What – is there anything that the Western allies can do to save Georgia’s democracy? Thank you so much.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. Happy to start. On Ukraine, as we’ve been very clear, what we’ve all been working to do is to make sure that as Ukraine engages this year, 2025, it can engage it from a position of strength, whether that means continuing the fight because Russia refuses to stop or whether it means entering into a negotiation to get at least to a ceasefire and maybe beyond. And as I mentioned a moment ago, we’ll continue to the very last day of this administration to bring that support forward to Ukraine. I know that our partners will continue well beyond.

If there’s going to be a negotiation, if there’s going to be a ceasefire because we brought it to that point, I think it’s going to be critical. And I believe that the incoming administration will want to make sure that they negotiate the best possible deal. And the best possible deal has to be one that builds into it real deterrence against Russia repeating its aggression six months, a year, two years, you name it, because here’s what we know: Putin has not and will not give up on his imperial ambitions. And if there’s a ceasefire, he’ll want to try to use the time to rest, to refit, and eventually to re-attack. That’s why it’s absolutely essential that part of this include an effective deterrent against any further aggression by Russia.

Now, that can take different forms, including the form of having certain countries police any demarcation or any ceasefire line, and that’s something I know that’s been discussed and that we talked about today with the foreign minister. The next administration will have to decide, if it comes to that, what role, if any, the United States would play. But again, I believe that the incoming administration, if there’s going to be a deal, will want the best possible deal, one that doesn’t unravel when Russia sees an opening to re-attack. And one way or another, as I said, we need to build into it the necessary deterrence so that that doesn’t happen.

On Georgia, we talked about this as well. And what both France and the United States have seen is democratic backsliding that’s deeply concerning. And not just democratic backsliding, but a retreat away from the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the Georgian people, the aspiration to build a future that is closer and closer to Europe.

So having seen that backsliding, having seen a government that’s acting in contravention of the clear will of the people that it purports to represent, having seen an election that raised many questions, having seen repressive actions taken by the government about people who are trying to speak freely and openly, we as well as our partners have taken action. We sanctioned the leader of the Georgian Dream party, Ivanishvili, as well as other members of the government. We suspended American assistance to the Georgian Government. Acting together with almost all of our partners in the OSCE, including France, we invoked the Vienna Mechanism through the OSCE to also make clear that the steps that have been taken, including legislation, that profoundly squeezes the space for freedom of expression and freedom of action by civil society – that has to change.

So I think you see a clear unity of purpose when it comes to the United States, France, many other countries faced with the very unfortunate actions of the government in Georgia.

FOREIGN MINISTER BARROT: (Via interpreter) You asked me about Ukraine first, and in this respect I would like to underline what Antony Blinken said. If – from day one we’ve been supporting Ukraine. If we said that we would support Ukraine as long as it takes and as much as it takes, it is first of all because it is a matter of the future of international law. If we were to accept Ukraine to capitulate, we would let – we would allow force to prevail. And it is a matter for security for the French people as well as for the Europeans.

And in this respect, we should show no complacency or certainly not be naive when it comes to the imperialistic views of Vladimir Putin, and I quote the word used by Tony Blinken in this respect. Why? Because since February 2022, the threat posed by Vladimir Putin has changed. We’ve seen that Putin’s Russia could launch a full-scale invasion just as they did in Ukraine. It became more international as well by exporting the conflict to Asia and by involving North Korea as well. And it became hybrid by getting into all fields of conflict and by attacking even members of the European Union.

So like Tony Blinken said, against all of that, our priority is of course to support Ukraine and allow Ukraine to, whenever they decide – choose to do so, to enter negotiation – negotiations with a strong hand, but also make sure that there is no return of the war on the European continent. It means that on our behalf, on behalf of all other Europeans, we need to step up our efforts in order to deter the threat from Russia, which is pushing towards the west.

Now, disinformation – very quickly – and interference in electoral processes, here, again, Europe’s been very clear. In 2022 at the time France was at the head of the European Union Council, we’d set some very clear rules to be applied to social networks. We applied the regulations on digital services, and I would like you to look at articles 34, 35 and 36, according to which social networks have to do what it takes to make sure that their discussions on the networks do not represent a new threat. They may have to pay fines up to 6 percent of their turnover, and it’s for the European Commission to make sure that these new European regulations are applying. I’m very much calling upon the commission to be extremely firm in this respect and very clear. Should the European Commission fail to do so, it would have to turn back to the European members the possibility of acting in their own name.

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Mathieu Rabechault, Agence France-Presse. Türkiye is threatening the Kurdish fighters with a military operation. What can France do in this respect in order to protect them and contribute to stability in Syria?

Next, Mr. Minister, Mr. Musk will be joining the American administration in a few days, less than two weeks. He referred to Germany and the United Kingdom. Is this appropriate?

FOREIGN MINISTER BARROT: (Via interpreter) Well, one can always express their views, but when one is about to join an administration, comments have a specific weight. What you said, these comments are part of a communication process in the context of ongoing electoral campaigns in a number of countries, and this is regrettable. That also could be a reference to some sort of support to a number of far-right parties in Europe, including in Germany. And if so, one has to be extremely careful, given what the longstanding positions of the American Republican Party have been regarding the far right.

Now, France and the United States have been working hand in hand particularly for four years now to fight Islamic terrorism, including Daesh in Syria. And in this respect, in the presence of Tony Blinken, I would like to express France’s condolences to the victims of the terror attack that took place in New Orleans.

The Kurds in Syria, for both the United States and France, have been some reliable and resolute allies in the fight against Islamic terrorism. With the fall of the criminal and barbaric regime of Assad, there is now hope for Syria – some fragile hope, but genuine hope; the hope that there will be – that Syria will catch up from a political and economic as well as moral point of view, and that will only happen if all of the communities find a role to play in this respect. And of course, the Kurds of Syria shall have their role to play. We owe it to them. They’ve been our companions, they’ve been fighting together with us against Daesh, and it is a matter for the future of Syria – it is extremely important – that the Kurds can fully contribute to the future of their country.

And I would like to commend the efforts undertaken by Tony Blinken in order to facilitate and mediate in between the Kurds in Syria as well as Türkiye, and as well the Kurds in Syria and the authority of transition. There were discussions with General Mazloum only a few days ago. We’ll continue efforts to that effect so that in the northeast of Syria – let me remind you that there are thousands of terrorist prisoners kept by the Kurds of Syria. And want to make sure that, of course, Türkiye’s security guarantees, which are legitimate, can be met; but as well make sure that the security interests of the Kurds and their right to fully contribute to the future of their country can be preserved.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I have very little to add, because I agree entirely with what Jean-Noel has just said. I simply say this: For both of our countries, it is essential as Syria is navigating this transition that we keep a lid on the terrorist threat – the enduring terrorist threat – posed by ISIS or by Daesh. And as Jean-Noel said, we’ve seen possibly a manifestation of that threat with the horrific incident in Louisiana, where the individual in question said he was an adherent of Daesh. It shows, unfortunately, the enduring potency of the ideology, but an even more acute danger would be if the more than 10,000 foreign terrorist fighters who are being detained under the vigilance of our Kurdish friends in Syria were to get out and reconstitute the very potent force that was Daesh in Syria, in Iraq, before it was defeated.

And this is an enduring American interest as well as a French interest. And it’s enduring as well, I believe, with the incoming administration. When Daesh was trying to build its caliphate, its actual physical caliphate, a territorial caliphate, it controlled a huge chunk of land between Iraq and Syria. And that caliphate was – that territorial caliphate was undone, was defeated. And that was completed under President Trump’s watch during his first term, with taking back Raqqa. So I believe that the incoming administration, like this administration, will continue to show a very strong interest in not allowing Daesh to rear its ugly head again, to see a resurgence. And, as Jean-Noel said, a critical part of that is making sure that we enable the Syrian Democratic Forces to do the job that they’ve been doing in the interests of everyone of securing the foreign terrorist fighters who are there as we continue to work to repatriate fighters and to repatriate their families to countries of origin.

So we’ve been working very closely as well with our ally, our partner, in Türkiye – which has very legitimate concerns of course about the PKK and about terrorism – to navigate this transition, to navigate it in a way that I think leads to a resolution of many of those concerns, including over time with the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into Syrian national forces, including with the departure of foreign members of that force to their own countries, including with a resolution of questions around oil, around borders, et cetera, but that’s a process that’s going to take some time.

And in the meantime, what is profoundly not in the interest of everything positive we see happening in Syria would be a conflict. And we’ve worked very hard to make sure that that doesn’t happen; we’ll continue to do that, and I believe that the incoming administration will do the same thing.

MODERATOR: (In French.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Merci.




Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with French President Macron
01/08/2025

Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with French President Macron
01/08/2025 04:24 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with French President Macron
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Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with French President Macron


Readout





January 8, 2025



The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:


Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris. The Secretary and President Macron discussed our steadfast support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s brutal aggression and concerns about PRC support for Russias defense industrial base, which is sustaining the Kremlin’s war machine. On the Middle East, they discussed the importance of a a transition process in Syria that is inclusive and upholds the rights of the Syrian people. They also discussed the need to conclude a ceasefire deal in Gaza that secures the release of all hostages without any further delay. Both leaders committed to continuing cooperation on these critical issues.



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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs France Office of the Spokesperson The Secretary of State


Secretary Antony J. Blinken Upon Accepting the Legion d’Honneur Award
01/08/2025
Secretary Antony J. Blinken Upon Accepting the Legion d’Honneur Award
01/08/2025 05:31 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Paris, France

The Elysee Palace
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Secretary Antony J. Blinken Upon Accepting the Legion d’Honneur Award
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Secretary Antony J. Blinken Upon Accepting the Legion d’Honneur Award


Remarks





January 8, 2025



SECRETARY BLINKEN: (Via interpreter) I have the words, but it’s hard to find the words. Never could I have imagined when I arrived in France a long time ago that I would be here tonight – with you, Mr. President, with all of you in this room. I can’t find the words. Yet I’m going to say a few, in English if I may, to say right away:

(In English) Mr. President, all of my esteemed colleagues, friends, loved ones: This is the honor of a lifetime to receive this award, surrounded by people I consider my extended family, in a city that, yes, I’ve long considered a home away from home. And Mr. President, it is all the more meaningful coming from you – a man whose intellectual depth, curiosity, leadership, and resilience I deeply, deeply admire. It makes this even more special than it inherently is.

As you said, Mr. President, I moved to Paris when I was just nine years old, with my mother, Judith, here with us tonight, and my stepfather, Samuel Pisar. My sister Leah, who is also here, came into the world soon after that, to my great and everlasting joy, and I also join my stepsisters Helaina and Alexandra.

And when I arrived in Paris – (via interpreter) without a word of French, but thanks to the Ecole Bilingue, a remarkable school, one – all my professors, my classmates, and our great friends the Servan-Schreiber, I learned. I learned by listening to Sardou, Clerc, Hardy, Gainsbourg, Cabrel, Higelin – and dare I say it, Claude Francois and Dalida. Let’s face it, these were the ’70s.

By reading Zola, Victor Hugo, Sartre, Camus, Duras, de Beauvoir – not forgetting Tintin and Astérix. In movie theaters, with Truffaut, Malle, LeLouche, Tavernier – and let’s not forget des Bronzes, Pierre Richard, and Louis de Funès.

In front of the TV, the 8:00 p.m. journal Apostrophes – and yes, also Kojak and the Streets of San Francisco dubbed in French, l’Ecole des Fans de Jacques Martin, Le Samedi est à Nous by Michel Drucker.

These were all exceptional teachers. Thanks to them, I managed to survive my French baccalaureate, the oral test, with a presentation of Montesquieu, “De L’esprit des Lois.” 14/20. The answer, if I may, on my grade card: “Could do better.”

(In English) This city is the place where I went to my first rock concert at age 14 – the Rolling Stones at the Pavillon de Paris, the Porte de Pantin, at the northern edge of the city. And I digress here just a minute: That was an unforgettable night, because the concert ended so late – and I was just 14 years old, and with my best friend at the time we had no other way to get back to the other side of the city but to walk. And walking through Paris at night, 2:00 in the morning, 3:00 in the morning, seeing the city in that way as it began to wake up, is something that I still have a powerful image of.

It’s the city where, before meeting my wife, I first fell in love – with Paris Saint-Germain. (Laughter.)

But as you say, it is also here where I first became aware of being from somewhere. You have it exactly right. My French classmates, my friends, being from the United States, for them it carried with it a range of expectations, of stereotypes. And then when I visited home in the United States, I lived the flipside of that as my American friends held forth on their opinions about France. And it did teach me a pair of lifelong lessons: Countries and cultures are always more complex than they look from the outside; and the best way to get to know a place is to try to learn to see the world through the eyes of the people who live there. And that was the exceptional opportunity that I was given at a young age by coming to France.

It was my first experience as acting as a bridge between communities, paying attention not just to what made them different, but what they had in common. In school, exactly as you said, with my classmates not only from France but from around the world, we discussed it all, we debated it all, we argued about it all – Vietnam, Watergate, the oil crisis, Afghanistan, the Cold War. All of that was on the table. And I don’t think I knew it at the time, but I was learning to be a diplomat. And as it turns out, I also didn’t need to look far for role models.

Neither my mother nor my stepfather were born here, but both devoted themselves in exceptional ways to bringing France and the United States, the French and the American people, together around the passions that drove them.

For Sam, Paris was first refuge after surviving the Holocaust. And indeed, as he liked to say, Paris is an anagram for Pisar. Taken in by an aunt and an uncle who were among the thousands of Jews who were saved by the righteous villagers of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, Sam made it his life’s passion to make the real the axiom “never again.”

He witnessed the reconciliation between France and Germany, the construction of Europe. He believed that there is no such thing as hereditary animosity, that the past does not have to be prologue. But he also believed that we have to remain eternally vigilant, because humanity’s striving for the best can sometimes be overcome by its capacity for the worst.

That’s the message he delivered to countries, to communities around the world, as well as to multiple French and American leaders that he had the opportunity to advise. It was his clarion call when he was made an a grand officier in 2012, underscoring the urgent need, as he put it at the time, “to alert future generations to the existential dangers that threaten to destroy their world as they once destroyed mine.”

When my mother joined Sam here, she threw herself into forging bonds between artists across the Atlantic, leading the American Center in Paris – driven, as she said, upon receiving the honor of commandeur in 2021 by, and I quote, “an unshakable belief in the power of art and culture to bring people together across countries, cultures, religions, races.”

Both dedicated themselves to causes that I’ve tried to carry forward over my decades in public service.

And both found, as I have, that our two nations were uniquely positioned to advance these causes because of the core principles we share, and our ongoing determination – never fully realized – to live up to them.

Our belief in liberty, in equality, in the human rights of all people – the rights of individuals and nations to choose their own path, to forge their own destiny.

Principles for which generations of French and American men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice.

Like the heroes I met earlier this year – alongside you, Mr. President, and President Biden – at the 80th anniversary of D-Day. People like Ben Miller, who was just 19 years old when – on June the 6th, 1944 – he and over a dozen other medics climbed aboard a canvas-covered glider and took off across the English Channel. As they descended, the pilot had to weave between giant telephone poles that the Nazis had planted along the coast. The poles shredded the wings of the glider, but they survived the landing, they clambered out onto Normandy’s beaches. And as Ben later recounted, “I lost my fear after that…because we had too many things to do.” With bombs and bullets raining down, he and other medics dragged wounded soldiers to safety and treated their injuries, saving countless lives.

This coming Tuesday, Ben will be 100 years old.

Our nations’ shared trajectory has been shaped by the extraordinary contributions of individuals like him and the others that you’ve recognized so beautifully, with such dignity, with such elegance, in Normandy, most of whose names and stories we’ll never know.

French and American citizens who led our nations not only in the struggle to defeat tyranny, but also to cure deadly disease, to root out entrenched injustice, to preserve this majestic planet, and so many other endeavors that have improved the lives of our people and people everywhere.

That history impresses on us a special responsibility not merely to preserve the relationship that we inherited, but to build on it, to make it ever stronger.

Especially in this moment, as our republics are being challenged both from inside by growing polarization, a declining faith in democratic institutions; and from the outside by adversaries who are bent on tearing down the system of rules and rights that preceding generations have sacrificed so much to shape and uphold.

If we are to emerge stronger from this time – as we have so often in the past – the United States and France must continue to adapt, to learn from each other, to work together, to make each other better.

And of course, that’s not just the job of our governments.

As one of the most astute observers of early America, Alexis de Tocqueville, observed, “The health of a democratic society may be measured by the quality of functions performed by private citizens.”

So as I prepare my own transition to private life in the days ahead, I’m reminded that the project of maintaining our democracies is and always will be primarily the duty of our citizens.

In that sacred role – and for the rest of my time – I hope to prove worthy of the honor that you’ve given me today.

So, aux armes, citoyens. (Laughter.) Marchons, marchon ensemble.

Vive la France. May God bless America. (Applause.)





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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs France Office of the Spokesperson Official International Travel The Secretary of State


United States Announces Significant Military Assistance for Ukraine
01/09/2025
United States Announces Significant Military Assistance for Ukraine
01/09/2025 07:36 AM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

As part of our continued surge in security assistance that President Biden announced on September 26, the United States is providing another significant package of urgently needed weapons and equipment to our Ukrainian partners as they defend against Russia’s war of aggression.

This additional assistance, provided under previous drawdowns from Department of Defense stocks, is valued at $500 million. It includes: AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles for air defense; air-to-ground munitions; support equipment for F-16s; armored bridging systems; secure communications equipment; small arms and ammunition; and spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation.

The United States and more than 50 nations stand united to ensure Ukraine has the capabilities it needs to defend itself against Russia’s aggression.




Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Transatlantic Quint Foreign Ministers
01/09/2025



Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Transatlantic Quint Foreign Ministers
01/09/2025 05:44 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary Blinken met today with Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas, French Middle East and North Africa Director Anne Grillo, and German Political Director Günter Sautter. The group discussed the situation in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime and ways to help the Syrian people seize this opportunity to build a better future. They reiterated the need for all groups in Syria to respect human rights, uphold international humanitarian law, ensure Syria does not pose a threat to its neighbors or serve as a base for terrorism, and take all precautions to protect civilians, including members of minority groups. The ministers also exchanged views on the implementation of the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, stressing the urgency of continued support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. They further discussed the need to bring an end to the war in Gaza, return all hostages, and increase humanitarian assistance.




Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025
Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025 11:02 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector
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Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector


Fact Sheet





January 10, 2025



Today, the United States is sanctioning major targets in Russia’s energy sector, the primary source of revenue fueling Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Department of State is imposing sanctions on nearly 80 individuals and entities. Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is designating more than 150 individuals and entities and individuals and identifying 183 vessels as blocked property. Treasury provides more information in its actions, please see press release.


The Department of State’s designations aim to reduce Russia’s oil and natural gas revenue through sanctions on operators of significant Russian crude oil production and liquified natural gas projects. We are designating the chief executive officer and members of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom’s (Rosatom).


All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, as amended, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.


The United States will continue to use all tools at its disposal to disrupt support for Russia’s military-industrial base and curtail the Kremlin’s ability to exploit the international financial system and generate revenue in furtherance of its war against Ukraine. We continue to stand in solidarity with Ukrainians in defending their homeland from Russia’s aggression.
Rosatom Board Of Directors And Senior Officials


Today, the Department is designating senior officials of Rosatom, including Chief Executive Officer Alexey Likhachev and members of Rosatom’s Management Board. This is the eleventh Russia sanctions action that includes Rosatom-related designations. Senior Rosatom officials have publicly stated that Rosatom enterprises are developing weapons systems, including for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Rosatom subsidiaries have provided the Russian defense industry with military-applicable armaments, components, and advanced technologies to further Russia’s war against Ukraine.


The individuals designated today enable Rosatom’s involvement in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, nuclear power plant construction exports, development of advanced technologies and materials, non-uranium extractive industries and associated businesses, and malign activities including the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.


Additionally, since the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States has previously designated important members of Rosatom’s Supervisory Board pursuant to E.O. 14024 in relation to other (non-Rosatom) roles they held. These previous designations included chairman of the Supervisory Board Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko and Supervisory Board members Denis Valentinovich Manturov, Larisa Igorevna Brycheva, Sergey Borisovich Korolev, Aleksandr Valentinovich Novak, Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev, and Maxim Stanislavovich Oreshkin.


Today’s actions bring the total number of Rosatom-related designations by the United States to nearly 70 subsidiaries and related individuals. They also serve to align our actions with past designations of Rosatom board members by the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. These designations are consistent with G7 commitments to reduce Russian nuclear energy supplies and services.


The Department is designating the following individuals pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(A) of E.O. 14024, for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation:
ALEXEY EVGENYEVICH LIKHACHEV, the Chief Executive Officer of Rosatom and a member of Rosatom’s Supervisory and Management Boards.
NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH SPASSKIY, Deputy Director General for International Relations and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
KIRILL BORISOVICH KOMAROV, First Deputy Director General for Development and International Business and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ALEXANDER MARKOVICH LOKSHIN, First Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
SERGEI GENNADYEVICH NOVIKOV, Deputy Director General for Execution of State Powers and Budgeting and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
KONSTANTIN IVANOVICH DENISOV, Deputy Director General for Security and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
OLEG VASILYEVICH KRYUKOV, Director for Public Policy on Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Decommissioning and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH NIKIPELOV, Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions of Rosatom and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
YURI VLADIMIROVICH YAKOVLEV, Deputy Director General for the State Safety Policy in the Defense Uses of Atomic Energy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
SERGEI ALEKSANDROVICH OBOZOV, Deputy Director General for Development of Rosatom’s Production System and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
YURII ALEKSANDROVICH OLENIN, Deputy Director General for Science and Strategy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ANDREI YUVENALYEVICH PETROV, Director General of Rosenergoatom and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ILYA VASILYEVICH REBROV, Deputy Director General for Economy and Finance and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
VYACHESLAV VLADIMIROVICH RUKSHA, Deputy Director General for the Northern Sea Route Directorate and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
Targeting Russia’s Energy Revenues


Today, the Department is designating entities engaged in the active production and export of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Russia; the provision of material support to LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ARCTIC LNG 2 (LLC ARCTIC LNG 2); the circumvention of U.S. sanctions on U.S.-designated JOINT STOCK COMPANY SOVCOMFLOT (SOVCOMFLOT); and attempts to expand Russia’s oil production capacity. These designations aim to significantly limit Russia’s ability to generate revenue from its energy resources.
Active Russian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Projects


The Department is designating two currently producing Russian LNG export terminals to directly disrupt Russia’s ability to produce and export LNG and reduce Russia’s revenue from LNG exports.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy:
GAZPROM SPG PORTOVAYA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is the Russia-based operator of the Portovaya LNG terminal.
CRYOGAS VYSOTSK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is the Russia-based operator of the Cryogas Vysotsk LNG terminal.
Vostok Oil Project


The Department is designating the operator of the Vostok Oil project, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VOSTOK OIL (VOSTOK OIL), and one of its subsidiaries. The Vostok Oil project is a major Russian oil development project from which Russia hopes to export upwards of 2 million barrels of oil per day. Today’s actions are intended to slow down or halt further construction of the Vostok Oil project and limit the project’s ability to market and export crude oil and petroleum products in the future.


VOSTOK OIL is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy.


LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TAGULSKOE (TAGULSKOE) is a Russia-based subsidiary of VOSTOK OIL that is primarily engaged in oil production and extraction. TAGULSKOE is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.
SOVCOMFLOT-Related Sanctions Evasion


The Department continues to designate entities providing material support to U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT so as to reduce Russia’s ability to export oil. Today, the Department is designating a PRC-based crude oil terminal operator, together with a PRC-based subsidiary, and a Kazakhstan-based ship management company for their support to the crude oil tanker NS BURGAS (IMO 9411020), a U.S.-blocked SOVCOMFLOT vessel.


SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION CO LTD (SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY) is a PRC-based oil terminal operator that facilitated port calls and discharges in September and December 2024 of a U.S.-blocked Russian crude oil tanker, NS BURGAS IMO 9411020, a vessel in which U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT has an interest. SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of SOVCOMFLOT.


GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY PIPELINE CONVEYOR CO LTD (GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY) is a PRC-based subsidiary of SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY that provides storage services. GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY.


UMBRA NAVI SHIPMANAGEMENT CORP (UMBRA) is a Kazakhstan-based ship management company that is the manager and operator of OXIS (IMO 9224805), a crude oil tanker that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of Russian-origin Urals crude oil with U.S.-blocked crude oil tanker NS BURGAS, a vessel in which U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT has an interest. UMBRA is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of SOVCOMFLOT. OXIS is being identified as property in which UMBRA has an interest.
Entities Supporting the U.S.-Sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 Project


To maintain pressure on Russia’s U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project, the Department of State is designating several PRC-based entities including a fabrication yard and a vessel operator involved in the construction and transportation of power generation modules for the Arctic LNG 2 project. The Department is also designating new ship management entities Russia is using to obfuscate the ownership of LNG carriers involved in Russia’s attempts to export cargo from the project.


ZHOUSHAN WISON OFFSHORE AND MARINE CO LTD (ZHOUSHAN WISON) has built and supplied power generation modules for LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. ZHOUSHAN WISON constructed four specialized modules similar to those previously delivered to the Arctic LNG 2 project by U.S-designated RED BOX ENERGY SERVICES PTE LTD. After ZHOUSHAN WISON allowed the modules to be shipped from and depart their facility, the modules were transshipped in intermediary ports in China and transferred between a series of vessels, including U.S.-blocked HUNTER STAR (IMO 9830769) and NAN FENG ZHI XING (IMO 9934498), some of which took actions to conceal their identity and location. The modules constructed by and shipped from the ZHOUSHAN WISON facility were ultimately offloaded at the Arctic LNG 2 project.


ZHOUSHAN WISON is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


HONGKONG YAQING SHIPPING CO LIMITED (HONGKONG YAQING) is the operator of OCEAN 28 (IMO 1021570), a vessel that transported power generation modules originating from ZHOUSHAN WISON to the Arctic LNG 2 project. HONGKONG YAQING is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. OCEAN 28 is being identified as property in which HONGKONG YAQING has an interest.


In an attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions on, and revitalize, Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, Russia has engaged in efforts to obfuscate LNG carriers’ ownership through third country ship management entities. The Department is designating two ship management companies, which manage two LNG carriers that loaded cargo from the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.


SKYHART MANAGEMENT SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED (SKYHART) is an India-based entity that became the operator of U.S.-designated LNG carrier MULAN (IMO 9864837) shortly before it loaded LNG from U.S.-designated LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


AVISION SHIPPING SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED (AVISION) is an India-based entity that became the operator of U.S.-designated LNG carrier NEW ENERGY (IMO 9324277) shortly before it loaded LNG from U.S.-designated LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. SKYHART and AVISION are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


The following vessels are managed by AVISION and are being identified as property in which AVISION has an interest:
PRAVASI (IMO 9409467)
ONYX (IMO 9236640)


The Department is also designating eight subsidiaries of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD, a PRC-based company established in August 2023 involved in the implementation of a marketing program for LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD:
XUANWU WENQU SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU LUCUN SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANYUE SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TRADING SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU ZUOFU SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU YOUBI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANKUI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANJI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based direct subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
Oilfield Service Providers


The Department is also designating multiple Russia-based entities providing oil and gas field services specializing in oil exploration, drilling and engineering work, and technological and hardware modernization.


LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEFTSERVICEHOLDING (LLC NSKH) and its seven subsidiaries are part of a network of Russia’s oil and gas service providers engaged in modernizing and advancing the capabilities of Russian oil and gas projects. LLC NSKH is a Russia-based entity that operates a large network of oil field service providers and engineering firms in the Perm region of Russia. LLC NSKH is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LLC NSKH. They are all subsidiaries of LLC NSKH:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PERMNEFTEOTDACHA is engaged in the construction of oil and gas wells, including intelligent drilling, and digital monitoring of equipment.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PERM ENGINEERING TECHNICAL CENTER GEOFIZIKA is engaged in geological exploration, geophysical and geochemical work in the field of subsoil study and reproduction of the mineral resource base.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TECHNICAL SERVICE CENTER is providing service for oilfield equipment, pipeline systems, and power facilities, including diagnostics, industrial safety assessments, major repairs, construction and metrological support.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FLEK is engaged in production of a wide range of chemical reagents used in the extraction, preparation and transportation of oil.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEFTGAZISSLEDOVANIYE is engaged in digital transformation of oil and gas enterprises, individual production processes, and development of digital technological solutions at the stages of exploration, drilling and production.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NSKH AZIYA DRILLING is a Russia-based drilling and engineering entity within the LLC NSKH network involved in construction of oil and gas wells.
FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ALL RUSSIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF OIL GEOLOGY is a Russia-based engineering institute specializing in exploratory drilling for hydrocarbons.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAYAVOZHNEFTEGAZ is the operator of a mid-sized oil and gas field development project in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INZHINIRINGOVIY TSENTR AVTONOMNAYA ENERGETIKA is the Russia-based entity that is the general designer for Arctic Station Snezhinka based in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RIGINTEL is a Russia-based engineering software entity within the LLC NSKH network.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KAPRON is a Russia-based petrochemical entity that holds a large share of the Russian petrochemical market as of result of the acquisition of facilities left behind by European companies in 2022.


The Department is also designating a range of other Russian oilfield service providers and energy-related entities.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
PETROENGINEERING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is a Russia-based oil field services provider and vendor of parts required for engineering works in the oil and gas industry.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PLANT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PROPELLER STEERING COLUMNS SAPPHIRE is a Russia-based entity involved in manufacturing unique thrusters and propeller steering columns for ice-class, large-tonnage, and multi-functional vessels, including Russian ARC7 model LNG carriers.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY LISKINSKII ZAVOD MONTAZHNYKH ZAGOTOVOK is a Russia-based entity that is one of the main manufacturers and suppliers of pipeline parts in Russia and has contributed to the construction of Russia’s largest pipeline projects, including Nord Stream 2, Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO), and Vostok Oil.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:
NONCOMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION REGIONAL INNOVATION INVESTMENT FUND YAMAL is a Russia-based entity that provides financial investments for the implementation of new technologies within the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT (GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT) is a Russia-based entity that constructs oil and gas extraction projects. GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT is currently developing the gas portions of the Chona project in East Siberia.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAZPROMNEFT ANGARA is a Russia-based entity engaged in operating oil and gas fields and also holds the mining rights for the Chona project, which is located in East Siberia.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RUSGAZBURENIE is a Russia-based entity that develops and constructs oil and gas wells as well as conducts multi-stage hydraulic fracturing.
Russia’s Metals and Mining Industry


The Department continues to designate entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining industry to further constrain Russia’s revenue generation capacity. Today, the Department is designating entities within the network of two of the largest coal producers in Russia. Additionally, the Department is targeting Russia’s military-industrial base by designating critical importers of raw materials, including chromium, a key component in the production of artillery used in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
JOINT STOCK COMPANY UGOLNAYA KOMPANIYA KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL (KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL) is a vertically integrated Russia-based coal entity and is considered one of the leaders in Russian coal mining.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL VZRYVPROM (VZRYVPROM) is a Russia-based entity that provides explosives for blasting operations at the open-pit coal mines of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SKIF is a Russia-based subsidiary of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.
KRU OVERSEAS LIMITED is a Cyprus-based subsidiary of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, VZRYVPROM:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TPK SIB is a Russia-based subsidiary of VZRYVPROM.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TALDINSKOYE POGRUZOCHNO TRANSPORTNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (TALDINSKOYE) is a Russia-based entity engaged in rail transport of freight in the KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL network.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY KISELEVSKOYE POGRUZOCHNO TRANSPORTNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (KISELEVSKOYE) is a Russia-based entity engaged in rail transport of freight in the KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL network.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RMK is a Russia-based entity that manufactures refractory products and is one of the country’s largest importers of chromium.
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY VOLZHSKY ABRASIVE WORKS is a Russia-based entity that produces silicon carbide used in the manufacture of abrasive products.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MAGNEZIT HOLDING is a Russia-based entity that serves as the holding company for a collection of several manufacturing and service entities that comprise one of Russia’s largest manufacturers of refractory products.
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF REFRACTORIES KOMBINAT MAGNEZIT is a Russia-based entity that is involved in the manufacture of refractory materials.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GRUPPA MAGNEZIT is a Russia-based entity that manufactures refractory products.
CLOSED JOINT STOCK COMPANY ORDER OF THE RED BANNER OF LABOR AND FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES PERVOURALSKIY SILICA PLANT NAMED AFTER EFIMA MOISEYEVICHA GRISHPUNA is a Russia-based entity and one of Russia’s largest manufacturers of refractory products and bauxite importers, a critical input in the production of refractory products for the metallurgical industry.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SEA COMMERCIAL PORT LAVNA is a Russia-based entity building the Lavna coal terminal located in Murmansk, Russia.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MORSKOI PORT SUKHODOL (SUKHODOL SEAPORT) is a Russia-based coal terminal operator located in the Far East of Russia and is planning to expand the port to include the construction of an LNG terminal.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY POLAR LITHIUM is a Russia-based entity that owns the rights to develop Russia’s largest lithium mine, with the intention of becoming the first domestic producer of lithium-bearing raw materials in Russia.
JSC RUSSIAN COAL (RUSSIAN COAL) is a Russia-based coal mining entity that controls several coal mines and is one of Russia’s largest coal companies.
AMURUGOL AO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
KRASNOYARSKKRAIUGOL AO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ KIRBINSKI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ SAYANO PARTIZANSKI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ STEPNOI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MINING AND COAL PREPARATION COMPLEX INAGLINSKIY is a Russia-based coal mining and preparation complex that is developing the reserves of the Chulmakan stone coal deposit.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MINING AND COAL PREPARATION COMPLEX DENISOVSKIY (DENISOVSKIY) is a Russia-based coal mining entity.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, DENISOVSKIY:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY REMONTNO PROIZVODSTVENNAYA BAZA KOLMAR is a Russia-based subsidiary of DENISOVSKIY.
Sanctions Implications


As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.


All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.


The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.


Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.



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Bureau of Energy Resources Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Energy Office of the Spokesperson Russia Sanctions Ukraine


Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025
Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025 11:02 AM EST



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Sanctions to Degrade Russia’s Energy Sector


Fact Sheet





January 10, 2025



Today, the United States is sanctioning major targets in Russia’s energy sector, the primary source of revenue fueling Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Department of State is imposing sanctions on nearly 80 individuals and entities. Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is designating more than 150 individuals and entities and individuals and identifying 183 vessels as blocked property. Treasury provides more information in its actions, please see press release.


The Department of State’s designations aim to reduce Russia’s oil and natural gas revenue through sanctions on operators of significant Russian crude oil production and liquified natural gas projects. We are designating the chief executive officer and members of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom’s (Rosatom).


All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, as amended, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.


The United States will continue to use all tools at its disposal to disrupt support for Russia’s military-industrial base and curtail the Kremlin’s ability to exploit the international financial system and generate revenue in furtherance of its war against Ukraine. We continue to stand in solidarity with Ukrainians in defending their homeland from Russia’s aggression.
Rosatom Board Of Directors And Senior Officials


Today, the Department is designating senior officials of Rosatom, including Chief Executive Officer Alexey Likhachev and members of Rosatom’s Management Board. This is the eleventh Russia sanctions action that includes Rosatom-related designations. Senior Rosatom officials have publicly stated that Rosatom enterprises are developing weapons systems, including for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Rosatom subsidiaries have provided the Russian defense industry with military-applicable armaments, components, and advanced technologies to further Russia’s war against Ukraine.


The individuals designated today enable Rosatom’s involvement in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, nuclear power plant construction exports, development of advanced technologies and materials, non-uranium extractive industries and associated businesses, and malign activities including the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.


Additionally, since the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United States has previously designated important members of Rosatom’s Supervisory Board pursuant to E.O. 14024 in relation to other (non-Rosatom) roles they held. These previous designations included chairman of the Supervisory Board Sergei Vladilenovich Kiriyenko and Supervisory Board members Denis Valentinovich Manturov, Larisa Igorevna Brycheva, Sergey Borisovich Korolev, Aleksandr Valentinovich Novak, Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev, and Maxim Stanislavovich Oreshkin.


Today’s actions bring the total number of Rosatom-related designations by the United States to nearly 70 subsidiaries and related individuals. They also serve to align our actions with past designations of Rosatom board members by the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. These designations are consistent with G7 commitments to reduce Russian nuclear energy supplies and services.


The Department is designating the following individuals pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(A) of E.O. 14024, for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation:
ALEXEY EVGENYEVICH LIKHACHEV, the Chief Executive Officer of Rosatom and a member of Rosatom’s Supervisory and Management Boards.
NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH SPASSKIY, Deputy Director General for International Relations and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
KIRILL BORISOVICH KOMAROV, First Deputy Director General for Development and International Business and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ALEXANDER MARKOVICH LOKSHIN, First Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
SERGEI GENNADYEVICH NOVIKOV, Deputy Director General for Execution of State Powers and Budgeting and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
KONSTANTIN IVANOVICH DENISOV, Deputy Director General for Security and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
OLEG VASILYEVICH KRYUKOV, Director for Public Policy on Radioactive Waste, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Decommissioning and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH NIKIPELOV, Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions of Rosatom and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
YURI VLADIMIROVICH YAKOVLEV, Deputy Director General for the State Safety Policy in the Defense Uses of Atomic Energy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
SERGEI ALEKSANDROVICH OBOZOV, Deputy Director General for Development of Rosatom’s Production System and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
YURII ALEKSANDROVICH OLENIN, Deputy Director General for Science and Strategy and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ANDREI YUVENALYEVICH PETROV, Director General of Rosenergoatom and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
ILYA VASILYEVICH REBROV, Deputy Director General for Economy and Finance and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
VYACHESLAV VLADIMIROVICH RUKSHA, Deputy Director General for the Northern Sea Route Directorate and a member of Rosatom’s Management Board.
Targeting Russia’s Energy Revenues


Today, the Department is designating entities engaged in the active production and export of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Russia; the provision of material support to LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ARCTIC LNG 2 (LLC ARCTIC LNG 2); the circumvention of U.S. sanctions on U.S.-designated JOINT STOCK COMPANY SOVCOMFLOT (SOVCOMFLOT); and attempts to expand Russia’s oil production capacity. These designations aim to significantly limit Russia’s ability to generate revenue from its energy resources.
Active Russian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Projects


The Department is designating two currently producing Russian LNG export terminals to directly disrupt Russia’s ability to produce and export LNG and reduce Russia’s revenue from LNG exports.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy:
GAZPROM SPG PORTOVAYA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is the Russia-based operator of the Portovaya LNG terminal.
CRYOGAS VYSOTSK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is the Russia-based operator of the Cryogas Vysotsk LNG terminal.
Vostok Oil Project


The Department is designating the operator of the Vostok Oil project, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VOSTOK OIL (VOSTOK OIL), and one of its subsidiaries. The Vostok Oil project is a major Russian oil development project from which Russia hopes to export upwards of 2 million barrels of oil per day. Today’s actions are intended to slow down or halt further construction of the Vostok Oil project and limit the project’s ability to market and export crude oil and petroleum products in the future.


VOSTOK OIL is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy.


LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TAGULSKOE (TAGULSKOE) is a Russia-based subsidiary of VOSTOK OIL that is primarily engaged in oil production and extraction. TAGULSKOE is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.
SOVCOMFLOT-Related Sanctions Evasion


The Department continues to designate entities providing material support to U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT so as to reduce Russia’s ability to export oil. Today, the Department is designating a PRC-based crude oil terminal operator, together with a PRC-based subsidiary, and a Kazakhstan-based ship management company for their support to the crude oil tanker NS BURGAS (IMO 9411020), a U.S.-blocked SOVCOMFLOT vessel.


SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION CO LTD (SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY) is a PRC-based oil terminal operator that facilitated port calls and discharges in September and December 2024 of a U.S.-blocked Russian crude oil tanker, NS BURGAS IMO 9411020, a vessel in which U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT has an interest. SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of SOVCOMFLOT.


GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY PIPELINE CONVEYOR CO LTD (GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY) is a PRC-based subsidiary of SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY that provides storage services. GUANGRAO LIANHE ENERGY is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SHANDONG UNITED ENERGY.


UMBRA NAVI SHIPMANAGEMENT CORP (UMBRA) is a Kazakhstan-based ship management company that is the manager and operator of OXIS (IMO 9224805), a crude oil tanker that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of Russian-origin Urals crude oil with U.S.-blocked crude oil tanker NS BURGAS, a vessel in which U.S.-designated SOVCOMFLOT has an interest. UMBRA is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of SOVCOMFLOT. OXIS is being identified as property in which UMBRA has an interest.
Entities Supporting the U.S.-Sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 Project


To maintain pressure on Russia’s U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project, the Department of State is designating several PRC-based entities including a fabrication yard and a vessel operator involved in the construction and transportation of power generation modules for the Arctic LNG 2 project. The Department is also designating new ship management entities Russia is using to obfuscate the ownership of LNG carriers involved in Russia’s attempts to export cargo from the project.


ZHOUSHAN WISON OFFSHORE AND MARINE CO LTD (ZHOUSHAN WISON) has built and supplied power generation modules for LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. ZHOUSHAN WISON constructed four specialized modules similar to those previously delivered to the Arctic LNG 2 project by U.S-designated RED BOX ENERGY SERVICES PTE LTD. After ZHOUSHAN WISON allowed the modules to be shipped from and depart their facility, the modules were transshipped in intermediary ports in China and transferred between a series of vessels, including U.S.-blocked HUNTER STAR (IMO 9830769) and NAN FENG ZHI XING (IMO 9934498), some of which took actions to conceal their identity and location. The modules constructed by and shipped from the ZHOUSHAN WISON facility were ultimately offloaded at the Arctic LNG 2 project.


ZHOUSHAN WISON is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


HONGKONG YAQING SHIPPING CO LIMITED (HONGKONG YAQING) is the operator of OCEAN 28 (IMO 1021570), a vessel that transported power generation modules originating from ZHOUSHAN WISON to the Arctic LNG 2 project. HONGKONG YAQING is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. OCEAN 28 is being identified as property in which HONGKONG YAQING has an interest.


In an attempt to circumvent U.S. sanctions on, and revitalize, Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, Russia has engaged in efforts to obfuscate LNG carriers’ ownership through third country ship management entities. The Department is designating two ship management companies, which manage two LNG carriers that loaded cargo from the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.


SKYHART MANAGEMENT SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED (SKYHART) is an India-based entity that became the operator of U.S.-designated LNG carrier MULAN (IMO 9864837) shortly before it loaded LNG from U.S.-designated LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


AVISION SHIPPING SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED (AVISION) is an India-based entity that became the operator of U.S.-designated LNG carrier NEW ENERGY (IMO 9324277) shortly before it loaded LNG from U.S.-designated LLC ARCTIC LNG 2. SKYHART and AVISION are being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LLC ARCTIC LNG 2.


The following vessels are managed by AVISION and are being identified as property in which AVISION has an interest:
PRAVASI (IMO 9409467)
ONYX (IMO 9236640)


The Department is also designating eight subsidiaries of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD, a PRC-based company established in August 2023 involved in the implementation of a marketing program for LNG from the Arctic LNG 2 project.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD:
XUANWU WENQU SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU LUCUN SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANYUE SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TRADING SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU ZUOFU SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU YOUBI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANKUI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
XUANWU TIANJI SEA FREIGHT SHANGHAI CO LTD is a PRC-based direct subsidiary of U.S.-designated NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD.
Oilfield Service Providers


The Department is also designating multiple Russia-based entities providing oil and gas field services specializing in oil exploration, drilling and engineering work, and technological and hardware modernization.


LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEFTSERVICEHOLDING (LLC NSKH) and its seven subsidiaries are part of a network of Russia’s oil and gas service providers engaged in modernizing and advancing the capabilities of Russian oil and gas projects. LLC NSKH is a Russia-based entity that operates a large network of oil field service providers and engineering firms in the Perm region of Russia. LLC NSKH is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LLC NSKH. They are all subsidiaries of LLC NSKH:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PERMNEFTEOTDACHA is engaged in the construction of oil and gas wells, including intelligent drilling, and digital monitoring of equipment.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PERM ENGINEERING TECHNICAL CENTER GEOFIZIKA is engaged in geological exploration, geophysical and geochemical work in the field of subsoil study and reproduction of the mineral resource base.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TECHNICAL SERVICE CENTER is providing service for oilfield equipment, pipeline systems, and power facilities, including diagnostics, industrial safety assessments, major repairs, construction and metrological support.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FLEK is engaged in production of a wide range of chemical reagents used in the extraction, preparation and transportation of oil.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEFTGAZISSLEDOVANIYE is engaged in digital transformation of oil and gas enterprises, individual production processes, and development of digital technological solutions at the stages of exploration, drilling and production.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the engineering sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NSKH AZIYA DRILLING is a Russia-based drilling and engineering entity within the LLC NSKH network involved in construction of oil and gas wells.
FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ALL RUSSIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF OIL GEOLOGY is a Russia-based engineering institute specializing in exploratory drilling for hydrocarbons.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAYAVOZHNEFTEGAZ is the operator of a mid-sized oil and gas field development project in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INZHINIRINGOVIY TSENTR AVTONOMNAYA ENERGETIKA is the Russia-based entity that is the general designer for Arctic Station Snezhinka based in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RIGINTEL is a Russia-based engineering software entity within the LLC NSKH network.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KAPRON is a Russia-based petrochemical entity that holds a large share of the Russian petrochemical market as of result of the acquisition of facilities left behind by European companies in 2022.


The Department is also designating a range of other Russian oilfield service providers and energy-related entities.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
PETROENGINEERING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY is a Russia-based oil field services provider and vendor of parts required for engineering works in the oil and gas industry.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PLANT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PROPELLER STEERING COLUMNS SAPPHIRE is a Russia-based entity involved in manufacturing unique thrusters and propeller steering columns for ice-class, large-tonnage, and multi-functional vessels, including Russian ARC7 model LNG carriers.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY LISKINSKII ZAVOD MONTAZHNYKH ZAGOTOVOK is a Russia-based entity that is one of the main manufacturers and suppliers of pipeline parts in Russia and has contributed to the construction of Russia’s largest pipeline projects, including Nord Stream 2, Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO), and Vostok Oil.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:
NONCOMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION REGIONAL INNOVATION INVESTMENT FUND YAMAL is a Russia-based entity that provides financial investments for the implementation of new technologies within the Yamal-Nenets autonomous region in the Russian Federation.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT (GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT) is a Russia-based entity that constructs oil and gas extraction projects. GAZPROMNEFT DEVELOPMENT is currently developing the gas portions of the Chona project in East Siberia.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAZPROMNEFT ANGARA is a Russia-based entity engaged in operating oil and gas fields and also holds the mining rights for the Chona project, which is located in East Siberia.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RUSGAZBURENIE is a Russia-based entity that develops and constructs oil and gas wells as well as conducts multi-stage hydraulic fracturing.
Russia’s Metals and Mining Industry


The Department continues to designate entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining industry to further constrain Russia’s revenue generation capacity. Today, the Department is designating entities within the network of two of the largest coal producers in Russia. Additionally, the Department is targeting Russia’s military-industrial base by designating critical importers of raw materials, including chromium, a key component in the production of artillery used in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
JOINT STOCK COMPANY UGOLNAYA KOMPANIYA KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL (KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL) is a vertically integrated Russia-based coal entity and is considered one of the leaders in Russian coal mining.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL VZRYVPROM (VZRYVPROM) is a Russia-based entity that provides explosives for blasting operations at the open-pit coal mines of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SKIF is a Russia-based subsidiary of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.
KRU OVERSEAS LIMITED is a Cyprus-based subsidiary of KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, VZRYVPROM:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TPK SIB is a Russia-based subsidiary of VZRYVPROM.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TALDINSKOYE POGRUZOCHNO TRANSPORTNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (TALDINSKOYE) is a Russia-based entity engaged in rail transport of freight in the KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL network.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY KISELEVSKOYE POGRUZOCHNO TRANSPORTNOYE UPRAVLENIYE (KISELEVSKOYE) is a Russia-based entity engaged in rail transport of freight in the KUZBASSRAZREZUGOL network.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RMK is a Russia-based entity that manufactures refractory products and is one of the country’s largest importers of chromium.
OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY VOLZHSKY ABRASIVE WORKS is a Russia-based entity that produces silicon carbide used in the manufacture of abrasive products.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MAGNEZIT HOLDING is a Russia-based entity that serves as the holding company for a collection of several manufacturing and service entities that comprise one of Russia’s largest manufacturers of refractory products.
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF REFRACTORIES KOMBINAT MAGNEZIT is a Russia-based entity that is involved in the manufacture of refractory materials.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GRUPPA MAGNEZIT is a Russia-based entity that manufactures refractory products.
CLOSED JOINT STOCK COMPANY ORDER OF THE RED BANNER OF LABOR AND FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES PERVOURALSKIY SILICA PLANT NAMED AFTER EFIMA MOISEYEVICHA GRISHPUNA is a Russia-based entity and one of Russia’s largest manufacturers of refractory products and bauxite importers, a critical input in the production of refractory products for the metallurgical industry.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SEA COMMERCIAL PORT LAVNA is a Russia-based entity building the Lavna coal terminal located in Murmansk, Russia.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MORSKOI PORT SUKHODOL (SUKHODOL SEAPORT) is a Russia-based coal terminal operator located in the Far East of Russia and is planning to expand the port to include the construction of an LNG terminal.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY POLAR LITHIUM is a Russia-based entity that owns the rights to develop Russia’s largest lithium mine, with the intention of becoming the first domestic producer of lithium-bearing raw materials in Russia.
JSC RUSSIAN COAL (RUSSIAN COAL) is a Russia-based coal mining entity that controls several coal mines and is one of Russia’s largest coal companies.
AMURUGOL AO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
KRASNOYARSKKRAIUGOL AO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ KIRBINSKI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ SAYANO PARTIZANSKI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
RAZREZ STEPNOI OOO is a Russia-based coal mining entity within the RUSSIAN COAL network.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MINING AND COAL PREPARATION COMPLEX INAGLINSKIY is a Russia-based coal mining and preparation complex that is developing the reserves of the Chulmakan stone coal deposit.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MINING AND COAL PREPARATION COMPLEX DENISOVSKIY (DENISOVSKIY) is a Russia-based coal mining entity.


Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, DENISOVSKIY:
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY REMONTNO PROIZVODSTVENNAYA BAZA KOLMAR is a Russia-based subsidiary of DENISOVSKIY.
Sanctions Implications


As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.


All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.


The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.


Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.



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Bureau of Energy Resources Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Energy Office of the Spokesperson Russia Sanctions Ukraine


Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025
Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025 11:12 AM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
hide

Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector


Press Statement





January 10, 2025



The United States is imposing sanctions today on more than 200 entities and individuals involved in Russia’s energy sector and identifying more than 180 vessels as blocked property. This wide-ranging, robust action will further constrain revenues from Russia’ energy resources and degrades Putin’s ability to fund his illegal war against Ukraine.


Of these targets, the Department of State is sanctioning nearly 80 entities and individuals, including those engaged in the active production and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia. Others include those attempting to expand Russia’s oil production capacity; those providing support to the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project; those involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector; and senior officials of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom.


The Department of the Treasury is concurrently sanctioning more than 150 entities and individuals, including major Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, Russian insurance companies, and shadow fleet vessels. Treasury is also identifying the energy sector of the Russian Federation, which restricts further Putin’s ability to generate revenue and fund Russia’s malign conduct. Treasury also issued a new determination prohibiting the provision of certain services to persons in the Russian Federation, thereby cutting off Russia’s access to U.S. services related to the extraction and production of crude oil and other petroleum products.


The United Kingdom joins us today in targeting the Russian energy sector as we continue to use all available tools together with G7 and other likeminded partners to curb Russia’s ability to fund its illegal war against Ukraine. We stand in solidarity with Ukrainians in defending their homeland from Russia’s aggression.


The Department of State actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, and the Department of the Treasury sanctions actions were taken pursuant to E.O. 14024, E.O. 13662, and E.O. 14071. For more information on today’s actions, please see the Department of State’s fact sheet and the Department of the Treasury’s press release.



Tags
Bureau of Energy Resources Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Energy Energy Office of the Spokesperson Russia Sanctions The Secretary of State Ukraine


Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025

Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
01/10/2025 11:12 AM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector
hide

Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector


Press Statement





January 10, 2025



The United States is imposing sanctions today on more than 200 entities and individuals involved in Russia’s energy sector and identifying more than 180 vessels as blocked property. This wide-ranging, robust action will further constrain revenues from Russia’ energy resources and degrades Putin’s ability to fund his illegal war against Ukraine.


Of these targets, the Department of State is sanctioning nearly 80 entities and individuals, including those engaged in the active production and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia. Others include those attempting to expand Russia’s oil production capacity; those providing support to the U.S.-sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project; those involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector; and senior officials of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom.


The Department of the Treasury is concurrently sanctioning more than 150 entities and individuals, including major Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, Russian insurance companies, and shadow fleet vessels. Treasury is also identifying the energy sector of the Russian Federation, which restricts further Putin’s ability to generate revenue and fund Russia’s malign conduct. Treasury also issued a new determination prohibiting the provision of certain services to persons in the Russian Federation, thereby cutting off Russia’s access to U.S. services related to the extraction and production of crude oil and other petroleum products.


The United Kingdom joins us today in targeting the Russian energy sector as we continue to use all available tools together with G7 and other likeminded partners to curb Russia’s ability to fund its illegal war against Ukraine. We stand in solidarity with Ukrainians in defending their homeland from Russia’s aggression.


The Department of State actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, and the Department of the Treasury sanctions actions were taken pursuant to E.O. 14024, E.O. 13662, and E.O. 14071. For more information on today’s actions, please see the Department of State’s fact sheet and the Department of the Treasury’s press release.



Tags
Bureau of Energy Resources Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Energy Energy Office of the Spokesperson Russia Sanctions The Secretary of State Ukraine


Online Press Briefing with Acting Under Secretary John Bass
01/10/2025
Online Press Briefing with Acting Under Secretary John Bass
01/10/2025 03:20 PM EST



John Bass, Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs

London Hub

MODERATOR: Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s London International Media Hub. I would like to welcome our participants dialing in from Türkiye, Syria, and around the world for this briefing with Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass on his travel to Ankara and consultations with the Turkish Government on Syria. We will have 30 minutes for this briefing, which is on the record.

We are pleased to offer this briefing with simultaneous interpretation into Arabic. We therefore ask everyone to keep this in mind and speak slowly.

We will have some opening remarks from our speaker and then he will take questions from participating journalists.

I will now turn it over to Under Secretary Bass for his opening remarks. Sir, the floor is yours.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: Thank you, Liz. Colleagues, good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever this may find you. I am concluding a one-and-a-half-day visit here in Ankara along with a number of colleagues from other parts of the U.S. Government who traveled with me for the latest set of discussions with interagency colleagues in the Turkish Government under the rubric of a Syria Working Group that we established last year between our two governments.

The principal focus of our visit has been to discuss the latest developments in Syria and ways we can work together, ways we can work with Syria’s other neighbors, and with our allies and partners in the Middle East and Europe to support the ongoing transition in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Our visit is part of a broader set of United States Government engagements with countries across the region and in Europe on ways we can work together to help the Syrian people seize this opportunity to build a better future.

The meetings here in Ankara, including this latest round this afternoon of our Syria Working Group, have been productive and constructive. And in these in-depth discussions we have focused on ways that, either together or in a complementary fashion, we can support a responsible transition in Syria that, over time, enables the Syrian Government to again take responsibility for and execute the functions of government and of governance that are normally provided by national governments but which for a number of reasons – notably the civil war in Syria in response to the atrocities and repression of the Assad regime – has for many years resulted in significant portions of Syria being outside of the control of the national government, and certainly of responsible national authorities.

An important element of those normal functions of governance that featured in our discussions today were responsibility for international borders, internationally recognized borders, and for internal security within the state. And in that regard, we discussed concrete steps that will need to be taken to ensure that this transition period does not result in the resurgence of Daesh or the resurgence of other foreign terrorist organizations that have been present inside Syria in a way that creates threats for the citizens of Syria, for Syria’s neighbors, or for any other country.

We’ve also discussed in depth a range of steps that the United States and other governments have taken to enable the interim authorities in Damascus to address the immediate needs of the Syrian people, including via support from other governments for things like salaries payments for the civilian administration at the national level, for donations of power or energy, and for some of the other measures that are required to stabilize the Syrian Government, to stabilize the economy, and to give the Syrian people hope that this transition will yield a better future for all of the citizens of the country.

So with that, I am happy to take your questions.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Under Secretary Bass. We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s call. Our first question is a pre-submitted question, and it comes from Serkan Demirtaş of Hurriyet Daily News in Türkiye. And Serkan asks: “What concrete proposals does the United States have to address Türkiye’s security concerns stemming from the YPG presence along its borders?”

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: Well, the first thing I would say is that the United States believes strongly that the situation in Syria – Syria itself should not pose a threat to any of Syria’s neighbors, to countries in the wider region, or to countries further afield, whether that’s in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere around the world. And my government is very mindful of the enormous challenges that the long-running civil war in Syria and the longstanding presence of Daesh in Syria created for Turkish society. And we greatly admire the generosity of the Turkish Government and the Turkish people in hosting over 3 million refugees for now well over a decade. And it’s in that spirit that we have been engaging today and earlier in discussions about how we can help work together to ensure that as this transition continues inside Syria, that it doesn’t just produce a better, safer environment inside Syria for all Syrians; it also addresses the security concerns of Türkiye, of Iraq, of Jordan, and of Syria’s other neighbors.

With regard to Türkiye, the presence of the YPG, and other foreign terrorist fighters in Syria has been a key focus of our discussion, and we have been very intently focused on working through ways in which we can ensure that the responsibility for security inside of Syria transitions back to the national government from the many armed groups that are present in different parts of Syria that have been in some respects providing local security for portions of Syria, and in ways that will over time strengthen the national government. So in that respect, it is very much a zero-sum equation in the sense that security should be provided by the national government for the national territory of the country.

What we’re working through in this visit and in coming days and weeks is how we can effect a responsible transition. And when I say “effect a transition,” how we can enable the right kind of transition between Syrians in the right kinds of conversations between some of these groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, to include the YPG elements in northeastern Syria, and the national government, so that that transition can occur responsibly, so that it contributes to strengthening national forces over time and rebuilding a military and a police service that responsibly fulfills its duties and obligations to the Syrian people. But to do that in a way that doesn’t create immediate risk, whether it’s inside Syria, whether it’s here in Türkiye, or for other governments from other terrorist organizations that might seek to take advantage of that transition period.

So it is a complicated process to help a national government, particularly one that is an interim government that needs to do a lot of internal work with other parts of Syrian society to determine what that government will look like in the future. It’s a complicated process to do that as well as work through the details of resuming these internal security responsibilities for the entirety of the territory. But we and many of our allies and partners, including here in Türkiye, are committed to helping the interim authorities in Damascus be successful in doing so.

MODERATOR: We’ll next take a live question from the queue, and we’ll go to Rabia Iclal Turan of Anadolu Agency. Rabia, please go ahead and ask your question.

QUESTION: Thank you, Elizabeth, and thanks, Ambassador, for doing this. A follow-up on north Syria, please. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan recently gave an ultimatum to the PKK/YPG in Syria, stating that the PKK fighters and leaders from other countries must leave, and shortly after Secretary Blinken said during a press conference in Paris that Washington and Ankara are working on the departure of the quote-unquote “foreign members” of the SDF. So is there a consensus between Washington and Ankara on the removal of the PKK elements from Syria? Do you call on the PKK to leave Syria?

And secondly, a quick one, if I may. We understand that President-elect Donald Trump has a different approach to Syria compared to the current Administration, which has only 10 days left in the office. How does this impact your engagements with Ankara? Thank you.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: So as Secretary Blinken noted, we are in agreement with the Government of Türkiye and a number of other governments that Syria cannot be, should not be in the future a safe haven for foreign terrorist organizations or foreign terrorist fighters, and we believe that any foreign terrorist that is present inside Syria should leave the country. Ideally, many of those people will be returning to their countries of origin, their countries of nationality, through a responsible process that involves those governments, potentially to face justice for their actions.

But they should no longer be present in Syria contributing to instability in the country, and that includes any foreign terrorists who have taken advantage of the long-term instability in Syria to set up shop in – whether it’s in northeastern Syria, whether it’s in southwestern or southern or southeastern Syria. It’s – we’re not specifying or picking and choosing among foreign terrorist organizations, and we understand this Turkish Government’s priority on addressing the most immediate concern for Türkiye’s government and its citizens and wider society.

At the same time, we think it’s quite important that we work together on this transition and the departure of any foreign terrorist fighters in ways that don’t contribute to creating more instability in Syria, that don’t create new opportunities for Daesh to undertake terrorist activities or to try to break members of the organization out of prison, and to make sure that the actions that we see the interim authorities taking to create and expand security within the country contribute to improving security conditions for all Syrians.

MODERATOR: Next we’ll take a question from the chat, and it goes to Ahmad Zakaria from Syria 24. And Ahmad asks: “What is the fate of al-Hol camp in the countryside of al-Hasakah and the prisons housing ISIS members in eastern Syria? Are there any upcoming plans concerning them?”

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: So the discussion today reflected a series of discussions that the United States, Türkiye, the Government of Iraq, and a number of other governments have had regarding the importance of ensuring that over time the population of the detention facilities in Syria is reduced and that the people who are currently resident in those facilities are able to go back to their countries of origin to be reintegrated into those societies. And we’ve seen important progress in recent weeks and months to reduce the overall population of al-Hol, and we are committed to continuing our support for the efforts to repatriate those family members of extremists who have been present there and to help ensure that they can have a humane transition and reintegration into the societies from which they originated.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Next we’ll take a question from the live queue, and we’ll go to Abdulhalim Sulaiman of Independent Arabia in Iraq. Abdulhalim, please go ahead and ask your question.

QUESTION: Good evening. Thank you, Elizabeth. (Inaudible) Mr. John, I will cut interpretation. Wait just a minute.

Okay, my question is: Are there any negotiation between Türkiye and Syrian Democratic Forces under your supervision, sir? And is there any agreement on disarming the border area and deploying international forces, perhaps French and American, around Kobani and another area in the border in northeast Syria? And what is the – Türkiye’s response to your efforts there? Thank you.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: Thank you for your question. We believe – the United States believes – that, as I mentioned earlier, that the national government of Syria should, over time, once again, resume responsibility for the internationally recognized borders of Syria and resume responsibility for appropriate border control and border security for Syria’s borders.

How quickly that can occur is in part a function of the capacity of the interim authorities to assume those responsibilities and to be able to provide effective border management in coordination with Syria’s neighbors. There are different dynamics, as you know, along different parts of Syria’s border with the different neighbors, so I don’t know that there is a precise timetable or – in which this will occur. But we are committed to doing everything we can to help create the conditions that will enable a national government to again resume those important responsibilities.

Part of an effective transition and part of ensuring there is good, positive momentum and forward progress that allows for the interim government to gradually over time develop capacity and give the Syrian people and the international community confidence that they are working to be responsible members of the international community and to meet the needs of the Syrian people is to ensure that there is not a resumption of large-scale fighting within Syria and that groups within the country that have vied for control of certain areas or previously resolved differences through violence are no longer doing that and that they are contributing to supporting the restoration of normal functions of government, whether that’s at the national level or at the local level in terms of the administration of different cities and areas of Syria.

So that’s the paradigm within which we’re working, and we are making clear to everyone within Syria with whom we have partnerships or with whom we’ve worked that our expectation as a government is that they will contribute constructively to this transition and support the re-creation of a national government in Damascus that is a responsible government, responsible to its own citizens and responsible to its neighbors and to the international community.

MODERATOR: Next we’ll take a pre-submitted question from Dilhan Deniz Kilislioğlu from NTV in Türkiye, and Dilhan Deniz asks: “Will the United States take further steps in lifting sanctions on Syria? And what would be the response if Türkiye were to launch an operation in Syria?”

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: So as you may have noticed, the United States earlier this week took important steps to provide provisions under our existing sanctions regime that substantially expand the range of economic activities and the range of support that governments can provide to the interim government to allow it to function effectively, to ensure that basic services can be provided to the Syrian people, and to make sure that conditions do not worsen for the citizens of Syria during this transitional period.

So we have authorized some very specific types of activities, including financial support from other governments for the interim authorities in Damascus, to ensure that technocrats, civil servants within the Syrian state can be paid and paid at a living wage, if I can use that term; to enable provision of electricity or fuel to generate electricity or meet other needs that address some of the key challenges the society has faced; and another – a wider range of some economic activities.

And we’ve also made sure that private financial transactions between Syrians outside of the country and Syrians inside of the country can occur so that people who have been displaced over the years by this terrible conflict can support family members or relations who are still inside the country in this challenging period.

We are continuing to talk with a number of governments, notably Syria’s neighbors but also countries in the Gulf and in the Arab world and in Europe, about additional ways in which we and other countries and organizations that have sanctions regimes can make adjustments to those regimes to allow for the kinds of immediate support that are required to enable the interim authorities to undertake a successful transition and to help the Syrian people begin to address the many needs that have built up over years of violence and suffering and repression by the Assad regime.

MODERATOR: Next, we’ll take a question from the live queue, and we’ll go to Mohamed Shehoud of Asharq News. Mohamed, please, go ahead and ask your question.

QUESTION: Thank you. I need to ask about the engage between the current Administration, Biden administration, and the incoming Trump administration, regarding Syria – and how the connection with your ongoing effort about removing HTS or sanctions, or with Ahmed al-Sharaa.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: Thank you. I am a senior official of the current United States Government. I can’t speak for the next U.S. administration, nor can I offer any insights at this time into how U.S. policy might change under the next administration.

But I’m confident that those of our colleagues in the U.S. Government who have been intently focused on these issues will do our very best to make sure that new colleagues who are entering our government with the change in administration will, to the best of our ability, be provided with as much information as possible about ongoing conditions and dynamics, about the steps that the current U.S. Administration has taken to try to support the interim authorities and address the needs of the Syrian people, and some of the opportunities and potential risks associated with steps that the new administration might choose to take, to ensure that our next government in the United States can make informed choices about the policy decisions that they face and about the policies and actions that they will choose to pursue with regard to Syria.

MODERATOR: We’ll stay in the live queue and take a question from Diyar Kurda from Rudaw Media Network. Diyar, please, go ahead and ask your question.

QUESTION: Thank you so much, Elizabeth. So thank you so much, Ambassador, for doing this. I have one question. The Kurdish officials in the past few days have floated the idea of U.S. and French troops could secure the Syrian northern border in – to address the Türkiye security concerns. Have you touched that issue with the Turkish officials? And overall, what’s the U.S. position on that idea? Thank you.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: Thank you. So obviously I can’t speak on any level for the French Government. What I can say with regard to my own government is that we are intently focused on the very real security concerns of the Turkish Government and Turkish society with regard to the extent to which foreign terrorists, including the PKK, have at times taken advantage of the situation inside Syria, and the importance of ensuring that this transitional period in Syria does not lead to additional risks to Türkiye, to Iraq, or to frankly any of Syria’s neighbors.

I would also say that we are very attuned in our government to the dynamics in which some people, some governments might see the presence of U.S. troops as providing reassurance; but we are also aware that some groups or individuals might seek to take advantage of the presence of U.S. forces to engage in activities which undercut the security of one of the neighboring countries, including Türkiye. And we do not want to see that result, and we are being very careful as a result of that perspective that we have to make sure that any adjustments that we might make to our presence and the activities of the United States forces inside Syria are engaged in to ensure that it doesn’t increase risk or jeopardy for the neighboring countries.

Our military presence inside Syria is for a very specific purpose, and that is to ensure that Daesh does not again become a threat to the people of Syria, the people of Türkiye, the people of Iraq or Jordan or any other country, given the very painful decade in which we have all worked so hard to deal with the geographic caliphate – so-called caliphate – that Daesh created and to restabilize, to help the governments of the countries that Daesh destabilized – to help those governments recover from that terrible experience. We don’t want to see that return, and it’s very much in that spirit that we are evaluating how we can contribute to a successful transition inside Syria.

MODERATOR: We have time for one last question, and it will go to Mohamed Maher from Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper in Egypt. And Mohammad asks: “What is the U.S. position on the Syrian territories occupied by Israel following the collapse of the Assad regime? Does the U.S. envision playing a role in mediating future discussions between Israel and Syria?”

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY BASS: So, I can’t speak to the future given – as I noted earlier – that I’m a member of the current Administration which will be departing office next week. But I can say that the United States government believes that all of Syria’s neighbors should work through this period – this transitional period – with the perspective of, of course, addressing their own national security concerns but doing that in ways that do not contribute to creating additional instability inside Syria or distracting the transitional authorities from concentrating on a responsible transition and on the very real and pressing needs and concerns of the Syrian people.

MODERATOR: And that concludes today’s call. I’m sorry that we could not get to all questions today. I would like to thank Under Secretary Bass for joining us, and I would like to thank all of our journalists for participating. If you have any questions about today’s call, you may contact the London International Media Hub at MediaHubLondon@state.gov.
The Week at State: January 3 - January 9, 2025
01/10/2025

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January 3 - January 9, 2025

Hello from snowy Washington. Residents paused from their normal routines to visit the Capitol, where former President Carter lay in state.

Here’s what happened at State this past week. ⤵️🕊️ We bid farewell to President Carter. The State Department continues his work to promote peace, protect rights, and bolster global health.
🌏 Secretary Blinken's last trip as Secretary to Seoul, Paris, Tokyo, and Rome.
🛂 For Human Trafficking Prevention Month, we will highlight ways you can help our whole-of-government effort to keep vulnerable people safe.


Remembering President Carter

On January 9, 2025, Americans remembered Jimmy Carter, the 39th president of the United States who died on December 29, 2024, at the age of 100.

As president, Carter established his reputation as an international peacemaker, largely through his mediation of the 1978 Camp David Accords. The Carter administration also articulated, devised, and implemented a human rights strategy that would serve as the cornerstone of Carter’s foreign policy.

In his remarks commemorating the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1978, President Carter said:

“Human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States. Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world.”

After his term as president, he pursued a long career as an advocate for the poor and for democracy and human rights. Carter won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 for “his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development.”



Building Partnerships Across the Globe

“When I took this job, the first instruction President Biden gave me was to do everything possible to re-energize, rejuvenate, in some cases even reimagine, our alliances and partnerships,” Secretary Blinken said in Japan on Tuesday.

For his last trip as Secretary of State, Secretary Blinken traveled to the Republic of Korea, Japan, France, and the Holy See from January 4–10 to underscore the essential role of relationships in addressing challenges across the globe.

In the Republic of Korea and Japan, Secretary Blinken reaffirmed our commitment to the security and defense of our shared values around the world.

In France, Secretary Blinken received the Legion d’Honneur, the nation’s highest civilian award, and met with senior French officials to underscore our nations’ historic alliance and discuss shared approaches to challenges in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.

In Rome, Secretary Blinken met with counterparts from France, Italy, the UK, and Germany to focus on helping the Syrian people build a better future.


You Can Help Fight Human Trafficking

(AP Photo/Hkun Lat)

In January, we observe Human Trafficking Awareness Month. This year is the 25th anniversary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Over the last two and a half decades, we have remained focused on four foundational principles of prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnership.

This partnership includes civil society, survivors, and our counterparts in this whole-of-government effort. You can be a part of this too – learn how to help support vulnerable people and ensure thoughtful consumer choices.


News You May Have MissedThe United States extends condolences to all those affected by the January 7 earthquake in southern Tibet. The U.S. government is closely monitoring the situation and stands ready to respond.
As part of our continued surge in security assistance, the U.S. is providing another significant package to equip Ukrainian partners as they defend against Russia’s war of aggression.
Traveling soon? Here are risk factors to watch in our advisories.
We celebrated Harlem Globetrotters Day. The Globetrotters have built cross-cultural connections through basketball for nearly a century.
Mauritania signed a Threshold Agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to ensure energy security and sustainable development.
Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources traveled to Albania. The U.S. is grateful for Albanian support for Ukraine and Afghan refugees.
We’re making progress in public health, sustainable energy, and economic growth with partners along the Lobito Corridor.

🔎 Looking AheadJanuary 11: National Human Trafficking Awareness Day (also known as “Wear Blue Day”)
January 20: Martin Luther King Jr. Day and U.S. Presidential Inauguration Day
January 27: International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust
👉 Note to Our Readers

We welcome your feedback on this newsletter. Send us your thoughts to EmailTeam@state.gov. 📩



Useful linksTravel advisories and updates on international travel for U.S. Citizens from the Department of State
Did you know that you can invite a representative from the Department of State to speak at your school, business, agency or organization? Learn about what we do through the firsthand experience of one of our representatives.

Read More at State.gov





Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye and Saudi Arabia
01/10/2025

Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye and Saudi Arabia
01/10/2025 07:42 PM EST


Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye and Saudi Arabia
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Under Secretary Bass’s Travel to Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Media Note

January 10, 2025



Under Secretary of State John Bass traveled to Ankara, Türkiye January 9-10. In Ankara, Under Secretary Bass met with senior Turkish government officials to discuss Syria and emphasized the importance of a peaceful, inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. He also participated in meetings on the importance of regional stability, preventing Syria from being used as a base for terrorism, and ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS.


Under Secretary Bass will then travel to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 11-13, to attend a Saudi-hosted multilateral meeting of senior government officials from the region and global partners to coordinate international support for the Syrian people. While in Riyadh, the Under Secretary will also hold bilateral meetings with key partners on advancing shared regional and global priorities.



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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of the Spokesperson Official International Travel Saudi Arabia Turkey Under Secretary for Political Affairs


Deputy Secretary Verma’s Meetings with Serbian President Vučić and other Senior Serbian Officials
01/11/2025



Deputy Secretary Verma’s Meetings with Serbian President Vučić and other Senior Serbian Officials
01/11/2025 05:19 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Deputy Secretary of State Richard R. Verma met with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Foreign Minister Marko Djuric, and other senior Serbian officials today in Belgrade. Deputy Secretary Verma emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Serbia relationship in securing peace and stability, including in Ukraine. They also discussed the growing U.S.-Serbia economic partnership, including in the energy, telecommunications and tech sectors, and U.S. support for Serbia’s progress on its path towards EU membership.

Follow Deputy Secretary of State Verma on Instagram and X: @DepSecStateMR.




Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Martha Teichner of CBS News Sunday Morning
01/12/2025

Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Martha Teichner of CBS News Sunday Morning
01/12/2025 12:31 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

QUESTION: No easy stroll to the exit for Antony Blinken. With exactly eight days left as Secretary of State, he’s only just concluded what is likely his last trip, back and forth across the globe with meetings in Seoul, Tokyo, Paris, and finally Rome. Blinken has traveled more than a million miles on the job.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Every minute, every hour, every day of the time that we have left we’re focused on getting results.

QUESTION: We flew with him in early December, three trips ago, from Washington to Brussels for the most recent NATO foreign ministers meeting.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We have a new NATO Strategic Concept. It recognized Russia as the most direct threat to the Alliance.

QUESTION: The main topic of discussion was Russian aggression in Ukraine, but there was a lot of well-wishing going on. There’s Blinken right in the middle of the so-called family photo. And now watch this: He photobombs the picture of all the women foreign ministers.

SECRETARY GENERAL RUTTE: You have been a staunch ally and people like you very much.

Mark Rutte of the Netherlands is secretary general of NATO. All this ceremonial show-and-tell might be seen as subtle messaging to the incoming Trump administration about the value of nurturing alliances, the stronger together argument.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: The instruction I got from President Biden on day one was get in there, rejuvenate, re-energize, and even reimagine our alliances and partnerships.

QUESTION: Here was one more chance for Blinken to hold up the Biden administration foreign policy report card and his own.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: If the United States is not engaged, if we’re not leading, then probably either someone else is, and probably not in a way that reflects our interests and our values; or maybe just as bad, no one is. What we’ve done over the last four years is we’ve re-engaged.

QUESTION: As for Ukraine.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: All told, the United States has provided $102 billion in assistance to Ukraine, our allies and partners $158 billion. This may be the best example of burden sharing that I’ve seen in the 32 years that I’ve been doing this.

QUESTION: President-elect Donald Trump wants to end Russia’s war with Ukraine, critics fear not to Ukraine’s advantage. Ever the diplomat, Blinken won’t say he’s trying to Trump-proof the potential outcome.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: For any of us to really speculate at this point I don’t think makes a lot of sense. What does make sense is to make sure that we give the next administration, we give the incoming Trump administration, the strongest possible hand for it to play around the world, whether it’s on Ukraine or anything else.

QUESTION: Sixty-two years old, Antony Blinken was practically born to be Secretary of State. His father, financier and philanthropist Donald Blinken, served as ambassador to Hungary. His stepfather, international lawyer and humanitarian Samuel Pisar, was a Holocaust survivor from Poland.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: He was on a death march out of the camps, and they – he and some friends managed to escape the death march itself, hid out in the Bavarian woods. They saw a tank with a five-pointed white star. And the hatch opened up and a very large African American GI looked down at him. And he got down on his knees and said the only words that he knew in English, that his mother had taught him before the war: “God bless America.” And the GI lifted him into the tank, into freedom, into the United States. Those are the stories that I grew up hearing, and it made me feel that there was something special about our country.

QUESTION: Blinken grew up in Paris. He went to Harvard, Columbia Law School, and in 1993 during Bill Clinton’s first term began his diplomatic career at the State Department. During one administration after another, Antony Blinken was always in the room where it happens. There he is in the famous picture when President Obama took out Osama bin Laden. Blinken was national security advisor to then Vice President Joe Biden. They are exceptionally close. Here he is with his family clowning with Biden at the White House last fall.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: One of the things that’s been an immense privilege is to have the kind of relationship where he would seek my counsel, and I always felt with him the ability to speak my mind.

QUESTION: It was reported in Bob Woodward’s recent book, War, that after Biden’s shaky debate performance last July Blinken met with the President and asked him to consider whether he wanted to be doing this another four years, adding, “I don’t want to see your legacy jeopardized.” Blinken and Biden, their legacies are inevitably linked. For better or worse, Blinken has defended the chaotic U.S. pullout from Afghanistan on their watch, reminding the world the first Trump administration made a deal with the Taliban forcing the withdrawal.

On their rocky relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the devastation of Gaza in response to the October 7th, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Blinken said this:

QUESTION: It appears that at least to some people on the outside that Netanyahu’s government is not particularly respecting the role that the United States is trying to play and has helped to finance in its support of Israel that calls for protecting people, feeding people, have been ignored.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: The quickest way, the most effective way to get people what they need is actually through what we’ve been trying to achieve for many months now, and that’s a ceasefire with the hostages coming home, massive assistance going in.

We’re very close to a ceasefire and hostage agreement.

QUESTION: Even this late in the game, Blinken is hoping a deal can be reached before Inauguration Day. But if not —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: When that agreement is reached, it will be on the basis of what President Biden put forward.

QUESTION: Who will get the credit?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Ultimately, it doesn’t matter. What really matters is whether the United States can bring real change, real change to people’s lives.

QUESTION: He still sounds idealistic. There’s something a bit square about Antony Blinken. After all, he’s the guy who promoted music diplomacy by performing the Muddy Waters blues standard Hoochie Coochie Man in a suit and tie.

What will he do now? He’s vague on that. And there’s what he said to me in Brussels as he left NATO headquarters for the last time as Secretary of State:

QUESTION: You can’t not have strong feelings knowing that you’re leaving this building.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Sure, you get – look, there’ll always be a moment, someone says something to you, there’s some generous recognition, and for about 30 seconds you feel that and you take it to heart, but then it’s back to work. That’s really – that really is my focus. Now, talk to me on January 21st.




Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Matza’s Participation in the Future Minerals Forum
01/13/2025

Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Matza’s Participation in the Future Minerals Forum
01/13/2025 05:10 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Matza’s Participation in the Future Minerals Forum
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Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Matza’s Participation in the Future Minerals Forum


Media Note





January 13, 2025



Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) Helaina Matza will lead the U.S. Government delegation to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia January 13-16 to participate in the Future Minerals Forum. In Riyadh, Acting Special Coordinator Matza will meet with government officials as well as private sector partners to continue ongoing PGI efforts to advance investment in energy and critical mineral supply chains.


To learn more about PGI’s priority areas, economic corridors, and investments thus far please visit our website.



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Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy Energy Office of the Spokesperson Official International Travel Saudi Arabia Office of Global Partnerships


Setting Records in U.S. Passport and Visa Services, Spurring Innovation, and Delivering on Our Commitment to Our Fellow Americans Under the Biden-Harris Administration
01/14/2025


Setting Records in U.S. Passport and Visa Services, Spurring Innovation, and Delivering on Our Commitment to Our Fellow Americans Under the Biden-Harris Administration
01/14/2025 08:42 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Setting Records in U.S. Passport and Visa Services, Spurring Innovation, and Delivering on Our Commitment to Our Fellow Americans Under the Biden-Harris Administration
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Setting Records in U.S. Passport and Visa Services, Spurring Innovation, and Delivering on Our Commitment to Our Fellow Americans Under the Biden-Harris Administration


Media Note





January 14, 2025



As part of the Biden-Harris Administration, the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs has been at the forefront of protecting U.S. citizens, enabling global travel that powers the U.S. economy, and improving federal customer service while safeguarding national security. The past several years have brought notable achievements towards these objectives.


Set Records in U.S. Passport and Visa Services


The demand for U.S. travel documents has reached historic levels, and the Bureau of Consular Affairs has risen to the challenge. Since 2021, the Department has issued an extraordinary 90 million U.S. passports, bringing the number of valid U.S. passports in circulation to nearly 170 million – an all-time high. In 2024 we proudly announced a 4–6-week passport processing timeline for applicants, the fastest turnaround in more than five years.


In addition to our commitment to service excellence, we are also expanding accessibility. In 2024, the Department unveiled the largest expansion of passport services in decades, with plans to open six new passport agencies in coming years – bringing these critical services closer to millions of Americans.


Today, more people can safely and securely travel to the United States than ever before. Since 2021, U.S. embassies and consulates abroad have issued approximately 30 million nonimmigrant visas, with a record 11.5 million visas issued in FY 2024 alone. These efforts have facilitated legitimate travel while safeguarding U.S. borders, fueling the $2.3 trillion travel and tourism sector, and supporting an estimated 10 million American jobs.


Spurred U.S. Innovation, Including Launching the Country’s First Online Passport Renewal System


Innovation has been the cornerstone of the Bureau’s work to transform consular services and improve customer experience. In September 2024, the Department launched the Online Passport Renewal (OPR) application, a groundbreaking platform that allows U.S. citizens to renew their passports entirely online, including a digital photo tool, all from the comfort of their home. To date, more than 1.5 million U.S. citizens have used this streamlined service, and we expect millions more to benefit from these services in the future. Thanks to increased staffing, technological advancements like OPR, and a host of other improvements, most people are getting their passports back much faster than advertised.


On the visa services front, in 2024 we piloted a domestic visa renewal program, allowing skilled workers supporting U.S. companies to renew their visas within the United States. This initiative benefited more than 6,000 applicants from 2,400 companies, reducing disruptions and ensuring continued productivity across U.S. industry.


In further support of U.S. innovation leadership, we implemented a change to the Exchange Visitor Skills List to attract and retain top global talent in research and academia. By doing so, we are helping U.S. businesses and universities continue their important work, from cutting-edge research to U.S.-led breakthroughs in science and technology.


Delivering Unparalleled Support for U.S. Citizens Abroad


From natural disasters to geopolitical conflicts, the Bureau of Consular Affairs has been a lifeline for U.S. citizens in times of crisis. Since 2021, we facilitated the safe evacuation of more than 10,000 U.S. citizens from danger zones – including Afghanistan, Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Haiti, Sudan, and Niger – using every resource at our disposal, including boats, buses, and helicopters. Around the clock and the world, our embassies, consulates, and task forces have provided 24/7 critical assistance to our fellow Americans.


We have also empowered U.S. travelers, providing the tools they need to make informed, confident decisions about their overseas travel. By enhancing travel advisories to include warnings about wrongful detentions by foreign governments, we are helping Americans to stay safer abroad.


Honoring Our Afghan Allies


The Department remains deeply committed to our Afghan allies, who supported our troops and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan for more than 20 years. Since January 2021, we have issued more than 78,000 Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for our Afghan allies – representing more than 51 percent of all Afghan SIVs issued since the program began in 2009. This monumental effort reflects our promise to stand by those who supported the U.S. mission and share our values.



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Bureau of Consular Affairs Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy Office of the Spokesperson Passports Visa Application Visas


Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan at a Strategic Partnership Commission Charter Signing Ceremony
01/14/2025

Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan at a Strategic Partnership Commission Charter Signing Ceremony
01/14/2025 03:33 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Colin L. Powell Treaty Room



SECRETARY BLINKEN: Please, have a seat. Good afternoon, everyone.

First, let me just say on a personal level what a pleasure it is to receive my friend, the foreign minister. We’ve worked together a lot these past few years, and he is and he’s been a wonderful, wonderful colleague, a wonderful partner.

And I think it’s fitting that we’re able to come together today, because this marks a significant milestone in the relationship between the United States and Armenia. We’re establishing our U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission. This commission gives us a framework to expand our bilateral cooperation in a number of key areas: economic matters, security and defense, democracy, justice, inclusion, and people-to-people exchanges. Each of these is a shared interest that forms the bedrock of our relationship and our partnership.

Over these recent years, we have been able to work together, among other things, but significantly, on our economic relationship and on our economic cooperation. We’ve expanded cooperation across the economies. We’ve done that on energy and we’re now poised to begin negotiations on a 123 Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, and this is genuinely a milestone. I think it underscores a couple of things: a mutual dedication that we have to nuclear nonproliferation standards and advancing nuclear security, but also opening new avenues for our two countries to collaborate on nuclear energy, on science, and on technology.

We’re also working with Armenia in the realm of security and defense, and in particular to support its efforts to assert its independence and sovereignty over its own territory. Next month, in the coming weeks, we will have a Customs and Border Patrol team travel to Armenia to work with their Armenian counterparts on border security capacity building, strengthening security cooperation, enhancing Armenia’s peacekeeping capabilities through exercises like Eagle Partner. We had a bilateral training exercise, Eagle Partner, that’s been done annually for the past two years. All of this is enhancing Armenia’s capacity to be a strong partner as well as to mind its own borders.

I’m also very pleased to announce today Armenia’s intent to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Ararat, you’ll be joining 87 other members to work together for greater stability in the Middle East and well beyond, so we are very, very grateful for that engagement.

On democracy and justice, let me just point out that the Armenian Government has implemented reforms that are demonstrating a real commitment to building an even more just and even more fair society. I recognize in particular the work that Prime Minister Pashinyan has done, his government has done implementing domestic reforms across critical areas, in particular justice and law enforcement.

Last month, here at the department we were very honored to present one of our Anti-Corruption Champion Awards to Justice Galyan for outstanding work in combating corruption. This is a testament to the scope of the reforms that Armenia is pursuing and that she has carried out so effectively.

So in a few moments, after the foreign minister speaks, we’ll have a chance to sign this framework agreement. But again, I just want to underscore that it really lays the foundation for even deeper cooperation, and it builds on our shared principles. We are increasingly strong partners, and I think that is for the good of both of our countries as well as the good of the region and beyond. And this charter, this strategic partnership that we’re signing, will, I think, contribute to a more resilient, a more peaceful, a more secure, a more independent South Caucasus. So I couldn’t be more happy to be able to do this today, and especially to do it with my friend.

Mr. Minister.

FOREIGN MINISTER MIRZOYAN: Thank you very much. Dear Secretary Blinken, colleagues, excellencies, dear friends, the Armenia-United States Strategic Partnership Charter which we are signing today provides a robust framework and injects greater ambition into our cooperation. It spans a wide area of fields, including strengthening economic and energy ties, connectivity, deepening defense and security cooperation, reinforcing democratic institutions, promoting justice and the rule of law, fostering innovation on high technologies, and enhancing people-to-people contacts.

Our relations, based on shared values and mutual interests, have witnessed remarkable growth in recent years. They have matured to a point where upgrading them to a Strategic Partnership is not only fitting but essential for navigating the complex geopolitical landscape. I am especially grateful to your contribution, Mr. Secretary, and your team’s tireless efforts on this journey in elevating our cooperation to this new level. We deeply value the unwavering United States support for Armenia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Equally important is the United States support for strengthening Armenia’s democratic institutions and promoting economic resilience.

We appreciate the United States engagement in promoting a durable and lasting peace in the South Caucasus region. We believe that a stable and prosperous South Caucasus is in the interest of all regional actors and the broader international community. Armenia remains committed to peace agenda and its implementation, and to working closely with the United States to achieve this shared objective.

In the spirit of shared commitment to global security, I am also happy to announce that Armenia intends to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, further demonstrating our dedication to combating international terrorism. We believe that collective action is essential in addressing this threat. We also commence negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, commonly known as 123 Agreement. It will provide a framework for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and mark our commitment to peaceful nuclear development under the highest standards of safety, security, and non-proliferation.

Looking ahead, we are eager to continue working with the new United States administration to fulfill the ambitious goals outlined in our Strategic Partnership Charter.

Dear friends, let this charter serve as a testament to the deepening strategic relations between Armenia and the United States, and as a road map for a future filled with shared achievements. Thank you. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan are signing a Strategic Partnership Commission Charter between the Government of the United States and the Government of Armenia. The charter sets forth a framework for economic and security cooperation; strengthening democracy, justice, and inclusion; and increasing people-to-people exchanges. Armenia is an essential strategic partner. As the Secretary said, we look forward to continued cooperation.

(The charter was signed.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: All right.

(Applause.)




Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan
01/14/2025


Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan
01/14/2025 09:28 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, today in Washington, D.C.  Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Mirzoyan signed the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission charter, marking the latest milestone in the growing U.S.-Armenia relationship.  The charter establishes new avenues for bilateral cooperation, including on economic cooperation; security and defense; strengthening democracy, justice, and inclusion; and increasing people-to-people exchanges.  Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Mirzoyan also announced the United States and Armenia will begin negotiations on an agreement to support Armenia’s nuclear energy sector and that Armenia intends to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.


U.S.-Armenia Relations
01/14/2025


U.S.-Armenia Relations
01/14/2025 09:37 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan launched the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership Commission on January 14, marking the latest milestone in our bilateral relationship. Strong partners make stable regional partners, and our bilateral cooperation reflects our shared commitment to a more resilient, peaceful, secure, and independent South Caucasus. To date, the United States has invested approximately $3.3 billion in Armenia to support democratic reforms, economic growth and resilience, and humanitarian assistance, including $340 million since 2021.  Our partnership is based on our shared democratic values, and together, we are working to expand our economic, and security and defense cooperation; strengthen democracy, justice, and inclusion; and increase people-to-people exchanges.

Economic Cooperation

The United States continues to support Armenia’s efforts to enhance its economic resilience, promote advanced technologies, and bolster trade, energy, and food security for a prosperous and secure Armenia. Trade between the United States and Armenia, and U.S. investment in Armenia’s burgeoning tech sector, have grown significantly since 2020, with bilateral trade more than tripling between 2020 and 2023, reaching $321 million. Since 2023, the U.S. Embassy in Armenia, through the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, has facilitated $15 million in U.S. exports, supporting nearly 300 U.S. firms to establish a footing in the Armenian market while connecting U.S. suppliers with Armenian firms looking to invest in the United States. In March 2024, the United States and Armenia held the first Trade and Investment Framework council meeting since 2020, mapping concrete ways to increase bilateral trade and investment.

The United States and Armenia will begin negotiations on a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, known as a 123 Agreement, which, once concluded, will provide Armenia a platform for enhanced nuclear energy cooperation with the United States. The United States is working with Armenia to strengthen its food security, including by diversifying its trade partners and improving domestic production. Our governments established an Export Control Working Group in September 2024, which provides a mechanism to exchange information on export control procedures and regulations. We also welcome Armenia’s commitment to work with the United States and our partners on sanctions enforcement.

Security and Defense

The United States has expanded defense engagements with Armenia, hosting bilateral exercise Eagle Partner in 2023 and 2024 to bolster interoperability during peacekeeping exercises. The United States has provided $27 million in funding to support Armenia’s efforts to develop its border security capabilities, in collaboration with State’s Export Control and Border Security program and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The United States is supporting Armenia’s defense sector reforms and has provided the Armenian Ministry of Defense with approximately $18 million in Foreign Military Financing to support the purchase of armored ambulances, the development of a Cyber Defense Operations Center, and improving National Training Center capabilities. Armenia joined the International Counter Ransomware Initiative in December 2024 and the United States is also collaborating with Armenia as it develops its national cybersecurity strategy, including the establishment of a National Computer Incident Response Team.

Strengthen Democracy, Justice, and Inclusion

The United States is partnering with the Armenian government to fight institutional corruption, improve its e-governance and strategic communications capacities, strengthen electoral and political processes, foster a strong civil society and independent media, and strengthen economic resilience and security. U.S. assistance to Armenia also focuses on strengthening institutions for human rights protection and enhancing the inclusion and economic well-being of women, as well as refugees, including those displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement is supporting Armenia’s effort to develop a modern, professional, and service-oriented law enforcement institutions. This includes over $16 million in support for the establishment, training, and equipping of Armenia’s nationwide Patrol Police Service. To strengthen Armenia’s independent media, promote freedom of expression, and combat foreign information manipulation and interference, the United States supports numerous exchange programs and professional development activities to foster a new generation of journalists while building capacity for local media organizations and the Armenian government.

Increase People-to-People Exchanges

People-to-people ties form the bedrock of the U.S.-Armenia relationship. The United States has supported three partnerships between Armenian universities and Cornell University, Washington State University, and Florida State University. The number of Armenians studying in the United States continues to grow, reaching a record number in 2023. The U.S. Embassy in Armenia administers 16 exchange programs sending Armenians to the United States, from high school students to parliamentarians. The United States recently reopened eligibility for Armenian participants in the SABIT business leader exchange programs.

Our countries also share a commitment to preserving and celebrating Armenia’s cultural heritage, including through the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation grants. The United States and Armenia have developed strong subnational connections, and the State Department facilitated new sister city and state partnerships between cities across our two countries.




Hitting Russia’s Military Industrial Base and Enablers of Sanctions Evasion
01/15/2025



Hitting Russia’s Military Industrial Base and Enablers of Sanctions Evasion
01/15/2025 10:56 AM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Building on our January 10 sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector, today the United States is designating over 250 enablers of Putin’s war against Ukraine. These sanctions will further constrain Russia’s ability to wage war and thwart sanctions evasion.

Of these targets, the Department of State is sanctioning more than 150 individuals and entities involved in Russia’s defense industry and supporting its military industrial base. These designations encompass dozens of companies outside Russia that facilitate Russia’s evasion of our sanctions, particularly in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which remains the largest supplier of critical defense-related goods to Russia. Additional designations target subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom.

The Department of the Treasury is re-designating under Executive Order 13662 nearly 100 major entities across Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors. Treasury is also designating participants in a sanctions evasion scheme established between Russia and the PRC to facilitate cross-border payments for sensitive dual-use goods, as well as a Kyrgyz Republic-based financial institution that worked with Russian officials and a U.S.-designated bank to circumvent our sanctions.

We continue to bring available tools to bear on disrupting Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine, together with G7 and other likeminded partners. We stand in solidarity with Ukrainians in defending their homeland against Russia’s illegal war of choice.

The Department of State actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, and the Department of the Treasury sanctions actions were taken pursuant to both E.O. 13662 and E.O. 14024, as amended. For more information on today’s actions, please see the Department of State’s fact sheet and the Department of the Treasury’s press release.




Sanctions to Disrupt Russia’s Military Industrial Base and Sanctions Evasion
01/15/2025


Sanctions to Disrupt Russia’s Military Industrial Base and Sanctions Evasion
01/15/2025 10:51 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

Today, the United States is sanctioning nearly 250 enablers of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine. As part of this action, the Department of State is designating more than 150 individuals and entities. Building on our January 10 targeting of Russia’s energy sector, today’s action aims to thwart sanctions evasion, particularly by actors based in the Peoples’s Republic of China (PRC), and to degrade Russia’s military industrial base. Additional designations target subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom).

Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is re-designating nearly 100 previously sanctioned targets across Russia’s financial services, energy, and defense and related materiel sectors. Treasury is also designating entities involved in several financial sanctions evasion schemes. For information about Treasury’s actions, please see Treasury’s press release.

All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The United States will use all tools at its disposal to disrupt support for Russia’s military-industrial base and curtail the Kremlin’s ability to exploit the international financial system and generate revenue in furtherance of its war against Ukraine. We support Ukraine as it defends its people and its sovereign territory from Russia’s unprovoked aggression.

DISRUPTING SANCTIONS EVASION AND BACKFILLING EFFORTS

The Department aims to disrupt the networks and channels through which Russia procures technology and equipment from abroad to support its war effort. Today’s designations target producers, exporters, and importers of items critical to Russia’s military-industrial base. Those items include microelectronics and computer numerical control (CNC) items on the Common High Priority List (CHPL), as identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) alongside the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United Kingdom. Entities based in the PRC remain the largest suppliers of these goods to Russia. Entities in numerous other jurisdictions, particularly Malaysia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), also sell these items and other important dual-use goods to Russia. These exports have included critical components that Russia relies on to produce the weapons systems it uses to wage war against Ukraine.

PRC-Based Entities Supporting Russia’s Military Industrial Base

The United States remains deeply concerned by the export of dual-use goods from the PRC to the Russian military-industrial base. PRC entities continue to trade in these items, using the sanctions evasion and circumvention networks that Russia creates to provide CHPL microelectronics, CNC tools (machine tools), and other military-applicable components. Imports from the PRC fill critical gaps in Russia’s defense production cycle, thereby enabling it to produce weapons systems, ramp up defense production, and bolster its military-industrial base.

Today, the Department is designating numerous entities and individuals based in the PRC that have supplied goods to Russian entities responsible for developing, producing, and supplying items critical to Russia’s military industrial base. These designations target producers and exporters of CNC items critical to Russia’s military industrial base, including those that have shipped goods directly to U.S.-designated entities in Russia.

Additionally, the Department is designating PRC-based entities involved in the supply and production of Russian glide bombs and attack drones Lancet and Garpiya-A1, used in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:WAFANGDIAN BEARING COMPANY LIMITED (WAFANGDIAN BEARING) is a PRC-based entity that supplied over $2.5 million worth of CHPL items to Russian entities between January 2023 and at least March 2024, including to U.S.-designated AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO TASKOM.
GANZHOU GUANGWEI INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO LTD (GUANGWEI INTERNATIONAL TRADE) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $900,000 worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, and aviation engines produced by U.S.-designated, PRC-based XIAMEN LIMBACH AIRCRAFT ENGINE CO LTD. GUANGWEI INTERNATIONAL TRADE supplied these items to Russian entities between June 2023 and at least January 2024, including APEKSGRUP LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. In 2023, Russia started producing a long-range attack drone, Garpiya-A1, using XIAMEN LIMBACH AIRCRAFT ENGINE CO LTD’s engines.
APEKSGRUP LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (APEKSGRUP) is a Russia-based entity engaged in metal products manufacturing that received aviation engines produced by U.S.-designated, PRC-based XIAMEN LIMBACH AIRCRAFT ENGINE CO LTD, from GUANGWEI INTERNATIONAL TRADE in 2023.
REG AUTO SHANGHAI INDUSTRY LTD (REG AUTO SHANGHAI) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $1.5 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components and aviation engines produced by U.S.-designated, PRC-based XIAMEN LIMBACH AIRCRAFT ENGINE CO LTD. From January 2023 to at least March 2024, REG AUTO SHANGHAI supplied these items to Russian entities, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ANGAR 22.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ANGAR 22 (ANGAR 22) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture and assembly of aircraft. ANGAR 22 received aviation engines REG AUTO SHANGHAI that were produced by U.S.-designated, PRC-based XIAMEN LIMBACH AIRCRAFT ENGINE CO LTD.
ZHEJIANG KAIDA MACHINE TOOL CO LTD (KAIDA MACHINE TOOL) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $3 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to Russian entities from January 2023 to at least April 2024. KAIDA MACHINE TOOL supplied these items to several Russian entities, including U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INKOR and LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITA TECHNOLOGY.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITA TECHNOLOGY (ITA TECHNOLOGY LLC) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the wholesale distribution of industrial machinery and equipment. ITA TECHNOLOGY LLC received over $2.7 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components from KAIDA MACHINE TOOL beginning in January 2023 through at least April 2024.
DONGGUAN JETLAND SUPPLIER CHAIN MANAGEMENT COMPANY LIMITED (DONGGUAN JETLAND) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $25 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to U.S. designated, Russia-based LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY I MACHINE TECHNOLOGY, from May 2023 to at least April 2024.
ZHEJIANG MARQUIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO LTD (MARQUIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $5 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to Russian entities from May 2023 to at least February 2024, including U.S.-designated, Russia-based HAITIAN PRECISION LLC and NEWTON ITM.
DONGGUAN CITY BIGA GRATING MACHINERY CO LTD (DONGGUAN CITY BIGA) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $12 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to U.S.-designated and Russia-based BALTIYSKAYA PROMISHLENNAYA KOMPANIYA and PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY SASTA, from June 2023 to at least April 2024.
ZHEJIANG GFIR TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL CO LTD (GFIR TECHNOLOGY) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $7 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to U.S.-designated, Russia-based LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KMT and LLC MASHIMPORT from January 2023 to at least April 2024.
SHANDONG WEIDA HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO LTD (WEIDA HEAVY INDUSTRIES) is a PRC-based entity that supplied over $1.6 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to Russia-based JOINT STOCK COMPANY NOVY LIZING between January 2024 and February 2024.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY NOVY LIZING (NOVY LIZING) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the supply of metal-cutting and industrial machines. NOVY LIZING received over $1.6 million worth of CHPL items from WEIDA HEAVY INDUSTRIES between January 2024 and February 2024.
DALIAN XINPENGHAI ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT CO LTD (M&E EQUIPMENT) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $24.7 million worth of CHPL items such as manufacturing components, including CNC machine tools, to U.S.-designated, Russia-based BALTIYSKAYA PROMISHLENNAYA KOMPANIYA from March 2023 to at least April 2024.
OKE PRECISION CUTTING TOOLS CO LTD (OKE) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $7 million worth of manufacturing items to Russia-based OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU DOMINIK, from January 2023 to at least April 2024.
OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU DOMINIK (DOMINIK) is a Russia-based industrial cutting machine supplier that received over $7 million worth of manufacturing items from OKE between January 2023 and at least April 2024. DOMINIK’s customers and partners include several Russian industrial companies that have been sanctioned for their roles in supporting Russia’s military, including for manufacturing weapons and rocket launchers used against Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:TAIHUI ELECTRONICS SHENZHEN CO LTD (TAIHUI ELECTRONICS) is a PRC-based entity that has supplied over $1.7 million worth of CHPL items, including electronic components, in March 2024 to Russia-based LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FIRST LOGISTICS COMPANY.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FIRST LOGISTICS COMPANY (FIRST LOGISTICS) is a Russia-based computer, office equipment, and software merchant wholesaler that received over $1.7 million worth of CHPL items from TAIHUI ELECTRONICS in March 2024.
ABINGO DISTRIBUTORS LIMITED (ABINGO) is a Hong Kong-based entity that has supplied $14.4 million worth of CHPL items, such as electronic components, to Russia-based LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHEYNCHIP from January 2023 to at least March 2024.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHEYNCHIP (LLC CHEYNCHIP) is a Russia-based entity engaged in wholesale trade of electronic equipment that received over $14 million worth of CHPL items from ABINGO from January 2023 to at least March 2024.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRECISION LASER SYSTEMS, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:HAUCORE LTD is a PRC-based state-owned enterprise that has supplied laser diodes to U.S.-designated Russia-based entities including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRECISION LASER SYSTEMS. These laser components are then shipped to U.S.-designated, Belarus-based OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY ROGACHEVSKY ZAVOD DIAPROEKTOR, an entity involved in Russia-Belarus defense cooperation, likely for inclusion in opto-electronic sights used in armored fighting vehicles. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PRECISION LASER SYSTEMS was designated by the Department of State on October 30, 2024 and OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY ROGACHEVSKY ZAVOD DIAPROEKTOR was designated by the Department of State on August 23, 2024, pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

PRC-Origin Servo Motors Used in Russian Glide Bombs Used Against Ukraine

The Department is designating the following entities and individuals involved in a procurement network for PRC-origin servo motors used in Russia’s Unified Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK). Russia uses UMPKs manufactured by U.S.-designated Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC (KTRV) to extend the range of its aerial bombs. This procurement network is responsible for the shipment of at least 80,000 PRC-origin servo motors valued around $200 million dollars intended for Russian defense end-users. PRC-origin servo motors procured by this network have been recovered on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, a Russia-based entity, OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU SV POLIMER, received shipments from PRC-based SHENZHEN UNISON BIO TECH CO LTD (UNISON), SHENZHEN BIOSEN BIO TECH CO (BIOSEN), and UNIHUI INTERNATIONAL LIMITED consisting of electronics and servo motors totaling at least $46.5 million. In April 2023, Russia-based OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU OMNITREID (OMNITRADE) was established and began receiving shipments throughout 2023 from PRC-based SHENZHEN YISHENGDA INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (YSD), UNISON, and BIOSEN consisting of electronics and servo motors totaling at least $75.5 million. Additional shipments from these PRC-based entities to Russian end-users have occurred.

Throughout 2024, OMNITRADE and its general director SERGEI NIKOLAEVICH VOVCHENKO contracted with U.S.-designated TRV Engineering JSC to supply millions of dollars worth of PRC-origin servo motors to TRV Engineering JSC. TRV Engineering JSC is the official authorized procurement agent for U.S.-designated, Russia-based KTRV and its subordinate companies. On August 23, 2024, the Department of the Treasury designated TRV Engineering JSC pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU OMNITREID (OMNITRADE) is a Russia-based developer and manufacturer of high-tech components used in the production of unmanned aircraft used in Russia’s defense industry. OMNITRADE has procured significant numbers of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, from PRC-based companies SHENZHEN UNISON BIO TECH CO LTD, SHENZHEN BIOSEN BIO TECH CO, SHENZHEN YISHENGDA INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CO LTD, and UNIHUI INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, and provided them to U.S.-designated Russia-based defense manufacturing companies.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU SV POLIMER (SV POLIMER) is a Russia-based manufacturer of polymer products and has procured significant numbers of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, from PRC-based companies SHENZHEN UNISON BIO TECH CO LTD, SHENZHEN BIOSEN BIO TECH CO, SHENZHEN YISHENGDA INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CO LTD, and UNIHUI INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, and provided them to U.S.-designated Russia-based defense manufacturing companies.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, or senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of OMNITRADE, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:SERGEI NIKOLAEVICH VOVCHENKO (VOVCHENKO) is the founder and General Director of OMNITRADE. VOVCHENKO has worked to supply millions of dollars worth of PRC-origin servo motors to U.S.-designated TRV Engineering JSC.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, or senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of SV POLIMER, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:DMITRII EVGENEVICH VOITIKHOV (VOITIKHOV) is the General Director of SV POLIMER.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of OMNITRADE, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:SHENZHEN UNISON BIO TECH CO LTD (UNISON) is a PRC-based company which sent millions of dollars worth of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, to OMNITRADE.
SHENZHEN BIOSEN BIO TECH CO LTD (BIOSEN) is a PRC-based company which sent millions of dollars worth of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, to OMNITRADE.
SHENZHEN YISHENGDA INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CO LTD (YSD) is a PRC-based company which sent millions of dollars worth of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, to OMNITRADE.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of SV POLIMER, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:UNIHUI INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (UNIHUI) is a Hong Kong-based company which sent millions of dollars worth of servo motors, a critical component used in the production of glide bombs used by Russia’s armed forces, to SV POLIMER.

Procurement Network of Limited Liability Company Zala Aero

Supporting Manufacture of the Lancet Drone

The Department is designating a number of entities integral to the supply of microelectronic components, machine tools, electric motors, and engines to Russia-based and U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ZALA AERO (ZALA). ZALA is the entity responsible for manufacture of leading battlefield drones used by the Russian military in Ukraine, such as the Lancet-3 and Lancet-3M drones. ZALA relies on a network of PRC-based and Türkiye-based exporters and intermediaries operating from Russia to evade sanctions and obtain foreign-made parts used in the manufacture of its Lancet drones and other advanced weapons systems supplied to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This action forms part of the Department’s ongoing effort to degrade Russia’s military capabilities in Ukraine, as it follows the November 2, 2023, designation of entities and individuals complicit in the procurement of items in support of the production of ZALA’s KUB-BLA and Lancet suicide drones used by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:STAR RAPID MANUFACTURING CO LTD (STAR RAPID) is a PRC-based entity that sent dozens of shipments worth over $16 million to Russia-based companies including U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OMP and LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY POLYEZNY ELEMENT 5 between January 2023 and at least March 2024.
SAHINLER METAL MAKINA ENDUSTRI ANONIM SIRKETI (SAHINLER METAL) is a Türkiye-based entity that sent approximately $1.4 million worth of items to Russia-based companies, including to LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KM GROUP and U.S.-designated PG VEKPROM LLC, between January 2023 and at least April 2024. These shipments included products such as machine tools.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KM GROUP (KM GROUP) is a Russia-based manufacturing entity that received machine tools, including CNC machine tools, along with engines and motors from SAHINLER METAL. KM GROUP plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY POLYEZNY ELEMENT 5 (PE 5) is a Russia-based manufacturing entity that is receiving ferrous metals and aluminum products used to support ZALA. PE 5 plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.
OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTYU SEB (SEB) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the wholesale trade of machinery, industrial equipment, ships, and aircraft. SEB plays an integral role in the transfer of items to ZALA.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AIDRONEKS (AIDRONEKS) is a Russia-based manufacturing entity that is receiving carbon fiber products from PRC-based entities. AIDRONEKS plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LITHIUMION (LITHIUMION) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacturing of batteries and electrical accumulators. LITHIUMION plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:ARMIDA MAKINA IC VE DIS TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI is a Türkiye-based entity that sent over $6 million worth of items to Russia-based entities, including to U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ENTEP, between January 2023 and at least April 2024. These shipments included a wide range of CHPL items, such as electric motors, static converters, and fiber optic communication systems.
JIANGXI XINTUO ENTERPRISE CO LTD is a PRC-based drone manufacturer that sent over $9 million worth of items to Russia-based companies, including to U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY OMP and LLC ALTRABETA, between January 2023 and at least February 2024. Most shipments related to carbon fiber products and electric motors and generators.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TIMECHIPS (TIMECHIPS) is a Russia-based technology entity engaged in the wholesale trade of computers and peripheral devices to computers and software. TIMECHIPS supplies imported military and dual-use products to enterprises in the Russian military-industrial complex and aerospace industry, and plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LOGIK AY SI (LOGIK AY SI) is a Russia-based technology entity that received over $3 million worth of items from Hong Kong-based, U.S.-designated ALIGN TRADING LIMITED between July 2023 and at least February 2024. Shipments included monolithic integrated circuits and electrical parts of machinery and other apparatuses. LOGIK plays an integral role in the procurement and transfer of foreign-made items to ZALA.

Procurement Network for PRC-Origin Components Used in Russian Defense Production

Russia-based OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU ROKEM SERVIS (ROKEM SERVICE) has coordinated with U.S.-designated entities including JOINT STOCK COMPANY PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION NORTHERN MACHINE-BUILDING ENTERPRISE (JOINT STOCK COMPANY PO SEVMASH) to provide equipment for use on Russian naval and MAIN DIRECTORATE OF DEEP SEA RESEARCH vessels, including submarines, support ships, frigates, corvettes, and tank landing ships. ROKEM SERVICE owner OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH KIRYUSHKIN and general director IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA MELNIK have been involved in such procurements. ROKEM SERVICE has facilitated cooperation between FANGYUE LI and PRC-based companies JIANGSU KUNYEE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY LTD and SHAANXI JIAJUNAO CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD to procure foreign-produced components required for water treatment and filtration equipment ultimately intended for use on Russian naval vessels.

On April 7, 2022, the Department of State designated JOINT STOCK COMPANY PO SEVMASH pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024. JOINT STOCK COMPANY PO SEVMASH is a Joint Stock Company United Shipbuilding Corporation subsidiary that builds submarines for the Russian Navy. On February 24, 2023, the Department of State designated MAIN DIRECTORATE OF DEEP SEA RESEARCH (GUGI) pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024. GUGI reports to the Ministry of Defense and is the maritime equivalent of a Russian military intelligence agency. It controls and operates Russia’s unconventional warfare submarines and its operational responsibilities include the placement and maintenance of deep-water military equipment.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity and individuals are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSTVENNOSTIU ROKEM SERVIS (ROKEM SERVICE) is a Russia-based entity involved in the manufacture and distribution of water treatment and filtration equipment. Additionally, ROKEM SERVICE has coordinated with the U.S.-designated entities including JOINT STOCK COMPANY PO SEVMASH to provide equipment for use on Russian naval and GUGI vessels, including submarines, support ships, frigates, corvettes, and tank landing ships.
OLEG NIKOLAYEVICH KIRYUSHKIN (KIRYUSHKIN) is a Russian and German national and is the owner and former General Director of ROKEM SERVICE. Additionally, KIRYUSHKIN has facilitated cooperation between ROKEM SERVICE and FANGYUE LI to procure foreign-produced components required for water treatment and filtration equipment.
IRINA NIKOLAEVNA MELNIK (MELNIK) is a Russian national and is the General Director of ROKEM SERVICE. Additionally, MELNIK has worked with JOINT STOCK COMPANY PO SEVMASH officials to procure foreign-produced components for use on Russian naval vessels.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individual are being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of ROKEM SERVICE:FANGYUE LI is PRC and German national and a board member and Chief Technology Officer of JIANGSU KUNYEE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY LTD. Additionally, LI has worked with ROKEM SERVICE to supply foreign-produced components ultimately intended for use on Russian naval vessels.
JIANGSU KUNYEE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY LTD is a PRC-based company that provides water filtration equipment and services. Additionally, JIANGSU KUNYEE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY LTD has worked at the direction of FANGYUE LI to supply foreign-produced components to ROKEM SERVICE ultimately intended for use on Russian naval vessels.
SHAANXI JIAJUNAO CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD is a PRC-based company involved in the provision of environmental and engineering products. SHAANXI JIAJUNAO CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD has worked at the direction of FANGYUE LI to supply foreign-produced components to ROKEM SERVICE ultimately intended for use on Russian naval vessels.

Other Third-Country Entities Supporting Russia’s Military-Industrial Base

The Department is also designating other third-country companies that have supplied goods or services to elements of Russia’s military-industrial base and Russian military end-users and Russian entities that have done business with them.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:FARTON MITEX SDN BHD (FARTON) is a Malaysia-based entity that has sent over $11 million worth of CHPL items between January 2023 and at least March 2024 to Russia-based entities, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BRIDZH BEAR. These shipments included products such as ball bearings, spherical ball bearings, tapered ball bearings, and cylindrical ball bearings.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BRIDZH BEAR (BRIDZH BEAR) is a Russia-based wholesale distributor of industrial machinery that received shipments of CHPL items from FARTON.
FOBEARINGS SDN BHD (FOBEARINGS) is a Malaysia-based entity that sent approximately $5 million worth of CHPL items to Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TORGOVYY DOM AGROAKHTUBA, between January 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included products such as ball bearings and roller bearings.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TORGOVYY DOM AGROAKHTUBA (AGROAKHTUBA) is a Russia-based entity that received approximately $900,000 worth of CHPL items between January 2023 and at least March 2024 from companies including FOBEARINGS.
GLOWY PREMIER TREND SDN BHD (GLOWY) is a Malaysia-based entity that has sent over $7.5 million worth of CHPL items between January 2023 and at least March 2024 to Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROMELEKTROSERVIS. These shipments included products such as ball bearings, spherical ball bearings, tapered ball bearings, and cylindrical ball bearings.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROMELEKTROSERVIS (PROMELEKTROSERVIS) is a Russia-based wholesale distributor of industrial machinery and equipment that received shipments of CHPL items from GLOWY.
SERMAX LOJISTIK SANAYI VE DIS TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI (SERMAX) is a Türkiye-based entity that shipped over $685,000 worth of CHPL items between January 2023 and at least March 2024 to Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DZHET SNAB and U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GALIKA SERVIS. These shipments included products of U.S., UK, and EU-origin such as ball bearings and parts of machine tools.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DZHET SNAB (DZHET SNAB) is a Russia-based manufacturing entity that received over $200,000 worth of CHPL items from SERMAX between April 2023 and at least March 2024.
BIMAKSAN TAKIM TEZGAHLARI SANAYI VE DIS TICARET MUHLIS KOKSAL VE ORTAGI KOLLEKTIF SIRKETI (BIMAKSAN) is a Türkiye-based entity that shipped over $6.1 million worth of CHPL items between January 2023 and at least March 2024 to entities including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROMLOGISTIKA, U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INKOR, and U.S.-designated PROMOIL LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. These shipments included products such as metalworking lathes and CNC machine tools.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY PROMLOGISTIKA (PROMLOGISTIKA) is a Russia-based manufacturing entity that received over $2.6 million worth of CHPL items, including from BIMAKSAN TAKIM TEZGAHLARI SANAYI VE DIS TICARET MUHLIS KOKSAL VE ORTAGI KOLLEKTIF SIRKETI, between January 2023 and at least April 2024. These shipments included products such as metal-cutting lathes and metalworking machines.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:AROHI SYSTEMS TRADING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (AROHI) is a UAE-based entity that shipped over $1.4 million worth of CHPL items to Russia-based entities, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITK SISTEMA, between August 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included microelectronic products with U.S.-brands and of EU origin, such as equipment for wire communication systems, static converters, and fiber optic communication systems.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITK SISTEMA (ITK) is a Russia-based computer programming service entity that received shipments of CHPL items from AROHI between August 2023 and at least March 2024.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TELECOM AND MICROELECTRONICS INDUSTRIES (TMI) is a Russia-based electronics manufacturer that received approximately $51 million worth of shipments that included U.S., EU, and other G7-origin CHPL items between July 2023 and at least March 2024 from U.S.-designated companies ASAY IC VE DIS TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI and LETT TRONIC GROUP LIMITED. These shipments included microelectronic products such as plugs and sockets for printed circuit boards and integrated monolithic circuits.
CS YONETIM VE DESTEK HIZMETLERI LIMITED SIRKETI (CS YONETIM) is a Türkiye-based entity that shipped over $1.9 million of CHPL items between May 2023 and at least March 2024 to Russia-based, U.S.-designated LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GAAN CORPORATION. These shipments included products of E.U.-origin such as digital oscillographs and signal generators.
PROFFPCB FZCO (PROFFPCB) is a UAE-based entity that shipped over $4.9 million worth of CHPL items to Russia-based entities, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TELP and LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOE PREDPRIYATIE NEVAAPPARAT, between December 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included products such as multilayer printed circuit boards.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TELP (TELP) is a Russia-based entity that received over $3.7 million worth of CHPL items, including from PROFFPCB, between January 2024 and at least April 2024. These shipments included products of U.S.-origin such as multilayer printed circuit boards.
ACE BEARINGS FZE (ACE BEARINGS) is a UAE-based entity that shipped over $1 million of CHPL items to Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ARMEKS and U.S.-designated OOO TD PODSHIPNIK TRADE, between April 2023 and at least February 2024. These shipments included products of U.S., EU, UK, and other G7-origin such as ball bearings and spherical roller bearings.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ARMEKS (ARMEKS) is a Russia-based entity that received over $170,000 of CHPL items from ACE BEARINGS in February 2024 alone.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOE PREDPRIYATIE NEVAAPPARAT (NEVAAPPARAT) is a Russia-based entity that received over $1.4 million worth of CHPL items, including from PROFFCB, between December 2023 and at least January 2024. These shipments included products such as multilayer printed circuit boards.
VICTORY EXPERT TRADING FZ LLC (VICTORY EXPERT) is a UAE-based entity that shipped over $1 million of CHPL items to Russia-based LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TAMARIKS between July 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included products of U.S.-origin such as commutation panels and static converters.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TAMARIKS (TAMARIKS) is a Russia-based entity that received over $1 million worth of CHPL items from VICTORY EXPERT between July 2023 and at least March 2024.
NAZMIH TRADING FZE LLC (NAZMIH TRADING) is a UAE-based entity that shipped over $575,000 worth of CHPL items to Russia-based companies, including LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VELOKS and U.S.-designated S 7 ENGINEERING LLC between October 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included products of U.S., U.K., E.U., and other G7 origin such as power units, commutators, and integrated circuits.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VELOKS (VELOKS) is a Russia-based entity that received over $500,000 worth of CHPL items from NAZMIH TRADING between November 2023 and at least March 2024. These shipments included products of G7 origin such as power units, commutators, and integrated circuits.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, GUGI, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:ATLASNOBLE GAYRIMENKUL DANISMANLIK ANONIM SIRKETI is a Türkiye-based entity that facilitated payments for sensitive equipment ultimately destined for U.S.-designated Russian military end-user GUGI.
YMV KREYN VE MAKINA SISTEMLERI SANAYI TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI is a Türkiye-based company that manufactures marine crane, winch, and propulsion systems. Additionally, YMV KREYN VE MAKINA SISTEMLERI SANAYI TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI manufactured sensitive equipment ultimately destined for U.S.-designated Russian military end-user GUGI.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of YMV KREYN VE MAKINA SISTEMLERI SANAYI TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:AHMET YUKSEL is a Turkish national and the owner and director of YMV KREYN VE MAKINA SISTEMLERI SANAYI TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI, which manufactured sensitive equipment ultimately destined for U.S.-designated Russian military end-user GUGI.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY BERDSK ELECTROMECHANICAL PLANT (BEMZ) is a Russia-based machine building entity which has been procuring aviation components for U.S.-designated S 7 ENGINEERING LLC.
VASILI ALEKSEEVICH YURCHENKO (YURCHENKO) is the Director-General of BEMZ.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of BEMZ:SERGEI PAVLOVICH SAVCHENKOV (SAVCHENKOV) is the majority shareholder and a member of the Board of Directors of BEMZ.

DEGRADING RUSSIA’S MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE

The Department is designating numerous entities and individuals involved in the development, production, and transportation of ammunition, artillery systems, missiles, armored vehicles, military radio-electronics, and other military-applicable equipment. These designations target critical battlefield inputs and weapons systems that enable the Kremlin to wage war against Ukraine.

Additionally, we are designating two entities associated with Russia’s premier arms trade show, International Military-Technical Forum ‘ARMY’. The annual exhibition is hosted by the Russian Ministry of Defense. This event serves as a premier opportunity for Russia’s defense industry to increase its sales, access, and influence with foreign partners and defense industries. These designations further isolate Russia’s defense industrial base from global markets and

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individuals are being designated for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY MOTOVILICHA PLANTS is a Russia-based manufacturer of artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems which are supplied to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY SEROV MECHANICAL PLANT (JSC SMZ) is a Russia-based ammunition manufacturer.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY NIZHNY NOVGOROD RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION NAMED AFTER MV FRUNZE is a Russia-based company that has designed and produced military radio-electronic devices.
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF COMMAND DEVICES is a Russia-based state-owned enterprise that has manufactured command and navigation instruments for rockets, spacecraft, and other defense purposes.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY AEROELEKTROMASH is a Russia-based company that has manufactured parts for helicopters used by the Russian military in Ukraine.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE ANTARES is a Russia-based company that has developed and produced movement, orientation and guidance systems for satellites and is licensed to produce military equipment to fulfill Russian state defense orders.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY ANTARES is a Russia-based entity that has supplied electrical connectors to Russia-based defense entities to fulfill Russian state defense orders.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY AVTOAGREGAT is a Russia-based entity that has supplied equipment to repair armored vehicles for the Russian Ministry of Defense.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SPETSTEKHNIKA is a Russia-based entity that has contracted with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY LUCH PLANT is a Russia-based entity that has supplied tank helmets to Russia-based defense entities to fulfill Russian state defense orders.
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY SARANSK INSTRUMENT WORKS is a Russia-based entity that has produced equipment for the Russian defense sector, including items intended for armored vehicles for the Russian Ministry of Defense.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY LYTKARINO OPTICAL GLASS PLANT is a Russia-based entity that has manufactured optical sights used in armored vehicles for the Russian Ministry of Defense.
POPOV COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT PLANT is a Russia-based entity that has produced communications equipment for Russian armored vehicles.
JOINT STOCK HOLDING COMPANY BARNAULTRANSMASH is a Russia-based company that has produced engines for the Russian BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY RYAZAN RADIO PLANT is a Russia-based entity that has produced communication equipment for the National Guard of Russia.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY VOENTORG is a Russia-based contractor for the Russian Ministry of Defense and has been the Russian military’s official clothing supplier.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES AND EXHIBITIONS is the Russia-based exhibition operator of the annual Russian military equipment exhibition, International Military-Technical Forum ‘ARMY’.
FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTION CONGRESS AND EXHIBITION CENTER PATRIOT is the Russia-based entity that owns the venue of the annual Russian military equipment exhibition, International Military-Technical Forum ‘ARMY’, and is the main exhibition venue of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE RUSBAL is a Russia-based manufacturer of inflatable mock-ups of military equipment, such as tanks and fighter jets, which are used by Russia’s armed forces.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MANAGEMENT METALLURGICAL COMPANY STEEL (MMC STEEL) is a Russia-based steel products manufacturer and parent company of PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY NADEZHDINSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD.
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY NADEZHDINSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD is a Russia-based steel products manufacturer and a primary supplier of raw materials into Russia’s artillery ammunition supply chain.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY RT LOGISTICS is a subsidiary of U.S.-designated Russian state-owned enterprise STATE CORPORATION ROSTEC that executes transportation for the government, with the capability of transporting dangerous goods for defense purposes.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of AUTOMOBILE PLANT URAL JOINT STOCK COMPANY:JOINT STOCK COMPANY TENTH BEARING PLANT is a Russia-based entity that has produced rolling bearings and automotive components to U.S.-designated Russia-based entity AUTOMOBILE PLANT URAL JOINT STOCK COMPANY. AUTOMOBILE PLANT URAL JOINT STOCK COMPANY was designated by the Department of State on May 1, 2024, pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SPECIAL MACHINERY is a Russia-based company that has designed and produced advanced polymer composite materials for rocket and space engineering including for Russian defense purposes.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENTS (AO NIIFI) is a Russia-based company that has developed, produced, and delivered electronics equipment for the Russian rocket and aerospace industry.
ALEKSEI GENNADIEVICH DMITRIENKO is the General Director of AO NIIFI.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION CENTER SKADA is a Russia-based company that created and supplied automation systems and software for industrial purposes.

TARGETING ROSATOM SUBSIDIARIES AND ENTITIES SUPPORTING ROSATOM

Today, the Department is designating several Rosatom subsidiaries and related entities and individuals in a continued effort to disrupt Rosatom’s support to Russia’s military industry. This is the twelfth Russia sanctions action that includes Rosatom-related designations.

The Department continues to designate Rosatom entities and individuals involved in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and defense sector, nuclear power plant construction exports, development of advanced technologies and materials, non-uranium extractive industries and associated businesses, and malign activities including the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine.

The Department is additionally taking action against entities and individuals supporting or involved with Rosatom subsidiaries, including KUZEY STAR SHIPYARD DENIZCILIK SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI, a Türkiye-based shipyard that constructed a floating long-dock for U.S.-designated FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ATOMFLOT (ATOMFLOT), and YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH ANTONOV, the acting General Director of ATOMFLOT.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vi)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ATOMFLOT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:KUZEY STAR SHIPYARD DENIZCILIK SANAYI VE TICARET ANONIM SIRKETI (KUZEY) is a Türkiye-based shipyard that constructed a floating long-dock, valued at approximately $50 million, for U.S.-designated FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ATOMFLOT (ATOMFLOT) to service and repair its nuclear icebreakers. The floating dock constructed by KUZEY was delivered to ATOMFLOT after it’s designation.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(C) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ATOMFLOT, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024:YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH ANTONOV is the acting General Director of ATOMFLOT. ATOMFLOT was designated by the Department of State on May 19, 2023, pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION TSENTROTEKH is a Russia-based subsidiary of Rosatom that is involved in the manufacture of centrifuges.
MINING AND CHEMICAL COMPLEX FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE is a Russia-based subsidiary of Rosatom that has conducted research in the field of nuclear energy.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOE PREDPRIYATIE TECHNOPROEKT is a Russia-based manufacturer of pipeline fittings used in the nuclear industry.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(ii)(F) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners, for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE ZAPORIZHZHYA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (FSUE ZNPP) is a Russia-based entity created in October 2022 by Russian Federation presidential decree in order to unlawfully claim supposed ownership of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have previously designated a separate entity created by the Government of the Russian Federation to operate the claimed plant. Joint Stock Company Operating Organization of Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP OO) was designated by Department of State on February 24, 2023, pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(iii)(B) of E.O. 14024, the following individual is being designated for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of FSUE ZNPP, a person that has, or whose members have, engaged in any activity described in subsection 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14024:VLADISLAV VASILIEVICH ISAEV is the General Director of FSUE ZNPP.

CURBING RUSSIA’S REVENUE FROM METALS AND MINING

The Department continues to designate entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining industry to further constrain Russia’s revenue generation capacity. Today, the Department is designating one of the largest scrap metal processing enterprises in Russia. Additionally, the Department is sanctioning producers of aluminum and manufacturers of pipe products critical to Russia’s military industrial base and energy sector.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRANSLOM (TRANSLOM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRANSLOMMARKET (TRANSLOMMARKET) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHERMET-SERVIS (CHERMET-SERVIS) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KEYDZHI RUS (KEYDZHI RUS) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY METEKSIM (METEKSIM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TREYD METALL (TM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TORGOVYY DOM VOLFRAM MOLIBDEN (VM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY NOVOTROITSKII ZAVOD HROMOVYH SOEDINENII (NZKHS) is a Russa-based entity that produces chromium compounds.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BURILNYE TRUBY (BURILNYE TRUBY) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of aluminum products.
PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY KAMENSK URALSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD (KAMENSK URALSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the production of aluminum and magnesium alloys used in various Russian industries.

The following entity is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KAMENSK URALSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY DEREVOOBRABATYVAYUSHCHAYA KOMPANIYA (DEREVOOBRABATYVAYUSHCHAYA KOMPANIYA) is a Russia-based entity that is 100 percent owned by KAMENSK URALSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individuals are being designated for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TERRA STAL GRUPP (TERRA STAL GRUPP) is a Russia-based pipe manufacturer that supplies products to enterprises in the Russian energy and construction industries.
KLIM ANDREYEVICH KOMAROV (KLIM KOMAROV) is the founder and 100 percent shareholder of TERRA STAL GRUPP.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY KERAMAX (KERAMAX) is a Russia-based manufacturer of ceramic flux. Ceramic flux is a connective material used to join separate pieces of metal and is commonly used throughout the energy, oil and gas, construction, shipbuilding, and machine-building industries in Russia.
ARTEM ANDREYEVICH KOMAROV (ARTEM KOMAROV) is the founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of KERAMAX.

The following entity is being designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy, and section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, ARTEM KOMAROV:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY UGOLNYY POTOK (UGOLNYY POTOK) is a Russia-based coal mining entity owned by ARTEM KOMAROV.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KERAMAX:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KERAMAKS (LLC KERAMAKS) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX that is engaged in the manufacture of ceramic flux, commonly used throughout the energy, oil and gas, construction, shipbuilding, and machine-building industries in Russia.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KERAMAKS PROFESSIONALNYE SVAROCHNYE RESHENIYA (KERAMAKS PROFESSIONALNYE) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX. KERAMAKS PROFESSIONALNYE is an online marketplace for products manufactured by KERAMAX.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KERAMAKS VERKHNYAYA SALDA (KERAMAKS VERKHNYAYA) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX that is engaged in the manufacture of ceramic flux.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TORGOVYY DOM KERAMAKS (TORGOVYY DOM KERAMAKS) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX. TORGOVYY DOM KERAMAKS is the distribution division for products manufactured by KERAMAX.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KERAMAKS METALLUGICHESKIYE MATERIALY (KERAMAKS METALLURGICHESKIYE MATERIALY) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX that is engaged in the manufacture of ceramic flux.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOYE PREDPRIYATIYE KERAMAKS INZHINIRING (KERAMAKS INZHINIRING) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX. KERAMAKS INZHINIRING is the research and development division of KERAMAX.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KERAMAKS LIZING (KERAMAKS LIZING) is a Russia-based subsidiary of KERAMAX that is engaged in the manufacture of ceramic flux.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY TUGANSK MINING AND PROCESSING ENTERPRISE ILMENITE (TGOK ILMENITE) is a Russia-based entity that is developing the Tugan ilmenite-zircon sands deposit in Russia, which is considered an import substitution project intended to reduce Russian reliance on imports of ilmenite, the primary ore of titanium, used to make many high-performance alloys.
AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO BOGOSLOVSKOE RUDOUPRAVLENIE (AO BOGOSLOVSKOE RUDOUPRAVLENIE) is a Russia-based entity that produces iron ore concentrate.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRANSLOM (TRANSLOM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TRANSLOMMARKET (TRANSLOMMARKET) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CHERMET-SERVIS (CHERMET-SERVIS) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY KEYDZHI RUS (KEYDZHI RUS) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY METEKSIM (METEKSIM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TREYD METALL (TM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TORGOVYY DOM VOLFRAM MOLIBDEN (VM) is a Russia-based entity engaged in the manufacture of scrap metal.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY NOVOTROITSKII ZAVOD HROMOVYH SOEDINENII (NZKHS) is a Russa-based entity that produces chromium compounds.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian Federation economy:JOINT STOCK COMPANY NEW SPACE CORPORATION (NEW SPACE CORP) is a Russia-based company that is developing an ice navigation platform for use in the Northern Sea Route.

TARGETING A WEALTH OBFUSCATION NETWORK

The Department is targeting a network of financial enablers used by U.S.-designated BORIS ROMANOVICH ROTENBERG (BORIS ROTENBERG) and ARKADY ROMANOVICH ROTENBERG (ARKADY ROTENBERG) to coordinate and safeguard their global portfolio of assets, even after their designations.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY UPRAVLYAYUSHCHAYA KOMPANIYA EVOKORP (EVOKORP) is a Russia-based financial services entity that has used closed-end mutual investment funds to hold and hide assets of ARKADY ROTENBERG and BORIS ROTENBERG.
MAKSIM VALERYEVICH VIKTOROV (VIKTOROV) is a Russia-based attorney and wealth management services provider whose company, EVOKORP, enabled ARKADY ROTENBERG and BORIS ROTENBERG to continue engaging in worldwide investments after their designations.
NEKOMMERCHESKAYA ORGANIZATSIYA FOND INVESTITSIONNYKH PROGRAMM (FOND INVESTITSIONNYKH PROGRAMM) is a Russia-based investment entity that invests in industrial and scientific projects. VIKTOROV is the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of FOND INVESTITSIONNYKH PROGRAMM.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, VIKTOROV and EVOKORP:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FINANSOVAYA KOMPANIYA LINIYA INVESTITSIY (LINIYA INVESTITSIY) is a Russia-based investment entity jointly controlled by VIKTOROV and EVOKORP.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, VIKTOROV:LEGAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP LIMITED (LEGAL INTELLIGENCE) is a UK-based entity majority owned by VIKTOROV.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TSENTRALNYY DEPOZITARIY FONDOV (FONDOV) is a Russia-based financial services entity majority owned by VIKTOROV.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FONDOV and LINIYA INVESTITSIY:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ELLAND POLYUS (ELLAND POLYUS) is a Russia-based entity jointly controlled by FONDOV and LINIYA INVESTITSIY.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FOND INVESTITSIONNYKH PROGRAMM:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VIKTORIANSKIY PARK (VIKTORIANSKIY PARK) is a Russia-based entity owned by FOND INVESTITSIONNYKH PROGRAMM.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entities and individual are being designated for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MLM NEVA TREYD (NEVA TREYD) is a Russia-based entity that installs lift equipment in residential and administrative buildings.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY BR INVEST (BR INVEST) is a Russia-based entity that produces building materials for use in building interiors and exteriors.
ALEKSANDR SERGEYEVICH KOZLOV (KOZLOV) was a bodyguard for BORIS ROTENBERG and is the nominal owner of many of BORIS ROTENBERG’s assets. KOZLOV is the controlling shareholder of NEVA TREYD and General Director of BR INVEST.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESURS GRUPP (RESURS GRUPP) is a Russia-based transportation services and management entity owned by KOZLOV.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entities are being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KOZLOV:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INTERSERVIS (INTERSERVIS) is a Russia-based wholesale trade entity owned by KOZLOV.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AVIALYUKSSERVIS (AVIALYUKSSERVIS) is a Russia-based entity owned by KOZLOV.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY SOCHI RAZVITIYE (SOCHI RAZVITIYE) is a Russia-based entity owned by KOZLOV.

Pursuant to section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the following entity is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KOZLOV and BORIS ROTENBERG:LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY T TRI (T TRI) is a Russia-based entity jointly owned by KOZLOV and BORIS ROTENBERG.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O. 14024 all property and interests in property of the sanctioned persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all individuals or entities that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.

All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.

Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.




Online Press Briefing with Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt
01/16/2025
Online Press Briefing with Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt
01/16/2025 03:21 PM EST



BRUSSELS HUB

MODERATOR: Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub. I’d like to welcome everybody joining us today for the press briefing. We are very honored to be joined by Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt, the Special Envoy to Combat – to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism.

With that, let’s get started. Ambassador Lipstadt, thanks so much for joining us today. I’ll turn it over to you for opening remarks.

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: Sure. Just briefly, I am sure everyone on this call recognizes that since October 7th we’ve seen an unprecedented surge – I really talk about a tsunami of antisemitism. We were seeing it before, but we were seeing some hopeful signs of progress, and since then it’s just been overwhelming. And one of the – we’ve seen it in Europe, we see it in Latin America, we see it in other places as well – North America. There’s almost no place that’s an exception to it.

And I want to be very careful here. I’m not talking about criticism of Israeli policy. As I’ve said many times, including, I think, on these media calls, criticism of Israeli policy does not constitute antisemitism. It can constitute antisemitism, it can cross the line into antisemitism, but ipso facto it does not constitute antisemitism. If that were the case, the thousands of people on the streets in Israel protesting various government policies would be antisemites, and of course that’s ridiculous.

When I first entered office almost three years ago, my objective was to get governments, leaders of governments, to take antisemitism seriously, not to see it as, oh, something – just a niche concern because there’s a noisy group that wants attention to it, but to recognize it as a threat to democracy, rule of law, to national security, to societal cohesion. And I think we’ve accomplished a lot of that. I’m not saying the job is done. It’s far from done. There are many more, and it’s something that I think has to be kept up. It’s something that never ends.

One of the things I’m particularly proud of, of course, is the launch of the Global Guidelines to Counter Antisemitism. At the moment, we have, I believe, 38 countries and four international multilateral organizations that have signed on, and we’re hoping that in the coming months more countries, I know, are seriously considering signing on. They are a tool in the toolbox for fighting antisemitism. Will they cure antisemitism? No. Can they mitigate it? Can they help control it? Can they educate people about it? I think they can.

I am very proud of the diversity of the different continents, the different groups, the different countries that have signed on. I’m also proud of the fact that, in contrast to most State Department documents, it’s short. It’s 700 words maximum. So that is something that I think is an important addition.

We’ve also strengthened education about antisemitism here within the State Department for our colleagues, because one of the things that was clear to me even before I came on, became more clear once I came on, is how many people don’t really understand what is antisemitism and don’t understand the threat that it is, as I mentioned before, to the well-being of the Jewish community, to democracy and rule of law, to national security and stability, and to societal cohesion.

We are at an inflection point. Antisemitism is becoming increasingly normalized. Things we thought people would never say, even if they were antisemites, that they would know would be totally unacceptable to say, are freely heard on streets of some of our leading Western democracies in many countries, including this country.

And it is – let me close with this thought. It is crucial that the fight against antisemitism remain a nonpartisan issue. It can’t become a political weapon, a political cudgel to beat up on people who have different political views than us or demonstrate that our political views are superior to theirs. I’m an – I described myself early on during my confirmation hearings as an equal opportunity fighter against antisemitism. I remain that, and I hope my tenure here has shown that.

With that I’ll stop, and I’m happy to take any questions.

MODERATOR: Thanks so much for those opening remarks, ma’am. We have a couple submitted questions. The first one is from Magali Barthès Barbero from Radio JM in France, who asks: “What are the main actions that the United States has done in the struggle against antisemitism, which is also expressed through anti-Zionism?”

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: I think a number of things. First of all, when the Congress elevated this office to the level of an ambassador, and that was done prior to my coming on – it was done in the previous administration – I think that that signaled that we’re taking it seriously. I think the President’s choice, nomination of me and the Senate’s confirmation of me, also did that, because while I’ve had wonderful predecessors who were tremendously dedicated to the task, for the first time there was someone who had spent her entire professional career studying, writing, confronting antisemitism. I think that all sent a message.

We developed – actually, spurred on by the example of certain of our European allies and the European Union in particular, the United States developed the National Strategy for Combating Antisemitism here at home, in which over, I think, 27 different federal agencies took part, looking at their activities, what might they do to understand antisemitism, to fight antisemitism, to be aware of antisemitism. We held an online – a symposium on online hate, bringing together representatives of the leading major social media platforms, all at the vice presidential level and above, to talk about the impact of antisemitism, online antisemitism, on Jews, on Jewish communities, et cetera, to demonstrate to them, to impress upon them, the seriousness of the problem and the seriousness with which we took that problem.

So, and I think just the – in my travels in the level of meetings I’ve received, and also the last thing I would mention, unlike my predecessors, I’ve been able to participate – again, this is no reflection on them. This is a reflection both on how we’ve elevated the office and on the elevation of the problem. I’ve been – we’ve made a point of having me participate in international fora – the Munich Security Conference, the Paris Peace Forum, the Halifax Security Conference, the World Economic Forum during UNGA – in other words to telegraph the message. I was just in conversation a few moments with Secretary Blinken on how this is a – it’s not just about protecting one group, but it’s about ensuring national stability, cohesion, democracy, et cetera.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. The next question, it’s time for Momchil Indjov from Club Z Media in Bulgaria, who asks: “Do you see – have you seen a surge in antisemitism, especially in Bulgaria?” And I think we can broaden that to the rest of Eastern Europe, but specifically Bulgaria, the only ally of Nazi Germany to save its Jews from deportation.

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: I did not have the chance to visit Bulgaria, but Bulgaria is one of the signatories to the Global Guidelines. And not only are there a signatory to the Global Guidelines, but they translated them. Bulgarians translated the Global Guidelines into Bulgarian to make them accessible for their diplomats, their diplomats in training, their foreign service officers in training, and to use them. So, I feel we had a very good partner there in that effort, and I am very pleased about that.

MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. We have another question, this time from Peter Morvay from Hetek in Hungary, who asks: “Madam Ambassador, do you feel there has been enough effort made in fighting left-wing antisemitism in recent years?”

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: I think – I pointed out to a senator during my confirmation hearings, and I’ve written quite a bit about this, that there was a real failure for many people on the left to see antisemitism in their own midst. I think there was also a failure of people on the right to see antisemitism with their – in their own midst. Certainly, much of the surge we’ve seen in the past 15 months has come from progressive left groups on the left. There’s no denying that. The campus, et cetera, et cetera.

But I also want to be very careful even if we look on that. I was going back over my notes in preparation and cleaning out my office and going through papers and things, and I recognized that before October 7th much of the focus not just of this office but of the governments and our many allies was on the dangers of right-wing antisemitism in its many different manifestations. So, even as we now pay more attention to antisemitism on the left, I think we can’t ignore the antisemitism from the right.

I used to talk about a spectrum – antisemitism from the far left and the far right. I now talk about a horseshoe where the two extremes meet each other. And that puts pressure on the center to speak out irrespective of where it’s coming from.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. We have one more question submitted. This one is from Albinson Linares from Noticias Telemundo in Mexico. What are – they ask: “What are the most worrying trends of antisemitism or antisemitic acts or aggressions that you have observed in Latin America?”

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: In Latin America, well with certain countries there have been leaders of the countries who have made truly antisemitic remarks, and my nation – either I or the Secretary or others – have called them out. So that has been worrisome.

And I think the trends we’re seeing there are not that different than the trends we see in other continents and other parts of the world. Now with the internet, which we all use and depend on including in this context, in this meeting, a noxious view can go around the world in nanoseconds, and it used to take some time for that to happen.

So, I am not sure that Latin America is any more immune from what we’re seeing in other places. And I also think that there are other countries, malign actors, NGOs, et cetera, who use antisemitism as a way of creating or amplifying societal divisions and societal instability. So, I am not sure that I can say there are distinctive elements in Latin America.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. Let’s give it just 20 more seconds to see if there’s another question before we wrap it up. It looks like that’s all that we have for today.

So, Ambassador, I wanted to thank you both for your service and for taking the time today to talk to us, and thanks to the journalists for all their questions. Ambassador, any final thoughts you’d like to give?

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: Just that I hope that in years to come we’ll talk about this in the past tense and not the present tense and we’ll see a change in things. I’m not entire – I’m an optimistic person generally. On this, I’m not too optimistic, but I still hope for the best. And thank you all for your interest. I really appreciate it.

MODERATOR: Thanks, Ambassador. We can always be hopeful.

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: That’s it.

MODERATOR: Certainly. We will send the audio recording of the briefing to all participating journalists and provide a transcript as soon as it is available. Ambassador, thank you again for your participation and thanks to everybody else. Have a great day.

AMBASSADOR LIPSTADT: Thank you very much.

# # #
U.S.-Norway Technology Safeguards Agreement
01/16/2025


U.S.-Norway Technology Safeguards Agreement
01/16/2025 04:11 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

On January 16, 2025, the United States and Norway signed the Agreement on Technology Safeguards Associated with U.S. Participation in Space Launches from Norway, or the U.S.-Norway Technology Safeguards Agreement. The Agreement, upon entry into force, provides the legal and technical framework for U.S. commercial space launches from Norwegian spaceports while ensuring proper handling of sensitive technology, consistent with our long-standing partnership as members of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation C.S. Eliot Kang and Norwegian Ambassador to the United States Anniken Huitfeldt signed the Agreement between the two countries.

This Agreement protects sensitive U.S. technology and sets the standard for how others should use such sensitive technology in the conduct of satellite and rocket launches from foreign locations.




Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability
01/16/2025


Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability
01/16/2025 05:14 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Press Briefing Room

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, good morning, everyone.

QUESTION: Good morning.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So we said we would run through the tape, and I think we’ve been going at a full sprint. This has been quite an eventful final week for this administration, making good on the President’s commitment to use every minute, every day, of every week that we had to get results.

When I came down here on my first full day in office, back when I had a little bit less gray hair – as my daughter likes to point out – I spoke about how the work that we do to keep the American people in the world informed through you, with you, could not be more important. Most of us have traveled well more than a million miles now together. We’ve done it with a remarkable press corps, people that I’ve gotten to know as colleagues. If I said “friends,” that might actually create problems for you, but let me simply say how much I appreciate the partnership, the professionalism, the work that we’ve done.

I have even greater respect, even greater appreciation for you asking the tough questions, for you holding us to account. Being on the receiving end, sometimes that’s not always the most comfortable thing; not always the most enjoyable thing. But it is the most necessary thing in our democracy.

QUESTION: Three hundred reporters in Gaza were on the receiving end of your bombs. Why did you keep the bombs flowing when we had a deal (inaudible)?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’m happy to address questions –

QUESTION: You all knew we had a deal. Everyone in this room knows we had a deal, Tony, and you kept the bombs flowing. Why did you sacrifice –

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’m happy to address questions when we get a chance, thank you.

QUESTION: – the rules-based order on the mantle of your commitment to Zionism?

QUESTION: Did you want to finish, or –

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Yeah.

QUESTION: Why did you allow my friends to be massacred? Why did you allow my friends (inaudible) we had a deal (inaudible)?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’m happy to address your questions when we get to questions. Thank you.

QUESTION: Did you want –

QUESTION: Hey. You just – you helped destroy our religion of Judaism by associating it with fascism.

QUESTION: Did you want to finish?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Yeah, I have a statement – yeah, I have a statement to make. Thank you.

QUESTION: You waved the white flag before Netanyahu.

STAFF: The Secretary will be happy to take questions at the end.

QUESTION: You waved the white flag before Israeli fascists.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I look forward to taking questions when I get a chance to finish my statement. Thank you.

QUESTION: Your father-in-law is an Israel lobbyist, your grandfather was an Israel lobbyist. Are you compromised by Israel? Why did you allow the Holocaust of our time to happen?

STAFF: It’s time to go. Thank you very much.

QUESTION: How does it feel to have your legacy be genocide? How does it feel to have your legacy be genocide? You too, Matt. You smirked through the whole thing. Every day.

STAFF: Thank you. Thank you.

QUESTION: You smirked through the genocide.

STAFF: Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. And thank you, Matt. Now I’ve got a few more things to say, and then I’m happy to take any question about anything, as we’ve done these past four years. And indeed, I’ll talk a little bit about the developments of the last few days as well. But I first really wanted to say thank you to each and every one of you, and also thank you to –

QUESTION: Well, maybe not everyone. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, okay, I was – (laughter). There is an asterisk, and yes, thank you Matt Lee. But also to a remarkable press team here, led by Matt Miller, who do the work every day of trying to make sure that you’re informed, the American people are informed.

Let me also just take a step back before diving into the developments of this week, these last days, just to consider how far we’ve come over these past four years – and also to think a little bit about where we might be going from here. When President Biden took office, the United States faced the worst public health crisis in more than a century. It faced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. And unprecedented breaches with allies and partners around the world. Our adversaries saw a historic opportunity to work together to challenge our interests, to challenge our global standing, to challenge the international system of rules and principles on which our security and prosperity depend.

The first time I had an opportunity to speak at length in this role, I laid out how we would work to leverage American diplomacy to safeguard and accelerate America’s renewal; how we would reimagine and revitalize our greatest strategic asset – our unmatched network of allies and partners – to deliver on issues that actually matter in the lives of our fellow citizens, matter in their livelihoods, matter in their futures; and to defend against increasingly assertive and aggressive revisionist authoritarian powers; and also how we’d modernize our own diplomacy to try to deliver on these priorities, to ensure that this department is ready to meet the tests of a more contested, a more complicated, a more combustible world.

As President Biden emphasized when he was here on Monday, thanks to historic investments at home and around the world, the United States can now operate from a position of greater strength to tackle all of these challenges. Our adversaries and competitors are weaker. Our strategy of renewal has set the stage for America to win the fierce competition to shape a new era of international affairs to the benefit of our people, to the benefit of people around the world.

And I think this week was another reminder both of the power and the purpose of American leadership and American diplomacy. Over 15 months of devastating conflict between Israel and Hamas, we’ve worked to broker a deal that would bring hostages home, that would stop the fighting, that would surge humanitarian aid to people who so desperately need it, that would create the space to conclude a permanent ceasefire. We now have that, and we expect implementation of the agreement to begin on Sunday.

As President Biden said yesterday, after more than 400 days of struggle, a day of success has arrived.

I want to thank our fellow mediators, Qatar and Egypt, for their extraordinary partnership, and I want to thank my colleagues – in particular Jake Sullivan, Bill Burns, Brett McGurk – for their remarkable skill and tireless dedication over these many months of negotiation. So –

QUESTION: Will you recognize the Geneva Conventions apply to the Palestinians?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: And again, I’m happy to address questions when I have a chance. I’m happy to address questions in a moment. Thank you.

This is a moment of tremendous relief for Israelis and Palestinians alike. The daughter of one hostage spoke for many when she said, “I can’t wait to see them come back to their families. I’m so desperate to see them.” A mother of five, displaced from Gaza City, said simply, “We are being reborn.”

It’s also a moment of historic possibility for the region and well beyond. It’s going to take tremendous effort, political courage, compromise, to realize that possibility, to try to ensure that the gains that have been achieved over the past 15 months at enormous, excruciating cost are actually enduring – to manage the still-profound risks, to deliver on the promise of a more integrated Middle East. And simply put, to forge this reality, there are two immediate imperatives: first, to fully implement the ceasefire deal; and then, second, to finalize a plan, an effective plan as I spelled out earlier this week, that provides for Gaza’s transitional governance, its security, its reconstruction, and that can make the halt in fighting endure.

Delivering on these two priorities will in turn create the conditions for Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations between them, which will require a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. On each of these imperatives, we’ve delivered concrete progress and we’ve laid a foundation for success, which we will hand over to the incoming administration. Together, they represent a historic opportunity to advance the long-term interests of the United States, our partners in the region, and around the Middle East.

In Ukraine as well we’ve seen the results of steadfast American leadership. We rallied and kept together some 50 countries to help Ukraine defend itself from Putin’s war of aggression. Through Ukrainian courage and also Western resolve and firepower, Ukraine repelled Russia’s invasion and took back half the territory it originally seized. We’ve marshaled commitments from countries around the world that will help Ukraine deter and defend against future attacks, and stand on its own feet militarily, economically, democratically.

We’ve also imposed the most ambitious sanctions and export controls ever on Russia, cutting off its biggest banks, reducing dramatically Europe’s reliance on Russian energy, oil and gas, almost to zero at this point. As a result of some of our latest sanctions, Russian oil tankers are piling up along the Chinese coast, unable to offload.

Ukraine will continue to stand as an independent, democratic nation anchored in the West with the freedom to choose its own future. If we sustain our support for Ukraine, if we continue exacerbate Putin’s growing manpower and economic dilemmas, we could continue to help Ukrainians gain leverage to negotiate a just and secure peace.

Now, I got back from what was my 21st trip to the Indo-Pacific in this job just a short while ago, a region where the United States is now competing from a position of strength. We brought our regional allies together, our partners together, around a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, where goods and ideas and people flow freely, where rules are applied fairly and transparently, where countries are free to choose both their own path and their own partners.

We enhanced bilateral relationships with our core treaty allies – with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines. We forged a new era of trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea, with Japan and the Philippines as well. We’ve re-energized the Quad with Japan, India, Australia; strengthened our relationships with ASEAN and the Pacific Island countries; elevated partnerships with Vietnam and Indonesia.

As the DPRK and the PRC continue to fuel Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, underscoring how European and Asian security are indivisible, we’ve also built enduring bridges between our Pacific and Atlantic allies and partners. Australia, Japan, and South Korea provided important support to Ukraine. In 2021, European allies were on the verge of signing a massive trade agreement with China; now they’re coordinating with us on everything from investment screening mechanisms to supply chain resilience to pushing back on China’s overcapacity and unfair trade practices.

At the same time, we’ve managed our competition with China responsibly so it doesn’t veer into conflict, while also cooperating on challenges where the world expects great powers to lead and where it’s clearly in the interests of the American people – from climate change to fentanyl.

We’ve also demonstrated that other countries can rely on the United States to tackle some of our biggest shared challenges and deliver on some of our own – on their own national aspirations: preventing disease outbreaks, enhancing food security, accelerating the clean energy transition, bringing together a global coalition of more than 160 countries to address the synthetic opioid crisis.

As we celebrate the return of hostages in Gaza, including Americans, as we look to relief for the people of Gaza, I’m also thinking of all those U.S. citizens who are held wrongfully, who are hostage, in countries around the world. I carry with me –

QUESTION: Do you know about the Hannibal Directive?

STAFF: Sir, respect. Let’s have some respect.

QUESTION: Miller says he doesn’t know about the Hannibal Directive. Do you know about the Hannibal Directive?

STAFF: You can leave, sir. You want to come with us –

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Again, I’m happy to address questions in a – just a – in a few more minutes.

QUESTION: I want him to answer –

STAFF: (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I look forward to answering questions in a few more minutes. Thank you.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

STAFF: Okay, well, let him speak. (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. Thank you.

QUESTION: He’s made lots of speeches. Let him answer some questions.

STAFF: Sir, what would you like? Would you like to be escorted out?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I look forward to answering questions. Thank you.

QUESTION: Answer some questions instead of making another speech every day.

STAFF: Sir, would you like to be escorted out?

QUESTION: Go away.

STAFF: You don’t have the responsibility to tell me where to go. Do you want to be escorted out or not?

QUESTION: I want him to answer questions.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Okay. Thank you. I look forward to answering questions in a minute. Thank you.

QUESTION: I’m a journalist; I’m not a potted plant.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Everyone will have an opportunity to ask questions in just a minute. Thank you.

QUESTION: Matt Miller has explicitly told me he will not answer my questions.

STAFF: Sir –

QUESTION: I am justified in what I’m doing.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So I have no greater pleasure in this job than crossing off a list I carry in my pocket – the names of those who had been arbitrarily detained and unfairly held hostage, unjustly held hostage, and bringing them home, returning them to their families, returning them to their loved ones.

Finally, I just wanted to share this morning –

QUESTION: Get your hands off me. Get your hands off me. Get your hands off me. Get your hands off me. Answer a damn question.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I look forward to answering questions in a few minutes.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) about Israel’s nuclear weapons – everybody from the ICJ – I was sitting here quietly and now I am being manhandled by two or three people. You pontificate about a free press? You pontificate about a free press? You are hurting me. You are hurting me. You are hurting me. I am asking questions after being told by Matt Miller that he will not answer my questions, and so I ask them.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Please, sir, respect the – respect the process. We’ll have an opportunity to take questions in a few minutes.

QUESTION: Wasn’t – wasn’t the point of the May 31st statement to block the ICJ orders? You blocked the ICJ orders. You –

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Please, sir, respect the process. Thank you.

QUESTION: Oh, respect the process. Respect the process while everybody – everybody from the International – from Amnesty International to the ICJ’s saying that Israel’s doing genocide and extermination, and you’re telling me to respect the process. Criminal. Why aren’t you in The Hague? Why aren’t you in The Hague? Why aren’t you in The Hague?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Finally, we’ve worked to modernize our diplomacy so that we’re more agile, we’re more effective, we’re more prepared for the challenges of a new era. We’ve reorganized this department to lead on issues that increasingly animate our diplomacy, whether it’s emerging technology, public health, strategic competition, economic statecraft. We’ve embraced new tools and approaches, from integrating data and AI into the work that we do, strengthening our capacity to anticipate, to plan for risks as well as opportunities in this more volatile world.

Maybe most important, we’ve invested in our people – improving our hiring and retention practices, diversifying our workforce, strengthening our training, providing more support to employees throughout their careers. We’ve hired the largest Foreign Service officer class in more than a decade, and we’ve grown our Civil Service corps at the fastest rate in more than 20 years.

It was gratifying to me, and I think to everyone in this department, that among the first and last stops President Biden made in his tenure was right here at the State Department. I think that is powerful evidence of the trust that he placed in us to carry out this country’s foreign policy. Our diplomats represent this country with exceptional skill, with professionalism, with heart. They often do so at great personal sacrifice, little fanfare, in some of the world’s most challenging environments. It has been, simply put, the greatest of honors to be able to work shoulder to shoulder with them.

These past four years, there have also been moments of disappointment, of hardship, of heartbreak, but I leave this job knowing that we spent every day thinking about and working toward what we believe is best for our people, the citizens we have the immense privilege of representing. And I’m confident we leave office with our country and with this department in a much stronger position than we found it.

And now, with that, one last time, I look forward to taking some questions. Mr. Miller.

MR MILLER: Matt, want to start us off?

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for your very opening comments about the work, the cooperation with us, the press corps. Even when we haven’t always been satisfied or – with the answers, we certainly appreciate the – your willingness to engage with us. And so thank you for that.

I want to start – I actually only have one question. Exactly 16 years ago today, January 16th, 2009, former – outgoing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had her final press briefing here, and all of the questions she got were about Israel and Gaza – every single one of them. And she said we were working on an enduring ceasefire. She was about to sign an agreement with then-Foreign Minister Livni that would move toward that way. She was working with international partners. Names have changed, but countries pretty much the same – Egypt, the Europeans, the Gulf Arab states.

And so, 16 years ago, we were in the same situation that we’re in now, particularly because the ceasefire, the current one, still seems to be in limbo. And I’m wondering if you can point to any progress that has been made over the course of those – the Bush administration, the Obama administration – has there been anything that has changed or given you hope? Because we’re basically back in the same position we were 16 years ago.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you, Matt. This is a long story. It’s an enduring story. It’s a story that is not likely to end any time soon. And if you go back over the course of many administrations – not only Secretary Rice, but so many of our predecessors and so many of her successors, and now me – this is a story that we’ve been engaged in, one way or another. And I think each of us has probably brought the conviction to it that we could and should do everything possible to try to get to and write a better conclusion, a good conclusion, for the story. And so many of us, for many years, have labored to do just that.

I think one of the lessons that we have to take away is that as resourceful and as powerful as we are, at the end of the day we can’t make decisions for others. They have to make them. They have to make hard choices. They have to take chances. We can do everything possible to push, to prod, to encourage, to support, but ultimately the decision lies with those most directly concerned. That’s one thing.

But the second thing is – and I believe this strongly – there’s also no substitute for our engagement, for the efforts that we make in trying to move this forward and get to a better place. And yes, we have absolutely seen both progress and promise, and the question is whether leaders on all sides – with the people behind them – will find a way to seize on those opportunities.

So as I laid out in some detail just the other day, when we took office we were very focused on pursuing greater integration in the region as the real answer to creating more security, more peace, more opportunity for people, not change – not trying to change individual countries, governments, societies, but bringing them closer together.

And before October 7th, we’d done a lot of work on this integration, building on the Abraham Accords of the first Trump administration, pointing toward the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. And as you all know, we were all planning to go to Saudi Arabia and Israel because we’d made so much progress on the normalization accords, on October 10th, a trip that of course didn’t happen, to do two things: to try to help finalize agreements that were necessary to get to normalization, and as part of that, to find a clearer way forward, a pathway to a Palestinian state – vital to Saudi Arabia, very important to us as well.

Even with everything that’s happened since October 7th, I believe strongly, including from my many conversations with leaders in the region, whether it’s in Israel, in Saudi Arabia, or beyond, that the desire to pursue integration, the desire to bring countries together remains strong, remains powerful, and can be a driving force for finally resolving some of these other questions, including the Palestinian question. Israel’s deepest desire from day one of its founding was to be treated like any other country in the region, to have normal relations. And it’s been demonstrated that that’s possible and desired, but it requires, among other things, ending the conflict in Gaza, which we are now on the verge of doing as a result of everything that we have put into this, an agreement that President Biden put forward – put forward before the world in May, got the entire world to endorse, and in the months since we’ve been working to negotiate the final details and get it implemented. And that’s where we are now.

So end Gaza’s one, and then yes, a credible pathway to a Palestinian state is two, and leaders will have to summon the vision and the courage to do that. I laid out some ideas for how you can get there just the other day, but I believe that is possible. And I believe the driving desire for integration is something that can carry this forward.

Finally, I’ll say this. We’ve also seen, as a result of so much of the work that we’ve done, what the possibilities are. For Israel, when it was attacked in an unprecedented way by Iraq and – by Iran, excuse me – a direct attack with hundreds of missiles, hundreds of drones, not only did we come to Israel’s active defense for the first time ever; we brought other countries along to do that, including countries in the region. And Israel now sees, powerfully, what it stands to gain from greater integration in the region, including in a common security architecture. All can see that this is a way to effectively isolate the troublemaker in the region, Iran.

So all of that is there; all of that is possible. And I think for the incoming administration, it’ll be important to continue to show: Here’s one path and what can be achieved by following that path, and then there’s another, which is perpetual violence, destruction, terrorism, and despair for people. That’s the choice. I think we’ve now put in place and done the work that, handing it off, can be used to build a strong foundation and move down that much more positive path.

MR MILLER: Leon.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Leon.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your service. Thank you for doing this. I trust you’re not going to miss the million of miles that you’ve done in the last four years, and that you’re happy to finally see your children. I wanted to ask you on Gaza, of course, you mentioned tremendous relief in the region, both with Palestinians and Israel. There seems to be uncertainty for the ceasefire, and it – basically it was announced yesterday, and it’s supposed to be implemented on Sunday. That’s four days, quite a long time. Israel has been – has led new strikes upon Gaza today or overnight. How confident are you that this ceasefire is actually going to happen? And if I may, just a broader question. After the four years, your four years and now that your tenure is coming up, what is your proudest accomplishment in these four years and what is your biggest disappointment?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So on the ceasefire, yes, I am confident and I fully expect that implementation will begin, as we said, on Sunday. Look, it’s not exactly surprising that in a process – in a negotiation that has been this challenging and this fraught, you may get a loose end. We’re tying up that loose end as we speak. I’ve been on the phone in one way or another all morning with Brett McGurk, with our Qatari friends, and I’m very confident that we – this is moving forward, and we’ll see the start of implementation of the agreement on Sunday.

In terms of my own tenure and what I take from it – and I think they’ll be plenty of opportunity to reflect on that in the weeks and months ahead – look, in terms of satisfaction, as I said at the outset, we came in knowing that we had to reset the foundation for American diplomacy and American foreign policy. And resetting that foundation meant, as I’ve said, re-engaging, rejuvenating, reimagining these alliances and partnerships. It’s the greatest strength that we bring to virtually every issue we have to tackle around the world – these voluntary partnerships and alliances that have stood us in such good stead over so many years and I think are vital to effectively operating in this more complicated, this more contested, this more combustible world. And that’s exactly what we did. But the point is not doing that for the sake of doing it; the point is doing it for the sake of more effectively dealing with the world we’re operating in. And I think we’ve demonstrated that.

When Ukraine was attacked by Russia, because of the investments that we’d made in our partnerships and our alliances, we were able to bring together 50 countries, keep them together, and marshal their focus and their resources on helping to defend Ukraine. And we’ve done that very successfully, and we’ve done that in a way where many other countries picked up the burden.

When it comes to maybe the biggest systemic challenge that we face in the international system, and that is China and the capacity that it has uniquely – whether it’s militarily, whether it’s economically, whether it’s diplomatically – to reshape the international order, what we’ve been able to do through these stronger alliances and partnerships is to focus other countries in ways that we haven’t seen before on how to deal effectively with the challenges posed by China. We have much greater convergence between us and partners in Europe, between us and partners in Asia, among all of us, in confronting these challenges. And I listed a few areas in which we’re working much more closely together. And as I’ve said before, when you bring just the United States to the table, well, we have a lot of weight; but when it comes to economic issues, for example, where China is engaged in unfair practices, where it’s engaged in overcapacity to try to drown our industries, our communities, our workers with their products, well, when we’re taking that on and we’re doing it alone, we’re 20 percent of world GDP. When we’re doing that in concert with allies and partners across Europe and Asia who are similarly aggrieved by these practices, well, we’re 50-60 percent of world GDP and it’s a lot more effective in getting China to change its conduct. So those are just two ways in which we’ve used this investment in our allies and partners to get real results, to tackle real problems, to meet real challenges.

And again, through so many of the issues that are affecting the lives of our people, we’ve brought countries together in a way that’s going to have a material impact on making things better. I mentioned earlier the coalition we built on synthetic opioids, on fentanyl. You’ve heard me say this before: The number one killer of Americans aged 18 to 45 is fentanyl. And it’s by definition a problem that has to be tackled cooperatively with other countries because the ingredients that go into making it may be made halfway around the world. They come close to our borders. They get synthesized into fentanyl. They come into the United States. They kill people. So the fact that we’ve brought all of these countries together now working in close concert to deal with this problem, that’s going to have a material benefit on the lives of the American people. In these ways and so many more, what I’m – what I take satisfaction is, is that we now can approach each of these problems from a position of much greater strength, much greater effectiveness.

Disappointments – yeah, of course, there are always many. There’s always the things that you didn’t get done. There’s always the could’ve, would’ve, should’ve that you ask yourself. But I think it’s also important to take a minute and take stock of what we actually have done, what the men and women of this department have achieved.

Would I have wished, do I wish, we could have gotten this ceasefire agreement months ago? Of course. The suffering since, the lives lost since, sure, could have been – could have been avoided if we had gotten this over the line sooner. But in something as complex, as complicated, where different events have intervened and the work that we had done, the progress we were making towards bringing it to conclusion was delayed or derailed, as the President again said yesterday, almost every time you’re trying to deal with something this hard, and as George Mitchell put it so well in the context of Northern Ireland peace, you’re going to have many, many days of setback and struggle before you get to that final day of success. But every one of those days of setback and struggle is necessary to get you to the day of success.

MR MILLER: Daphne.

QUESTION: Thank you for your service and thank you for taking our questions over the last four years. Since the Gaza war erupted, there has been a flood of reports with supporting videos and evidence of potential IHL violations by Israel, and yet your department has refrained from making a definitive assessment. There is a sense out there that you gave Israel a pass on this issue and that that’s a part of the administration’s legacy. Is there any chance you will deliver a definitive assessment on this in your final days?

And if I may, on another region, we’re reporting that the U.S. will impose sanctions on Sudan’s Burhan today. Could you confirm whether the administration will take that step? And why do this now and why wait till now?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you. We and I take very seriously the work that we do – and we have a responsibility to do – to assess in any place whether violations of international humanitarian law are occurring, war crimes, other abuses of international law, international norms, international practice. And that’s what we continue to do every day, whether it’s in the Middle East, Gaza, or in many other places around the world. And I’ll come to that because your question about Sudan goes there as well.

In Gaza, we faced a uniquely challenging situation in trying to make final determinations. Because uniquely in Gaza, besides having a population that’s been trapped there that has nowhere else to go, you have an enemy that embeds itself in and among civilians – houses, hospitals, mosques, schools. And getting a clear picture and a clear understanding of whether any one incident in that context constitutes a violation of international law in one way or another is an incredibly complicated thing to do, especially to do in real time.

So we continue to gather the information. We continue to assess it. If we have any conclusions that we can draw in the time that remains, we will. I’d also point out that in Israel itself there are hundreds of cases that are being investigated. They have a process; they have procedures; they have rule of law. And we also look to them to carry out that process, to carry out the rule of law themselves. That’s the hallmark of any democracy.

We have reported in a number of ways on what we’ve seen, including in the NSM report. We’ve taken actions in a variety of ways in a variety of places, particularly, for example, in the West Bank, where we’ve seen abuses committed by extremist settlers against Palestinians and for the first time taken action against them. And I believe and trust that this process will continue, and as we are able to reach results we will.

When it comes to Sudan, you know the actions we took in the direction of the RSF just a few days ago. The SAF has also committed war crimes and it continues to target civilians. It’s obstructed the advancement of the peace process. It’s refused to participate on numerous occasions in ceasefire talks that we’ve sought to convene. And together with the RSF, it’s caused what is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis that people are suffering through every day.

And we believe strongly, as we’ve said, there’s no military solution to this conflict. So we have to see two things. We have to see the effective provision of humanitarian assistance to people who need it. We’ve been working very hard on that. We’ve seen some progress but not nearly enough. And we have to see the end of the firing, the end of this conflict. And there we’ve seen virtually no progress.

So in this situation, we’re able much more clearly to account for actions that are taken. There’s no ambiguity about the environment in which both sides are operating and what the results of the actions that they’ve taken actually are, both in terms of the horrific consequences for human life and what that means under our law and under international law.

MR MILLER: Michele.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? Thank you. Is the RSF and Burhan – are they equally responsible for mass atrocities? And is the – are these sanctions a sign of failure of diplomacy?

And then real quickly on the Middle East, how would you describe your dealings in these past 15 months with Netanyahu?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So on the RSF and the SAF, the actions we took with – on the RSF, as you know, founded – had a determination of genocide. The actions that we’re looking at for the SAF go to war crimes, so there are gradations in these things. And we follow the law. We look at the criteria. We look at this intensely with our lawyers, with our experts, in order to make these determinations, guided, as I said, by the criteria.

The end result is, one way or another, people are suffering grievously in Sudan. It is, again, the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. And we have been deeply engaged with our diplomacy to try to bring it to an end. We haven’t, to date. But as I’ve said, part of our challenge in any of these situations is to keep working through it, to keep pushing, to keep pressing to get to that one day of success. It is for me, yes, another real regret that, when it comes to Sudan, we haven’t been able on our watch to get to that day of success. As I said, some improvements in getting humanitarian assistance in through our diplomacy, but not an end to the conflict, not an end to the abuses, not an end to the suffering of people. We’ll keep working it for the next three days, and I hope the next administration will take that on as well.

On the last 15 months, look, one of the things I think is really important is, as a general matter, to focus less on personalities and on people and more on policies, and what is it that we can do, what is it we should do, to effect those policies. And so what we’ve been working on over the last 15 months, since October 7th, was to help shape the response in a way that accomplished three basic things: one, of course, to try to ensure that October 7th could never happen again and to make good on our commitment to Israel’s security; two, to prevent a wider war, a broader conflict that drew in more countries, more groups, both because that would bring even more death and destruction and because it was exactly what Hamas was looking for, get that wider war, be able to have others attacking Israel, and to allow Hamas to continue to do what it was doing; and third, of course, was to try to do right by the people who are caught in the middle of this crossfire that Hamas initiated – the children, the women, the men of Gaza – with better protection for them, with more assistance for them. And that’s what we’ve been focused on these 15 months.

None of that changes what’s happened, but it has put us now in a position where there is the real possibility for moving this to a better place – the immediate possibility, more than possibility, now the immediate reality of finally moving Gaza to a better place, finally getting hostages home, finally getting relief that people need, finally having an opportunity to have an enduring ceasefire. But also, as I was talking about with Matt before, in the region, as a result of the extraordinary setbacks that all of these actors who are responsible for the death, the carnage, the inability to make progress, the setbacks that they have encountered, whether it’s Iran, whether it’s Hizballah, whether it’s Hamas.

So that creates a real moment of opportunity. And as I said, we’ve done everything we can to put in place, to make the investments and the plans necessary to take advantage of that opportunity. We’re handing them off, and my hope, as I said, is the administration that’s coming in will continue them.

MR MILLER: Jenny.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on shaping those policies, looking back is there anything you would have changed in how you negotiate to shape those policies? And do you regret not being firmer on the red lines you gave to Israel on humanitarian aid and civilian harm, given the state of Gaza right now?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So again, a few things that I think are important, or at least that I take away from this. One is it’s, I think, a mistake to ascribe to any one individual or any small number of individuals policies that in the case of Gaza were basically supported by an overwhelming majority of Israelis after the trauma of October 7th. This is a deeply traumatized society, just as Palestinian society is deeply traumatized by everything that’s followed October 7th. And if you don’t understand that or don’t factor that in, it’s really challenging to make progress.

So I think we’ve looked at that. We’ve understood that. And as I said, we had certain priorities that the President set that we’ve tried to carry forward in approaching everything we’ve done since October 7th. And we are now in a place where we’re finally, I think, making good on those priorities. We – as I mentioned, one of them was to avoid a broader war with more countries coming in, and at various moments throughout these last 15 months we’ve been right on the edge of having that wider war.

And because of American diplomacy, because of American deterrence, because of America’s ability to mobilize others, we’ve avoided it. When we had those unprecedented attacks by Iran on Israel, we marshaled other countries to come to Israel’s defense. And then when it came to Israel’s response, we shaped it, shaped it in a way that it was strong but also calibrated so that Iran’s air defenses were taken out, but we didn’t have actions that were escalatory and that produced a wider war. And that didn’t just happen. It was the product, again, of American diplomacy and American deterrence.

Throughout the 15 months on the humanitarian situation, when – and again, in an environment that is unique, which doesn’t obviate Israel’s responsibilities, doesn’t excuse things that haven’t been done that should have been done, but is important because operating in that unique environment with a population trapped in Gaza – in other places where there are conflicts, people can usually go somewhere else. You’re a refugee – not a good thing, but better than being trapped in a crossfire. Gaza, almost uniquely, people are trapped. And as I’ve said many times before, trapped with an enemy that deliberately uses them, hides among them, looks for civilian casualties as not only a necessary cost but one that actually advances their agenda. And we know this from the leader of Hamas himself, Yahya Sinwar. So that’s made things very challenging. But whenever on humanitarian assistance we’ve seen things moving from bad to worse, we’ve engaged strongly and we’ve gotten results, whether it was back in April or May, whether it was more recently in September, October.

But fundamentally, the only way given the complicated – incredibly complicated environment to really get at the needs of the people was through a ceasefire and a hostage deal, and that’s why we’ve been laboring so hard on it. And that’s why now, as it’s implemented, we’re finally going to see the relief that people so desperately need.

Let me just add this, and I’m sorry for going on: At various points along the way in terms of getting that deal, the biggest impediments really have been Hamas and its refusal to get to yes. Now, have there been moments when Israel has done things or taken actions that have made life more complicated, more difficult? Yes. But broadly speaking, and especially in the last months until we got to success, Hamas has been the major impediment.

And there were two things that were factoring into Hamas’s thinking, and we know this. One, as I said, was the hope that they could get a wider war, that others would jump in, that the cavalry would come to the rescue. And it wasn’t until recently that it became clear that that was not the case. And whether it was Iran, whether it was Hizballah, whether it was Iranian proxies, whether it was the supply routes for those proxies through Syria, as a result of actions that Israel took, as a result of actions that we took, as a result of conflicts and problems that these various actors had gotten themselves into that we exacerbated, it finally got to the point where Hamas concluded that, as I said, the cavalry wasn’t coming to the rescue. That wasn’t going to happen.

Second, Hamas held back at various points because it saw or hoped that public international pressure was mounting on Israel, and it could just wait it out and that pressure would get to a point where Israel would have to accede to all of Hamas’s demands. And that includes the hope that there would be a lot of public daylight between the United States and Israel. And so while clearly we’ve had differences – real differences – with Israel on the way it’s gone about the necessary defense of its people and its country, we’ve expressed those clearly at various points. But we’ve mostly done it privately precisely because we didn’t want to feed into Hamas’s clearly held views that if that pressure was mounting and if there was daylight, they could do nothing, they could refuse to engage on the – in the negotiations, hold back on a ceasefire and releasing the hostages, and thus perpetuate the suffering, the loss for the people that they purport to represent.

All of those dynamics were in play. All of those dynamics were ones that we had to make judgments about, navigate with eyes on the prize of getting to the day we got to yesterday, which is the ceasefire and hostage release. So it’s absolutely appropriate to ask questions about that, to ask ourselves questions, for everyone to ask questions. Some people say we did too much to restrain Israel when it comes to Iran, when it comes to Hizballah, when it comes to others. Others say we did much too much to enable, and all of those questions are the right ones to ask and they’ll be asked for a long time. We had to keep our focus relentlessly on getting to this place where we could actually get a change, where we could actually get an end to a conflict, an end to suffering, and the prospect of something better.

MR MILLER: We’ll take one more. Nick Schifrin.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, thanks very much. On why you got to the ceasefire deal, as you just highlighted, you’ve talked a lot about Hamas and pressure; Hamas being diminished helped get them across the line. But on the Israeli side, do you believe that Trump and Steve Witkoff, either through direct pressure or through Netanyahu’s perception of Trump – that helped get this deal across the line?

And I want to bring up Ukraine and give you a chance to do legacy on Ukraine. You’ve argued that you’ve taken a lot of recent steps to try and give Ukraine leverage and give the Trump administration leverage. Let me just point out, though, that there’s no money left in the replenishment fund, Ukraine struggles on the front line, Ukraine has a – sorry, Russia has a reconstituted defense industrial base because of China. So do you fear that your legacy on Ukraine could actually be defined by your successor?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: On the ceasefire deal first, look, the important thing is not who gets the credit, the important thing is getting the result. And that’s exactly what we’ve gotten, and as I’ve said, the deal that was agreed is based on the proposal that President Biden put out months ago in May, the framework that he made public in detail that we then went around the world and got country after country to endorse, culminating with the UN Security Council. That’s what moved Hamas in the first instance, because up until that point Hamas had been rejecting the idea of having an initial phase of six weeks, ceasefire, hostages begin to come out, prisoners are released, humanitarian assistance surges, and we use the time to reach an agreement on the conditions for an enduring ceasefire. They’d rejected that scheme, and it wasn’t until May when the President went public, detailed it, and we got the whole world behind it that Hamas was isolated and it moved.

And then every – practically every day since then has been work on trying to actually negotiate the details that had to follow from that to fill in the framework – and understandings on its implementation. And we got very close to completing that on a number of occasions, and as I said, events of one kind or another inevitably intervene – that delay, that derail the work that you’re doing. But we kept at it, and meanwhile, as I just described – I won’t belabor – all of these other factors that went into the calculus of Hamas changed dramatically, and in no small part because of actions we took in a way to exacerbate the challenges of Hamas and its many potential supporters, as well as actions that that Israel took.

So I think that’s what got us to this day. Our diplomacy, our deterrence, really isolated Hamas to the point where they finally came to the – came back to the table, got to yes. In recent weeks, just to cite some other examples, when Hamas was refusing to engage in the fall, I went to our friends in Qatar and said: It’s time to tell them that their political operation housed in Qatar is no longer welcome. And that’s exactly what the Qataris did. In recent weeks, we went also to other actors, including Türkiye and President Erdogan, to use his weight and influence to get Hamas back to the table to try to conclude an agreement. And he did and they did.

So it’s a long way of saying that all of these things coming together over many months, I believe, is what’s gotten us here. Now, having said that, it was, I think, very important and very responsible to not only fully inform the incoming administration of what we were doing but also, yes, to involve them in the – this last part of the process that got us to the agreement. And the reason for that is virtually everything that now needs to be implemented under the agreement will be implemented under the Trump administration. And it was very important for the parties to know that the Trump administration stood behind the agreement that we’d negotiated and that President Biden put forward.

And I both appreciate and applaud the very good work that Steve Witkoff did, working closely with us, with Brett McGurk, in helping to get this over the line. But I think sending – being very clear with all concerned that the incoming administration supported, endorsed, and would carry forward its responsibilities under the agreement, that was an important thing to do.

QUESTION: Ukraine?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’m sorry. On Ukraine. So as I look at it, first, where we started was Putin’s intent, desire, and plan to erase Ukraine from the map, to subsume it into Russia, to realize his imperial designs. And as a result of the actions that we took in support of the Ukrainian people with many other countries, that’s failed and it won’t succeed. Ukraine is standing, and that’s the most important thing of all.

Now, the question of where Ukraine goes from here and where we go from here is obviously a very important one, because there’s an opportunity, again, an opportunity that we’re handing off to make sure that Ukraine can go forward as an independent country, increasingly integrated with Western institutions, because that’s the desire of its people, and a country that stands on its own feet – whether that’s militarily, whether that’s economically, whether that’s democratically – and if its people and elected officials so desire, to pursue some kind of resolution or ceasefire with Russia.

Now, that requires Ukraine to decide that that’s what it wants to do. It also requires Russia to agree. And there, what we’ve been working to do all these past months right up to the end, is to make sure, as I’ve said many times, that Ukraine is in a position of strength to be able to make those decisions, whether that’s to continue fighting if it’s necessary or to negotiate but to negotiate from a strong position. Part of that, though, has also been imposing extraordinary costs on Russia, and I think you should not discount those, including the impact that they have on Russia’s decision-making.

The losses that Russia has incurred are almost unimaginable – I think, by some assessments, 7-to 800,000 casualties. That includes those killed and those wounded. The flight of so many of its most talented people from Russia, the weight of sanctions, export controls, the weight that’s such that everything Russia tries to do, even the workarounds that it’s done with its war economy, everything is harder, takes more time, and costs a lot more. We see the impact on its economy. We see the impact on its future – its inability to invest in the critical industries of the future that would be a source of strength for Russia. So there’s a heavier and heavier weight bearing down.

So I believe that the incoming administration is in a position where, if the Ukrainians so desire and so choose, it can help to negotiate a good deal. And President Trump talks about having good, strong deals. I think there’s an opportunity to get one. One of the most critical things will be, if there is to be a ceasefire, is to make sure that it’s enduring, that it holds. Because what we know is this: In Putin’s mind if there’s a ceasefire, he’s simply going to rest, refit, and then when he deems the moment right, re-attack. So you have to have built into any ceasefire the effective deterrence necessary so that he doesn’t re-attack. That is, I think, a necessary part of any good, strong deal for Ukraine.

So there are lots of ways of doing that, and we’ve been talking to European partners about some of that. Again, all of that I’m sharing with the incoming administration, and I would hope and expect that they can help land this in a place where everything we’ve done to make sure that Ukraine not only survives – which it is and which it will – but actually thrives can be realized.

QUESTION: Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’ll take a couple more.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

QUESTION: How about here, sir.

MR MILLER: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: On Austin Tice. On Austin Tice, please.

QUESTION: Sir, how about (inaudible) the only –

MR MILLER: (Inaudible.) Go ahead.

QUESTION: On Austin Tice, it’s been a few weeks since Roger Carstens had said they were narrowing down locations where he may have been held. I just wanted to see if you had any more fidelity on that. And then separately, yesterday your successor, before the Senator Foreign Relations Committee commented on the Panama Canal. You’ve been dismissive of the incoming administration’s overtures on Greenland but not as vocal on the Panama Canal. He said the issue is not a joke and it’s a legitimate issue that needs to be confronted over questions of neutrality and China’s ability to choke off commerce on both sides of the canal. So I wanted to see your comments on that.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Sure. Look, on Austin Tice, all I can tell you is this: Not a day goes by where we’re not out there trying to, obviously, find him or get information about what has become of him. And I don’t have anything to report beyond what we’ve already said, but we have people throughout Syria who know the importance that we attach to this and are leaving no stone unturned to find Austin. So he and his family remain in my thoughts, all of our prayers, but mostly we’re working to – in any way that we can – to find him. And of course, if we have any further information and hopefully have Austin, we’ll share that or the next administration will share that.

Look, on Panama, on the Panama Canal, we have a treaty, we have a settled policy of many years. And that’s not going to change. And as I’ve said before, I think it doesn’t warrant spending a lot of time talking about it. Now, when it comes to the resilience of our supply chains, when it comes to making sure that we can get what we need and we don’t have risk attendant with it, including from countries with which we have challenged relations, that’s – that is important. And that’s something that we’ve worked on pretty much around the world for the last four years, building a greater diversity of the supply chains, building a greater resilience; also, trying to make sure that countries that were trying to build up and build out their own infrastructure to improve the lives and livelihoods of their people had a better offer from us so that they didn’t have to turn to others on much more onerous terms. And we’ve made extraordinary progress on that these last four years. So I think that’s where the focus should be and that’s where the – where I expect the focus actually will be.

MODERATOR: Tom.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking the extra questions. Since the ceasefire was announced, authorities in Gaza have reported another 73 people killed. Aren’t we seeing an erosion of norms given the extraordinary numbers? And you’ve been saying for months that Hamas is degraded militarily. At one point you said, I think, Israel was only making marginal gains when there had been another very big airstrike with civilians killed. So I just want to put that point to you that hasn’t – haven’t we seen here the degradation of norms given the kind of extraordinary numbers? And here we are still seeing them after a ceasefire agreement is announced in the run-up to that. So I wanted to get your thoughts on that.

And just secondly, on the point about international journalists being banned from Gaza, can you tell us that you are and have been still pressing the Israelis, that it is your expectation that international journalists will be allowed in?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Second part first – yes, that remains the expectation, and I think it’s, as in any place, very important that all of you and your colleagues are able to report, are able to share with the world what the reality is. So we – and certainly I fully expect that to happen, and especially in the context of a ceasefire where the idea that it just may be too dangerous for anyone to operate is no longer the case. So I fully expect to see that.

QUESTION: During the ceasefire, during phase one?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I would hope so. I can’t speak to what the policies will be, but from my perspective, at least, yes.

Second, with regard to the ongoing actions, I spoke to this the other day at the Atlantic Council. And yes, I think some months ago, Israel achieved its core strategic objectives in Gaza, the fundamental objective being to ensure that Hamas could not repeat the horrors of October 7th, and to do that, to dismantle its military organization and capacity and to deal with the leaders who were responsible for October 7th. And that happened some months ago. But in order for there to be a ceasefire, it was necessary that there be some agreement on getting the hostages out, including seven Americans who remain.

And in order to get the ceasefire to be enduring, now that we have an agreement on its first phase, there have to be understandings on what comes after, on a post-conflict plan, one that allows Israel to fully pull out its forces and stay out, one that makes sure that Hamas can’t go back in, and one that’ll – that provides for the necessary governance, security, reconstruction of Gaza. And we’d been working every day in parallel on those plans. So now there’s an opportunity finally to move forward.

But as I’ve said, as I said to you the other day, I think Israel’s perspective on this has been if they took pressure off of Hamas, it would make it less likely that Hamas would actually finally conclude this agreement. That’s their – that’s the way they see it and that’s the way they proceeded. We’ve tried to reinforce every day the urgency of actually getting to an agreement so that all of this would stop, the firing by both sides would stop, the hostages would come out, the relief would get in. Well, we’re finally at that point.

I thank you all very, very much. Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: And enjoy driving yourself on Route 66 and the GW Parkway. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Matt, stay out of my way. (Laughter.)




Joint Statement by the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) on a Russian Influence Campaign
01/17/2025


Joint Statement by the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) on a Russian Influence Campaign
01/17/2025 10:02 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, which includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union, and NATO:

Begin text:

The G7 RRM notes recent statements by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada exposing the ongoing covert activities of Russian state media outlet RT (formerly Russia Today) and the Social Design Agency (SDA). These statements reveal that the Kremlin has funded and directed covert efforts by these entities to subvert societies through global disinformation and influence campaigns.

The above-referenced statements have noted that RT and SDA employ deceitful tactics, aiming to exploit social and political issues to polarize and weaken societies, to undermine and delegitimize elected governments, and to advance the Kremlin’s malign interests. This includes diverting attention from the atrocities committed and humanitarian crises caused by its war of aggression against Ukraine.

The G7 RRM regards any foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) with the utmost seriousness. G7 RRM members will continue to shed light on these malign activities, which may include but are not limited to state-backed hostile cyber activities, psychological and information operations and covert influence.

Since its inception, the G7 RRM has focused on countering foreign state-sponsored disinformation and promoting the resilience of society against FIMI. The G7 RRM includes G7 members and partners, including Australia, New Zealand, NATO, the Netherlands, and Sweden as observers. The G7 RRM and likeminded global partners stand together in countering these ongoing malign activities.

End text.




Global Alliances Standing Firm: Reflections From a Final Diplomatic Visit
01/17/2025


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FROM THE DESK OF
Secretary Antony J. Blinken

U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE




I’ve traveled more than a million miles over the last four years. Everywhere I’ve gone, we’ve worked to bring countries together, with the belief that partnership is essential to building a world that’s a little bit safer, a little more secure, and a little more prosperous. Last week, I completed my final trip as Secretary of State, visiting East Asia and Europe to meet with some of our closest allies.

Secretary Blinken prepares to deliver opening remarks for President Biden’s foreign policy address on the work of his Administration to strengthen America and lead the world, at the Department of State on January 13, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Chuck Kennedy)


When I took this job, President Biden told me that my number one assignment was to revitalize and reimagine our alliances and partnerships. Over the past four years, that is exactly what we have done, and in the process better positioned us to meet the tests of our time and deliver for our people.

It is fitting that my last trip as Secretary included the Republic of Korea, Japan, and France. In a world that is more complex, more competitive, and more contested than at any time in recent memory, these relationships exemplify the strengths of our alliances – both those that are new and changing, and those that are enduring.

Secretary Blinken has a working luncheon with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Cho Tae-Yul on January 6, 2025 in Seoul, Republic of Korea. (Official State Department photo by Chuck Kennedy)

With Japan and the Republic of Korea, we have invested in a new trilateral relationship to protect our shared vision of an Indo-Pacific that’s free, open, and secure. We have launched a trilateral partnership with Japan and the Philippines and revitalized the Quad with India and Australia. Relationships that started out focusing on bilateral and regional issues are now genuinely global in scope.

Alliances are indispensable in facing the pressing global challenges of our time, and the indivisibility of global security is more apparent than ever. When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, nations like Japan quickly recognized that this was not simply a regional conflict but a direct attack on principles that ensure peace and stability worldwide. With the Republic of Korea, we’ve enhanced our coordination and response to North Korean aggression, including recent missile launches. Today, there’s a greater premium than ever before in likeminded countries finding ways to work together to meet these challenges.

Secretary Blinken meets with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris, France, on January 8, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Chuck Kennedy)

In France, I revisited a partnership that has gone back many, many years and that continues to deliver results. Together, France and the United States produced a ceasefire in Lebanon that is holding and creating the possibility for a different and better future for the country. And global support for Ukraine – that France and the United States have helped bring about together – is one of the strongest examples I’ve ever seen of burden-sharing.

Even though we’re in political transition, the world doesn’t stop. It doesn’t wait for our transitions. There is much on our common agenda that we must continue working on. If the United States is not engaged – if we’re not leading – then someone else is, and probably not in a way that reflects our interests and our values.

What we’ve done over the last four years is we’ve re-engaged. In these and so many other ways, these partnerships produce results that will make a difference in the lives of our people. And I’m convinced that in the years to come, our countries will continue to work together and lead together on the world stage – not out of convenience, not out of charity, but because the challenges we face demand our engagement, demand our partnership, and demand our cooperation.

We’ll confront a changing world as we always have, guided by shared commitment to bring greater freedom, greater opportunity, greater security to the people that we’re entrusted to represent.

Sincerely,

Secretary Antony J. Blinken



Note to Readers

This email – “From the Secretary's Desk” – features my remarks and speeches on important current events. It was adapted from remarks that I delivered during my recent trip to Europe and East Asia.

Find all my speeches, remarks, and other press statements on State.gov.





Sanctioning Anti-Dayton Actors and Their Financial Enablers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
01/17/2025


Sanctioning Anti-Dayton Actors and Their Financial Enablers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
01/17/2025 01:22 PM EST



Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Sanctioning Anti-Dayton Actors and Their Financial Enablers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Sanctioning Anti-Dayton Actors and Their Financial Enablers in Bosnia and Herzegovina


Press Statement





January 17, 2025



The United States today designated eight individuals who organized and executed the commemoration of Republika Srpska (RS) Day on January 8-10, 2024 in support of RS President Milorad Dodik’s secessionist agenda. Seven of those sanctioned today also helped plan and organize the 2025 commemoration. RS commemorations have been determined to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Directed and overseen by Dodik, they are emblematic of Dodik’s longstanding efforts to undermine the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, a cornerstone for regional peace and security. These individuals’ actions threaten the territorial integrity, peace, and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina by undermining the Dayton framework and its core institutions, including the BiH Constitutional Court and the authority of the High Representative.


Today, the United States is also sanctioning five individuals and one entity that form part of the Dodik family’s financial patronage network. Dodik has used his official position to accumulate personal wealth through companies linked to himself and his family at the expense of the Bosnian people. Dodik and his family often rely of a network of trusted associates to obfuscate their involvement and circumvent U.S. sanctions.


The Dayton Peace Agreement and the Constitution of BiH are the democratic and multiethnic framework essential to peace and stability in the country. As demonstrated by President Biden’s January 8, 2025 E.O. expanding U.S. sanctions authorities in the Western Balkans, the U.S. government will continue to promote accountability for those who seek to erode the rule of law and threaten peace and stability and facilitate efforts to circumvent U.S. sanctions.


The Department of the Treasury designated Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik on January 5, 2022, and on July 17, 2017. Treasury’s actions today were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) Executive Order 14033, as amended by E.O. 14140. For more information on today’s action, see Treasury’s press release.



Tags
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions Human Rights and Democracy Office of the Spokesperson


Multilateral Experts Group Initiates Joint Actions to Further Counter the Shadow Fleet and its Maritime Risks
01/17/2025



Multilateral Experts Group Initiates Joint Actions to Further Counter the Shadow Fleet and its Maritime Risks
01/17/2025 01:41 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Multilateral Experts Group Initiates Joint Actions to Further Counter the Shadow Fleet and its Maritime Risks
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Multilateral Experts Group Initiates Joint Actions to Further Counter the Shadow Fleet and its Maritime Risks


Media Note





January 17, 2025



The following text was jointly agreed upon by United States, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom following recent engagements.


Begin text:


On Friday January 10, 2025 in Copenhagen, Denmark convened a multilateral group of experts to develop concrete plans to further counter Russia’s shadow fleet including its high-risk activities in the Baltic Sea. Already, officials have built on that in-person engagement with follow-on virtual consultations to identify next steps and establish strong working relations. The group includes sanctions, energy, legal, and maritime experts from the United States, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The initial meeting was called on the basis of the new measure by the convening European countries to request relevant proof of insurance from suspected shadow fleet vessels that the NB8++ countries jointly announced at the JEF Leaders’ Summit in Tallinn on 16-17 December 2024, and taking notice of the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit in Helsinki 14 January 2024.


We are united in our commitment to further deter and disrupt high-risk maritime activities related to the shadow fleet together, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.


The shadow fleet comprises vessels that may engage in illegitimate and high-risk shipping practices for the purpose of circumventing sanctions, especially the Oil Price Cap set by the G7+. Shadow fleet vessels raise serious concerns for both the public and private sectors, as these vessels evade compliance with safety, environmental, and liability standards, not least due to the potential inadequate insurance.


Over the last three years, Russia has significantly expanded its shadow fleet, which contributes to its ability to fund its unjust and illegal war in Ukraine. Coastal States face elevated threats from Russia’s various maritime actions, including in relation to their shipping and offshore activities; critical undersea infrastructure; and marine environment, as well as wildlife.


The Russian shadow fleet has led to an increased risk of an environmental disaster in the Baltic Sea as well as globally. Obfuscating vessel positions through GPS interference and AIS manipulation has increased the risk of an accident. Recent events have shown that the shadow fleet used by Russia may also pose a risk to critical maritime infrastructure.


We applaud recent efforts to address these developments, such as:
The Coalition Advisory for the Maritime Oil Industry (October 2023, updated October 2024);
IMO Resolution A.1192(33) (Dec. 6, 2023);
Porvoo Declaration by the Council of the Baltic Sea States (Jun. 14, 2024 )
‘Call to Action’ on the shadow fleet, agreed at the UK-hosted European Political Community (EPC) Summit (Jul. 19, 2024);
Joint statement of the Nordic-Ukrainian Summit (Oct. 28, 2024);
The Shadow Fleet Expert Group Joint Statement (Nov. 15, 2024);
Insurance Initiative announced by NB8++ (Dec. 16, 2024);
Joint Statement of The Joint Expeditionary Force Leaders’ Summit in Tallinn (Dec. 17, 2024);
Joint Statement of the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit (Jan. 14, 2025); and the targeted U.S., EU, and UK sanctions against known vessels in the shadow fleet.


We are determined to further enhance our cooperation to counter high-risk maritime activity related to the shadow fleet in the coming time, including by:
Working on modalities for swift information-sharing on vessel insurance and other risk criteria to inform our sanctions development and other policy responses, particularly noting that insurance information will be requested from suspected shadow fleet vessels by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom;
Aligning our sanctions designations further and pursuing more proactive measures, including enforcement towards parties involved in their violation/circumvention;
Supporting workstreams related to best practices and standard operating procedures to deter and address harmful activities, including vessels that damage undersea infrastructure;
Exploring policy options to promote accountability and full economic liability for harm-causing actions;
Highlighting and shining future light on the risks associated with Russia’s shadow fleet together with academia, researchers, and the legitimate shipping industry;
Coordinating closely with likeminded partners, especially NB8++ countries; and
Maintaining close and regular engagement and information-sharing to anticipate and counter future maritime threats.


Collectively, we are committed to countering the shadow fleet and related threats, holding enablers to account – including through sanctions-related actions – for the risks they pose and the support they are providing to Russia’s war against Ukraine.


End text.



Tags
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Denmark Estonia Finland Office of the Spokesperson Poland Sweden United Kingdom


Condemning the Sentencing of Navalny’s Lawyers
01/17/2025



Condemning the Sentencing of Navalny’s Lawyers
01/17/2025 02:11 PM EST



Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases…Condemning the Sentencing of Navalny’s Lawyers
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Condemning the Sentencing of Navalny’s Lawyers


Press Statement





January 17, 2025



The United States condemns today’s sentencing of Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, and Aleksey Liptser.  These attorneys for late opposition politician Aleksey Navalny were sentenced to prison terms for allegedly participating in a so-called “extremist group.”  In this case, the Kremlin arrested and intimidated lawyers who were simply doing their jobs to ensure a political prisoner was afforded his right to legal representation, turning defense lawyers into political prisoners themselves.  This is yet another example of the persecution of defense lawyers by the Kremlin in its effort to undermine human rights, subvert the rule of law, and suppress dissent. 


We call on the Russian Government to release all political prisoners immediately.  



Tags
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Human Rights and Democracy Office of the Spokesperson Russia


The Week at State: January 10 - January 16, 2025
01/17/2025
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January 10 - January 16, 2025

As we reflect on four years of foreign policy achievements, the United States prepares to welcome a new administration while continuing to strengthen its role on the global stage.

Here’s what happened at State this past week. ⤵️✈️ President Biden delivered his farewell foreign policy speech.
🕊️ Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire deal that will end the fighting and free Israeli hostages.
🌏 Secretary Blinken concluded his final trip as Secretary of State.


President Biden Looks Back at Foreign Policy Accomplishments

On Monday, January 13, President Biden gave a farewell address highlighting the achievements of his administration in restoring U.S. leadership abroad, advancing democracy, and addressing global challenges.

“America is stronger, our alliances are stronger, our adversaries and competitors are weaker,” President Biden said at the State Department. “And we have not gone to war to make these things happen.”

The administration also highlighted several foreign policy accomplishments in its end-of-term success list, including strengthening NATO and deepening relationships in the Indo-Pacific.



Ceasefire Reached Between Israel and Hamas

After months of U.S.-led diplomacy, Israel and Hamas agreed on January 15 to a ceasefire and hostage deal, halting the fighting in Gaza, delivering humanitarian aid, and reuniting hostages with their families after over 15 months in captivity.

“Even as we welcome this news, we remember all the families whose loved ones were killed in Hamas’s October 7th attack, and the many innocent people killed in the war that followed,” President Biden said in a statement. “It is long past time for the fighting to end and the work of building peace and security to begin.”

The agreement came a day after Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s remarks at the Atlantic Council, where he outlined a post-conflict plan to “allow Israel to fully withdraw from Gaza, prevent Hamas from filling back in, and provide for Gaza’s governance, security, and reconstruction.”


Secretary Blinken Wraps Up His Final Trip as Secretary of State

Secretary Blinken concluded his final trip, visiting the Republic of Korea, Japan, France, and Italy. During his travels, he reinforced the importance of U.S. partnerships in tackling global challenges, from security to climate change.

“I’ve traveled over a million miles in this role, and everywhere I’ve gone, I’ve heard from people with a strong desire to work together with the United States,” Secretary Blinken said on X/Twitter. “Because of the work we’ve done to bring countries together, we’ve advanced progress for people in America and around the world.”

As Secretary Blinken wrapped up his time in office, he delivered farewell remarks to Department of State employees and remembered the people he met along the way.


News You May Have MissedSecretary Blinken reflected on key moments in American diplomacy from his tenure as the 71st U.S. Secretary of State.
The U.S. imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia’s energy sector. New sanctions targeted Russia’s oil industry, aiming to curtail revenue streams funding its activities in Ukraine.
The United States and Nigeria enhanced technology collaboration through a $2 million broadband study grant that will advance technology and expand connectivity in Nigeria, fostering economic growth.
Secretary Blinken condemned Venezuelan election fraud and Nicolás Maduro’s illegitimate attempt to seize power.
If your passport was lost or destroyed in the California wildfires, you may be able to replace it free of charge. Learn more at travel.state.gov/disaster.






🔎 Looking AheadJanuary 20: Martin Luther King Jr. Day
January 20: U.S. Presidential Inauguration Day
January 24: International Day of Education
January 27: International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust
👉 Note to Our Readers

We welcome your feedback on this newsletter. Send us your thoughts to EmailTeam@state.gov. 📩






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Denouncing Sham Elections and Continued Repression in Belarus
01/17/2025

Denouncing Sham Elections and Continued Repression in Belarus
01/17/2025 06:12 PM EST



Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

The 2025 presidential election in Belarus cannot be free or fair in the country’s current repressive environment. The Lukashenka regime’s systematic efforts to silence any dissent have determined the outcome of the election long before any ballots are cast, depriving the Belarusian people of the opportunity to choose their own leaders and determine their own future. The United States joins many of our European allies in assessing that elections cannot be credible in an environment where censorship is ubiquitous and independent media outlets no longer exist, where only regime-approved candidates can even appear on the ballot, and where members of the opposition are either imprisoned or in exile. The regime’s failure to issue a timely invitation to the OSCE to observe the upcoming election underscores its disregard for a transparent electoral process, as well as for its obligations as an OSCE participating state. The United States condemns the Lukashenka regime’s campaign of repression and its attempts to legitimize an election that cannot be free or fair.

Repression is born of weakness, not strength. The unprecedented measures to stifle any opposition make it clear that the Lukashenka regime fears its own people. The bravery of Belarusians inside and outside the country is having an effect. The United States recognizes the extraordinary perseverance of Belarusian individuals and civil society organizations working to hold the regime accountable. We continue to remember – and advocate for – the nearly 1,300 political prisoners who remain behind bars in Belarus. The United States stands with the



Belarusian people as they demand transparency, democracy, and freedom.
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