COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,update

 

Press material Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 11:44 | Press release | Cyber-attacks: six persons added to EU sanctions list for malicious cyber activities against EU member states and Ukraine   The Council today approved additional restrictive measures against six persons involved in cyber-attacks affecting information systems relating to critical infrastructure, critical state functions, the storage or processing of classified information and government emergency response teams in EU member states. For the first time, restrictive measures are being taken against cybercriminal actors that use ransomware campaigns against essential services, such as health and banking. The new listings include two members of the ‘Callisto group’, Ruslan Peretyatko and Andrey Korinets. The ‘Callisto group’ is a group of Russian military intelligence officers conducting cyber operations against EU member states and third countries through sustained phishing campaigns intended to steal sensitive data in critical state functions, including defence and external relations. The EU also targeted Oleksandr Sklianko and Mykola Chernykh of the ‘Armageddon hacker group’, a group supported by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation that carried out various cyber-attacks with a significant impact on the governments of EU member states and Ukraine, including by using phishing emails and malware campaigns. In addition, Mikhail Tsarev and Maksim Galochkin, key players in the deployment of the malwares ‘Conti’ and ‘Trickbot’ and involved in ‘Wizard Spider’, are also sanctioned. Trickbot is a malicious spyware program, created and developed by the threat group ‘Wizard Spider’, which has conducted ransomware campaigns in a variety of sectors, including essential services such as health and banking, and is therefore responsible for significant economic damage in the European Union. The EU horizontal cyber sanctions regime currently applies to 14 individuals and four entities, and includes an asset freeze and a travel ban. Additionally, EU persons and entities are forbidden from making funds available to those listed. With these new listings, the EU and its member states reaffirm their willingness to step up efforts to provide a stronger and more sustained response to persistent malicious cyber activities targeting the EU, its member states and partners. This is in line with joint efforts with our international partners, such as the UK and the US, to disrupt and respond to cyber crime. The EU remains committed to a global, open, and secure cyberspace and, reiterate the need to strengthen international cooperation to promote the rules-based order in this area. The relevant legal acts have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Background In June 2017, the EU established a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (the "Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox"). The framework allows the EU and its member states to use all CFSP measures, including restrictive measures if necessary, to prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious cyber activities targeting the integrity and security of the EU and its member states. The EU framework for restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the EU and its member states was set up in May 2019. On the 21st of May, 2024 the Council approved conclusions on the future of cybersecurity aiming to provide guidance and setting the principles towards building a more cyber secure and more resilient EU. The European Union and its member states, together with its international partners, have strongly condemned the malicious cyber activity conducted by the Russian Federation. This was also the case in 2020 on the attack against Ukraine, which targeted the satellite KA-SAT network, owned by Viasat. Russia has continued their pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. The EU will continue to strengthen its cooperation in particular with Ukraine to advance international security and stability in cyberspace, increase global resilience and to raise awareness on cyber threats and malicious cyber activities. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1779 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States (including a list of sanctioned individuals) Cybersecurity: Council approves conclusions for a more cyber secure and resilient Union (press Release 21 May, 2024) Cybersecurity: How the EU tackles Cyber Threads (background information) Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (consolidated text dated 23 November 2023)

Press material Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 10:10 | Press release | Children and armed conflicts: Council updates EU guidelines and approves conclusions   The Council today adopted updated EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, which were first adopted in 2003 and then updated in 2008, and approved conclusions on the matter. The Council is gravely concerned about the rise of violations of children’s rights in the context of armed conflict, exacerbated by the proliferation of wars, including Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children. Children are strongly affected by armed conflicts. In nearly all the world’s conflict zones, from the Sahel, Central and Eastern Africa to the Middle East and Asia, children represent as much as half of the affected population. They face violence, injury and death, recruitment, displacement and uprooting, interrupted education, lack of health care and long-lasting physical and mental trauma. Moreover, the changing nature of conflicts, tactics, and weaponry has multiplied the risks for children, and civilians in general. The UN Secretary General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, points to a 21% increase of grave violations against children in conflict situations in 2023, with the highest numbers being recorded in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Somalia, Nigeria, and Sudan. With adequate and timely support, children can recover from extreme situations and thrive. Their protection, recovery, and reintegration are essential to long-term peace and security, as well as sustainable development. The updated EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict approved by the Council today are intended to strengthen the EU’s contribution to the respect, protection, and fulfilment of rights of children in armed conflict and other situations of armed violence by terrorist organisations or organised criminal groups, globally. They adopt a robust, comprehensive, and holistic approach and will serve as an operational framework for all member states and EU institutions working in this area. The updated EU guidelines are intended to take new developments into account – e.g. increased threats not least from the use of new technologies and the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons in populated areas - and fully align the EU’s approach with the framework established by the United Nations Security Council through successive resolutions, notably 'the six grave violations against children during times of armed conflict'. They also reinforce the EU’s alignment and cooperation with the mandate of the UN Secretary-General and the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict. In parallel, the EU updated and published its Checklist for the Integration of Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions and Operations. The CSDP checklist is an operational and hands-on tool providing guidance for the planning and conduct of operational activities for more than twenty crisis management missions and operations. The protection of children affected by armed conflict must continue to be a central pillar of the human rights, peace and security, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian agendas. Council conclusions on children and armed conflicts EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict (2003) UNSG framework 'The six grave violations' (Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict) UN Secretary-General Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict (2023)

Press material Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 09:09 | Press release | Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU’s 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures   The Council adopted today a 14th package of economic and individual restrictive measures dealing a further blow to Putin’s regime and those who perpetuate his illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. These measures are designed to target high-value sectors of the Russian economy, like energy, finance and trade, and make it ever more difficult to circumvent EU sanctions. “ Our sanctions have already significantly weakened the Russian economy and prevented Putin from accomplishing his plans to destroy Ukraine, although he still continues the illegal aggression targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. The 14th package of sanctions demonstrates our unity in supporting Ukraine and seeking to limit Russia’s criminal activities against Ukrainians, including efforts to circumvent EU measures. ” —  Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Today’s package includes restrictive measures on additional 116 individuals and entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the following sectoral measures: Energy In order to ensure that EU facilities are not used to tranship Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) to third countries, and thereby reduce the significant revenues that Russia derives from LNG sale and transport, the EU will forbid reloading services of Russian LNG in EU territory for the purpose of transshipment operations to third countries. This covers both ship-to-ship transfers and ship-to-shore transfers, as well as re-loading operations, and does not affect import but only re-export to third countries via the EU. The European Commission will monitor the implementation and development of this decision and may propose mitigating measures if necessary. Furthermore, the EU will prohibit new investments, as well as the provision of goods, technology and services for the completion of LNG projects under construction, such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG. Import restrictions are introduced on Russian LNG through EU terminals not connected to the natural gas system. Anti-circumvention The EU is equipping itself with additional tools to crack down on circumvention. First of all, EU parent companies will be required to undertake their best efforts to ensure that their third-country subsidiaries do not take part in any activities resulting in an outcome that the sanctions seek to prevent. Second, in order to help counter the re-exportation of battlefield goods found in Ukraine or critical to the development of Russian military systems, it was decided that EU operators selling such battlefield goods to third countries will need to implement due diligence mechanisms capable of identifying and assessing risks of re-exportation to Russia, and mitigating them. In addition, EU operators transferring industrial know-how for the production of battlefield goods to third-country commercial counterparts will now have to include contractual provisions to ensure that such know-how will not be used for goods intended to Russia. Finance The Council decided to outlaw the use of the ‘System for Transfer of Financial Messages’ (SPFS), a specialised financial messaging service developed by the Central Bank of Russia to neutralise the effect of restrictive measures. EU entities operating outside of Russia will be forbidden from connecting to the SPFS or equivalent specialised financial messaging services. In addition, EU operators will be barred from making transactions with specifically listed entities using SPFS outside of Russia. Furthermore, the Council is introducing a ban on transactions with targeted credit and financial institutions and crypto assets providers established outside of the EU, when these entities facilitate transactions that support Russia’s defence-industrial base through the export, supply, sale, transfer or transport towards Russia of dual-use goods and technology, sensitive items, battlefield goods, firearms and ammunition. Funding of political parties and other organisations In view of the continued Russian attempts to interfere with the democratic processes in the EU and undermine its democratic foundations, including through influence campaigns and the promotion of disinformation, the Council decided that political parties and foundations, non-governmental organisations, including think tanks, or media service providers in the EU, will no longer be allowed to accept funding coming from the Russian state and its proxies. In line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the measures agreed today will not prevent media service providers and their staff from carrying out other activities in the EU, such as research and interviews. Transports For the first time, the EU has adopted a measure targeting specific vessels contributing to Russia’s warfare against Ukraine, which are subject to a port access ban and ban on provision of services. These vessels can be designated for various reasons such as the transport of military equipment for Russia, the transport of stolen Ukrainian grain, and support in the development of Russia’s energy sector, for instance through the transport of LNG components or transshipments of LNG. This measure also targets tankers part of Putin’s dark fleet which circumvent the EU and Price Cap Coalition’s caps, while adopting deceptive shipping practices in complete disregard of international standards. 27 vessels were targeted today on these grounds. Furthermore, in order to avoid other forms of circumvention, the Council decided to widen the EU flight ban. The prohibition to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the EU will also apply to any aircraft used for a non-scheduled flight, and where a Russian natural or legal person, entity or body, is in a position to effectively determine the place or time for its take-off or landing to reach, for instance, a holiday destination or a business meeting. Furthermore, operators must provide any information requested by member states’ national competent authorities about non-scheduled flights, including ownership of the aircraft and possibly passengers broaden the prohibition on the transport of goods by road within the territory of the EU, including in transit, so as to cover EU operators which are owned 25% or more by a Russian natural or legal person. Import-export controls and restrictions The Council added 61 new entities to the list of those directly supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex in its war of aggression against Ukraine. They will be subject to tighter export restrictions concerning dual use goods and technologies, as well as goods and technology which might contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector. Some of these entities are located in third countries (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates) and have been involved in the circumvention of trade restrictions and engaged in the procurement of sensitive items used for example in the production of drones, or providing material support for Russian military operations. Furthermore, today's decision expands the list of restricted items that could contribute to the technological enhancement of Russia’s defence and security sector by adding certain machine tools and certain “All Terrain Vehicles”. The EU also introduced further restrictions on exports of goods which contribute in particular to the enhancement of Russian industrial capabilities (e.g. chemicals, including manganese ores and compounds of rare-earths, plastics, excavating machinery, monitors and electrical equipment), as well as further restrictions on the import of helium from Russia, which is a source of significant revenues for the regime. Liechtenstein is added to a list of partner countries which apply a set of restrictive measures on imports of iron and steel from Russia, and a set of import control measures that are substantially equivalent to those of the EU. Protection of EU operators The package also includes measures to allow EU operators to claim compensation from damages caused by Russian companies due to sanctions implementation and expropriation. It also creates the instrument to draw up a list of company subject to a transaction ban for meddling with arbitration and court competence. Other measures Today’s package will impose restrictions on accepting applications for registrations in the EU of certain intellectual property rights by Russian nationals and companies, with the aim of offsetting the actions of the Russian government and courts illegitimately depriving EU intellectual property rights holders of their protection in Russia. Lastly, it will be forbidden to purchase, import, transfer or export Ukrainian cultural property goods and other goods of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific or religious importance, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the goods have been unlawfully removed from Ukraine. The relevant legal acts will soon be published in the Official Journal of the EU. Background In its conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, the European Council reiterated its full unwavering support to Ukraine, its people and its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. In its previous conclusions, the European Council also called for further steps to weaken Russia’s ability to continue waging its war of aggression, including by strengthening the sanctions, and implementing existing sanction fully and effectively. On 21 May 2024 the Council greenlighted the use of net profits stemming from unexpected and extraordinary revenues accruing to central securities depositories in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, for further military support to Ukraine, as well as its defence industry capacities and reconstruction. Extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian assets: Council greenlights the use of net windfall profits to support Ukraine’s self-defence and reconstruction (press release, 21 May 2024) European Council conclusions, 17 and 18 April 2024 Russia: two years after the full-scale invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine (press release, EU adopts 13th package of individual and economic sanctions, 23 February 2024) EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Press material Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 10:41 | Press release | Official development assistance: the EU and its member states remain the biggest global provider   The Council today approved conclusions on the EU development aid targets in the thirteenth annual report to the European Council, which confirms that the EU and its Member States have maintained their position as the largest global provider of official development assistance (ODA). The report analyses trends with regard to commitments to and delivery of the EU’s ODA. In an increasingly complex financing landscape, which has been deeply impacted by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, ODA remains a major source of finance for the poorest countries, and continues to play a crucial role in achieving the 2030 Agenda. In its report, the Council notes that in 2023, EU collective ODA reached EUR 95.9 billion, up from EUR 93.3 billion in 2022 and EUR 71.6 billion in 2021. This increase since 2021 demonstrates the renewed efforts of the EU and its Member States to provide support to developing countries and persons in vulnerable situations, through a Team Europe approach. The EU and its Member States have therefore maintained their position as the largest global ODA provider, accounting for 42% of global ODA in 2022 and 2023, and have confirmed their leadership on the global agenda for sustainable development. In 2023, the EU’s combined ODA represented 0.57% of EU Gross National Income (GNI). Although there is a slight decrease compared to its 0.59% share of EU GNI in 2022, this is still significantly higher than the 0.49% share in 2021 and, indeed, of the aggregate of the non-EU Development Assistance Committee members, whose ODA represented 0.31% of their GNI in 2023. The Council stresses that it is urgent for the EU and its Member States to take additional action towards achieving both individual targets and the EU’s collective commitment to providing 0.70% of GNI as ODA, and to devote 0.20% of its ODA to the Least Developed Countries by 2030. Annual Report 2023 to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2023 (OCDE)

Press material Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 10:28 | Press release | Council approves conclusions on the mid-term evaluation of the NDICI-Global Europe external financing instrument   The Council today approved conclusions on the mid-term evaluation of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe). The conclusions follow up on the Commission’s report on the evaluation of the European Union's External Financing Instruments for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs). In the conclusions, the Council considers that NDICI-Global Europe is overall fit for purpose and delivering against its objectives. In addition, the Council notes that, by merging several external financing instruments from the 2014-2020 MFF, NDICI-Global Europe is addressing the fragmented set-up of the previous financial architecture and is a step forward in terms ofclarity, effectiveness and transparency of the EU's support to and cooperation with its partner countries. The Council emphasises that the current geopolitical context requires an EU that delivers on its development and geopolitical objectives, promotes the EU's core values and interests globally, and responds to the needs of partner countries. In this regard, NDICI-Global Europe, through its policy-first ambition and strengthened partnerships, enhances the Union's geopolitical role. The Council also underlines that the NDICI-Global Europe instrument and the Global Gateway strategy are key tools in the drive to strengthen the efficiency, transparency and concrete results of development efforts in partner countries, through a Team Europe approach. At the same time, the Council affirms the need for stronger policy coherence in the development area to achieve more effective development cooperation, in view of the specific objectives of both NDICI-Global Europe and the 2030 Agenda. Challenges for effective implementation Regarding the challenges that remain for effective implementation of NDICI-Global Europe, the Council stresses, among others, the following aspects: further enhancing coherence between internal and external policies and priorities, and taking into account the impact of EU policies on partner countries; addressing the increased complexity for local actors and civil society to participate in and have access to funding under the NDICI-Global Europe programmes; further adjusting the governance of EU external action in line with lessons learned; addressing the shortcomings identified regarding the incentive-based approach; increasing efforts to reinforce local ownership, in particular among communities, local and regional authorities and civil society organisations; further enhancing collaboration and synergies between EU and bilateral cooperation; further improving the synergy between country, regional and thematic programmes as well as support for global public goods; improving linkages between more flexible crisis response and longer-term development as well as stronger coherence with common security and defence policy (CSDP) instruments; improving the modalities, criteria and guidance for the deployment of the cushion for emerging challenges and priorities; further investing in expertise and capacity-building at EU delegations and headquarters in order to apply markers and monitor targets more rigorously and use data more strategically; further increasing the impact of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), speeding up contracting, and facilitating the implementation and monitoring of the budgetary guarantees.  The Council also highlights that monitoring of the implementation of NDICI-Global Europe should continue. Mid-term evaluation of NDICI-Global Europe Commission's report on the evaluation of the European Union's External Financing Instruments Annex to Commission's report Press material Monday, 24 June 2024   ● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 11:09 | Press release | Sudan: Council lists 6 individuals for undermining stability and political transition   The Council adopted restrictive measures today against six individuals responsible for activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan, where fighting is still ongoing between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective affiliated militias. On the RSF side, the new listings include Abdulrahman Juma Barakallah, a General commanding the RSF in West Darfur who is responsible for committing atrocities and other abuses, instigating ethnically motivated killings, targeted attacks on human rights activists and defenders, conflict-related sexual violence, and the looting and burning of communities. They also include the RSF’ financial adviser, as well as a prominent tribal leader of the Mahamid clan affiliated with the RSF in West Darfur. On the SAF side, sanctions target the Director General of Defense Industry System (DIS), a company already sanctioned by the EU, and the Commander of the Sudanese Air Force, El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin, for their responsibility in the indiscriminate aerial bombing of densely populated residential areas since the beginning of the conflict. Ali Ahmed Karti Mohamed, a former Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Government of Omar al-Bashir is also listed. Those targeted are subject to an asset freeze and a prohibition on the provision of funds or economic resources to them, directly or indirectly. Additionally, they are subject to travel bans in the European Union. Restrictive measures under the Sudan sanctions regime now apply to a total of six individuals and six entities. The relevant legal acts have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Background On 22 January 2024, the Council adopted a first set of restrictive measures against six entities of the SAF and the RSF responsible for supporting activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan. On 12 April 2024, the High Representative issued a statement on behalf of the EU on the one-year mark of the war between the SAF and the RSF, appealing to the warring parties for an immediate and durable ceasefire, and reminding them of their obligation under international humanitarian law to protect civilians. The EU stated that it was ready to continue to use its tools in order to contribute to ending the armed conflict, discouraging the obstruction of humanitarian assistance and halting the culture of impunity. Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1784 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan (including a list of sanctioned individuals) Sudan: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union one year into the conflict (press release, 12 April 2024) Sudan: Council adds six entities to EU sanctions list (press release, 22 January 2024) Sudan: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the latest situation (press release, 27 November 2023)

Meetings Monday, 24 June 2024

● Council of the EU   24/06/2024 11:44 | Meetings | General Affairs Council, 25 June 2024   Background brief - General Affairs Council of 25 June 2024