COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Think Tank, update

 

Library blog Wednesday 29 November 2023

● General Secretariat of the Council   Think Tank reports on the invasion of Ukraine   The EU military assistance mission for Ukraine as a peace actor who teaches to fight; Europe’s missile gap and how to close it; challenges from a human rights law perspective for forcibly displaced and stateless Ukrainians; how the EU seeks to limit circumvention of the sanctions on Russia; and what European policymakers should learn from global public opinion on the war in Ukraine are some of the topics discussed in the present update.

Meetings Thursday 30 November 2023

● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 16:41 | MEETING | Main results - Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (Health), 30 November 2023   EU ministers for health met in Brussels to discuss open strategic autonomy from a health perspective and they approved conclusions on mental health. The Spanish presidency also updated health ministers on ongoing legislative files and their state of play, such as the regulation on EMA fees, the European Health Data Space regulation, the regulation on substances of human origin and the pharmaceutical package.

Press material Thursday 30 November 2023

● European Council   30/11/2023 13:53 | Speech | “A European Defence for our Geopolitical Union” : speech by President Charles Michel at the EDA annual conference   “Europe will not be made all at once, but it will be made.” Those famous words by Robert Schuman express what we are doing today. We are making another important part of our European Union. We are making our security and defence union. History will judge, but I sincerely believe our defence union was born in the hours after Russian tanks rolled over the Ukrainian border. In those first hours, we took the historic decision to send weapons to Ukraine, a decision that was impossible to imagine just a few days before. And we have not looked back. Now we must build on this momentum. So, what do we need to do, and how should we do it? First, we must fortify our European continent. We must project strength and protection. We must beef up our European defence. A stronger and more capable European defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security, of which NATO remains the foundation. I know some ideas are not consensual so far, but they will feed our democratic debate and chart the way forward. Today, I would like to share some ideas with you. For almost 20 years, you, the EDA, have spearheaded European defence cooperation. The idea of European defence is not new. Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the increasingly unstable security environment, have injected a new urgency. So we must confront today’s changing security paradigm. With war on our doorstep, our ambition must match the urgency. Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, we, the EU, have acted decisively and with unity in at least four key areas: First, we took the unprecedented decision to deliver weapons and ammunition to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. Second, we endorsed our Strategic Compass in March 2022. For the first time, the EU agreed on a common threat assessment and a common course of action on defence. Third, in Versailles, we decided to develop our strategic autonomy in three critical areas: our economic base, the energy sector and defence. In fact, we agreed to take greater responsibility for our security and to invest more and better in defence capabilities and innovative technologies. And fourth, in March this year, we decided to boost joint procurement and ramp up production. Under the leadership of High Representative Borrell and your leadership, Chief Executive Jiří Šedivý, the EDA has played a crucial role in coordinating these fundamental decisions. I would like to say thank you for that. These collective decisions have launched our union into a new era of enhanced security and defence. Our European awakening is just beginning to take shape. I feel that the time has come to create a real union of defence, coupled with a true defence single market. It should focus on two goals moving forward. First, our ironclad military support for the people of Ukraine, because Ukraine’s security is our security, the security of all of us. Second, we must make our European defence stronger. Now, tomorrow, and in the future. The people of Ukraine are fighting for a free and sovereign homeland. But we know that they are also fighting for our shared values – for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous European continent. So far, with our member states, we have provided unprecedented military assistance to Ukraine: €27 billion through our European Peace Facility and our EU military assistance mission. But we need to do more. More missiles, more ammunition, more air defence systems. And faster. This is an obligation: an obligation towards the Ukrainian people and towards our own citizens. By protecting Ukraine, we protect ourselves. Our continued strong military support also sends a signal to our partners – especially our American allies – a clear signal that we take our security more seriously than ever. Our European Peace Facility will remain key to our military assistance. We have already topped it up twice, but with fewer stocks left to donate, it should evolve towards more acquisition and procurement, and towards more support to our European defence industry, which will increasingly be the engine of our security. I intend to put this topic on the agenda of European Council meetings to come. We adopted our Act in Support of Ammunition Production in record time and now we are already putting it into action to ramp up production. We are working to get one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine. Yes, this is a challenge. It will take slightly more time than we hoped, but it will happen. We have broken countless taboos since Russia invaded Ukraine. We have done what would have been unthinkable only a few weeks before: jointly procuring military equipment, using the EU budget to support the increase in our military production, and funding joint research and development in defence. All this without changing the treaties. At the same time, member states have sharply increased their defence spending, already before the start of the war – some by more than 12% on a yearly basis. This year alone, the total defence spending of all EU member states is roughly €270 billion. Last year, a quarter of total defence spending – nearly €60 billion – was allocated to defence investment. This means that we can invest at least €600 billion in the next 10 years. With €600 billion, we can do great things. This can and should be a watershed moment. Our capability development priorities, set out by our member states this year, provide a clearer picture. This is a unique opportunity to break the pattern of market fragmentation: fragmentation of demand and fragmentation of supply. We must be more coherent, we must be more effective. On the demand side, as long as EU defence companies are structured along national lines, demand will primarily come from their respective national governments. This leads to a scale of production that does not match the geopolitical reality we face. Competition in the defence market spurs innovation, but it only works if capabilities are the driving priority. So we must encourage member states to pool their resources more for greater efficiency and interoperability. Just one example: some European states are committed to a joint effort for a future combat air system, while others have teamed up with Japan on a global combat air programme to develop fighters by 2040. In my view, consolidated projects would be preferable in the future. On the supply side, we are all dependent on critical raw materials and rare earths from third countries, including China. Graphite, for instance, is the most-used material in the defence industry – for helicopters, submarines, artillery and missiles – and China produces 70% of the world's graphite. Only coordinated European action will ensure that we have access to critical raw materials to increase domestic military production – much like our Chips Act, which strives to strengthen the EU chips value chain. We must work towards a true defence single market. I would like to propose four concrete ideas: First, we need to make the coordination of our defence spending more effective. The role of the European Defence Agency has significantly expanded in recent years. The EDA should become a powerful European defence department, run by the High Representative under the core guidance of the European Council. It would be a driving force to bundle military expertise and instruments, and we need to provide you with the resources that will be needed to coordinate and lead on joint procurement and its financing, in close connection with the member states. Of the 68 PESCO projects the EU has set up to date, 10 are coordinated by the EDA. This number has to go up. Second, we must adapt our regulatory framework so we can act faster and with more flexibility. Buying tanks or air defence systems is not the same as buying paper and printers. Public procurement and joint purchasing need to be more adapted to the specifics and geopolitics of the defence sector. Third, we must ramp up financing in our defence industry. Increasing the predictability of public orders will help our industry access private financing and it will send a very clear message: produce and we will buy. We will ensure long-term contracts because our security and stability will require long-term investment. We must also support our SMEs, especially those innovating for our defence industry. I commend the EIB decision to invest €8 billion in security until 2027, because financing European defence is in our common interest, it involves both public and private money. We should also consider the idea of European defence bonds to strengthen our technological and industrial base. These EU bonds could emerge as a new asset class, including for retail investors. And fourth, we need to focus on concrete projects that have a structural European impact and that provide safety for our citizens. We already have strategies for space and for maritime domains, but we can go further in the air domain. For instance, the EU could develop next-generation and fully interoperable capabilities in future combat systems. Recent initiatives, such as the Future Air Combat System project and the European Sky Shield initiative, are proof that our member states are more ready to cooperate. Now is the time to think big. The cyber domain offers vast potential for the future. Cyber defence is still in its infancy. That is why it can offer the greatest opportunity for developing common cyber capacities. I propose a European cyber force that would be a fundamental component of our European defence. It would help us to take a position of leadership in cyber responsive operations and information superiority, and I believe it should be equipped with offensive capabilities. The sensitive issue of chain of command would need to be addressed. If we are serious about enhancing our security, this is the domain where we can make a quantum leap. Finally, I am currently consulting with EU leaders on our strategic agenda for the coming years. I had meetings over the last few days in various capitals. Let me assure you, Europe’s security and defence is a key part of these discussions, because all 27 leaders want to make it clear to their citizens that we will be there for them to ensure their safety and their security in this unpredictable world. We need a true European defence for more security. We need a true European defence for our ambitious geopolitical union. We must build a virtuous triangle of common threat assessment, common strategic goals, and enhanced operational capabilities. Thank you once again for everything you do at the European Defence Agency. You can count on me and on the European Council to make Europe defence-ready, more sovereign and better prepared to protect our European values and freedoms. Press material Thursday 30 November 2023   ● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 12:20 | Press release | Mental health: member states to take action across multiple levels, sectors and ages   Almost one in two Europeans has experienced an emotional or psychosocial problem in the last year. The recent context of compounded crises (the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the climate crisis, unemployment, and the food and energy price increases) has further worsened the situation, in particular for children and young people. "As you know, we live in a time of polycrisis that has severely hit the mental health of Europeans. The COVID-19 pandemic, the consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine or the climate crisis itself are just some of the shocks which have exacerbated already poor levels of mental health. Improving mental health is a social and economic imperative. I am deeply pleased that in the conclusions we approve today we have obtained such important consensus as the need to implement an approach to mental health that covers all policies and recognizes the social, environmental and economic determinants of mental health." Mónica García Gómez, Spanish Minister for Health In its conclusions, the Council highlights the importance of addressing mental health and well-being in the different context in the life course, which benefits both individuals and societies. It recognises the beneficial role of communities, schools, sports and culture in strengthening mental health and life-long mental well-being. The conclusions invite member states to elaborate actions plans or strategies with a cross-sectoral approach to mental health, addressing not only health, but also employment, education, digitalisation and AI, culture, environment and climate factors, among other things. Suggested actions aim to prevent and combat mental health problems and discrimination, while promoting wellbeing. Member states are invited to ensure access to timely, effective and safe mental health care, as well as to act across a wide spectrum of areas, sectors and ages, including: early detection and awareness-raising at school and amongst young people tackling loneliness, self-harm and suicidal behaviour managing psychosocial risks at work, with special attention to health professionals social and job reintegration after recovery to prevent relapses measures against mental health stigma, hate speech and gender-based violence using antidiscrimination as a prevention tool, with a focus on vulnerable groups The conclusions encourage the member states and the Commission to continue moving towards a comprehensive approach to mental health maintaining this subject in the international agenda. This includes cooperation and coordination between EU member states and the Commission, such as exchanging best practices and promoting EU funding opportunities in the area of mental health, as well as designing actions and recommendations and monitoring progress. The Council conclusions on mental health draw on the Commission’s communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health, published in June 2023. The topic of mental health is of the utmost importance to the Spanish presidency. This set of conclusions is the framework of a wider cluster of conclusions on mental health to be approved during the Spanish presidency, including mental health and its interconnection with precarious working conditions, the mental health of young people, and mental health and co-occurrence with drug use disorders (the latter to be approved in December). Council conclusions on mental health Mental health (background information)

Press material Thursday 30 November 2023

● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 11:40 | Media advisory | Press briefing ahead of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 4 and 5 December 2023   The press briefing ahead of the Justice and Home Affairs Council will take place on Friday, 1 December 2023 at 15.30. This briefing will be "off the record". The press briefing will take place in a hybrid format: EU accredited journalists will be able to participate and ask questions either remotely or in person at the Europa building press room. To attend the event remotely, please use this link to register and have the possibility to ask questions. Those who already registered for previous press events of the Justice and Home Affairs Council do not need to do it again. Deadline for registration: Friday, 1 December 2023, 14.30. Further instructions will be sent to all registered participants shortly after the deadline.

Press material Thursday 30 November 2023

● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 11:01 | Press release | Joint Statement of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Union for COP 28   The 27 Member States of the European Union and the 79 Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) States reaffirm their commitment to implement the Paris Agreement. We call for increased ambition on adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation, and scaled up finance, capacity building, and technology transfer. Furthermore, we call for accelerated climate action and a just transition that leaves no one behind. Having regard to the EU-OACPS Partnership Agreement (Samoa Agreement), founded on a shared commitment to contribute to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, we the Organisation of African Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) and the European Union (EU): Reaffirm our strong commitment to implement the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and its long-term goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development fully and effectively. Stress our strong will to achieve successful outcomes at COP 28 and emphasize the importance of concluding a first Global Stocktake with an ambitious and forward-looking outcome that provides concrete policy signals to Parties and non-Party Stakeholders that can drive action on the ground, enhances international cooperation, and mobilizes political will and leadership in line with best available science, equity and taking into account common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances, to inform immediate and future climate action, including the next round of NDCs, and clear pathways to achieve emissions reductions, enhance adaptive capacities and resilience for all, and necessary finance flows, keeping the 1.5° C goal within reach. Underline that the shift towards a climate neutral economy, in line with the 1.5ºC goal, will require the global phase out of unabated fossil fuels and a peak in their consumption already in this decade. In addition, call on global action towards the tripling of installed renewable energy capacity to 11 TW and doubling of the rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, and supports advocating for global energy targets as part of the COP 28 negotiated outcomes. Highlight the need to enhance cooperation including through capacity building, technical and financial assistance from all sources, to address the challenges and secure the benefits, including in terms of energy access and security of a just transition. Reaffirm the goals of developed countries to mobilize climate finance per year by 2020, and annually through 2025, to address the needs of the developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency in implementation, and to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving scaled up financial resources. Recognise the need for increased global investments to meet our climate goals of the Paris Agreement, and to rapidly and substantially scale up investment and climate finance from billions to trillions of dollars globally from all sources, and, in this regard, it is essential to align all financial flows with these objectives. Urge COP 28 to set a framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation that places the protection of people, ecosystems, and livelihoods at the heart of climate action, and fosters adaptive capacities and resilience building for all by strengthening national adaptation policy and planning processes. Urge the prompt operationalisation of the Loss and Damage funding arrangements including a Fund by COP 28. Underline that the new funding arrangements including a Fund must focus on developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, be based on a wide variety of sources of funding, and consider coordination, coherence, and complementarity with existing funding arrangements. Reaffirm the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan, including the transformation of the global financial architecture and multilateral development banks to unlock and scale-up grant and concessional finance to address inherent vulnerabilities of developing countries to exogenous shocks such as the ongoing climate emergency, burgeoning public debt and post COVID-19 pandemic recovery.

Press material Thursday 30 November 2023

● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 10:33 | Press release | Cohesion policy: Council sets out guiding principles for the future   The Council today approved conclusions, setting out its position on key aspects for the future development of cohesion policy. The conclusions will serve as a basis for discussions in the coming years and for the Commission’s work on the legislative framework for cohesion policy after 2027. The conclusions emphasise that cohesion policy must remain a key pillar of the EU and, to this end, must maintain as its sole objective the strengthening of the EU’s economic, social and territorial cohesion and the reduction of regional disparities. While cohesion policy is a policy for all EU regions, more targeted and adaptable support should be ensured for the less-developed regions. Particular attention should be paid to the needs of rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as the northernmost sparsely populated regions, as well as island, cross-border and mountain regions. The Commission is invited to systematically consider the needs of the outermost regions and the impact of its legislative proposals on those regions. The Council also highlights the need to measure and evaluate the specific needs of the different territories, and to address the problem of the regions in the development trap. Recalling the crucial role of cohesion policy in addressing recent crises, the Council considers that cohesion policy should be able to adapt to new developments and unexpected events, while preserving its long-term transformational nature and structural objectives. The Commission is asked to develop options to better help regions manage various new challenges, including demographic trends, migration, and the green and digital transition, and to further channel investments towards growth-enhancing reforms. The Council also recalls the importance of shared management and of the partnership principle for cohesion policy, as well as ensuring a place-based approach in its design and programming. It encourages efforts to further simplify the management of cohesion policy, while guaranteeing high standards for the prevention of and the fight against fraud and corruption. The Commission is also asked to further ensure complementarities between cohesion policy and other relevant European policies and initiatives from their design phase, and to facilitate operational coordination between the programmes that support cooperation between regions. Council conclusions

Press material Thursday 30 November 2023

● Council of the EU   30/11/2023 02:59 | Press release | Council and EU parliament reach provisional agreement on EU law protecting journalists and human rights defenders   The EU has taken an important step towards the protection of journalists and human rights defenders against unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings. The Spanish presidency of the Council and the European Parliament reached a political deal on a directive which would protect these individuals from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). The use of these lawsuits to silence people who speak out on issues of public interest is a growing phenomenon. The directive will put in place procedural safeguards against such claims in civil matters with cross-border implications. "Our democracies are in danger when the rich and powerful can silence critics in court just because they speak out on matters of public interest. With this new law the EU is defending journalists and human rights defenders against unfounded and abusive court cases." Félix Bolaños, Spanish minister for justice Individuals targeted by SLAPP cases will benefit from a number of procedural safeguards and protections. They can ask the court to: dismiss a claim at an early stage. If a claim is considered to be manifestly unfounded, a judge may decide to dismiss the claim at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings. The court should accelerate requests like this from the defendants demand a financial security from the person or company who brought the claim. A court can decide to require that the claimant, i.e. the person or company who started a SLAPP case, provides a security for the costs of the proceedings seek other types of remedies. A court can decide for instance that the claimant must bear the costs of the proceedings, including the costs of legal representation of the SLAPP victim. A judge may also decide that the party that started the SLAPP case could be subject to a penalty or other equally effective measures Cross-border SLAPP cases The Council and the European Parliament agreed on how to define the cross-border nature of a SLAPP case. A matter will be considered to have cross-border implications unless both parties are domiciled in the same member state as the court seised and all other elements relevant to the situation are located in that member state. Third-country judgments If a person living in the EU is targeted by a SLAPP case in a third-country, EU member states must refuse the recognition and enforcement of this third-country judgment if it would be considered manifestly unfounded or abusive in the member state in question. Measures in support of SLAPP victims To further support SLAPP victims, member states will have to provide, in one single place, information on the procedural safeguards and remedies. To better grasp the extent of the phenomenon, member states will also gather specific available data on SLAPP cases from the courts. Next steps Today’s agreement will need to be endorsed by member states’ representatives within the Council (Coreper). If approved, the text will then need to be formally adopted by both the Council and the European Parliament. Background SLAPPs are typically initiated by powerful individuals, lobby groups, corporations and state organs. Their purpose is to censor, intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defence until they abandon their criticism or opposition. Typical targets of SLAPPs are journalists and human rights defenders. Other persons engaged in public participation such as researchers and academics may also be targeted. The increase of SLAPPs has been documented in a number of rule of law reports, evaluations by the European Commission which examine rule of law developments in EU member states, and Council of Europe analyses. Press material Wednesday 29 November 2023   ● Council of the EU   29/11/2023 10:59 | Press release | Council agrees position on safer firearms trading   The Council today agreed on a mandate for the presidency to start negotiations with the European Parliament on updated EU rules on the import, export and transit of firearms into and from the EU. The new rules aim to close the loopholes for firearms trafficking, while facilitating trade and movement of firearms used for legitimate purposes. Aim of the review The revised rules aim to limit firearms trafficking by having common rules and procedures, coordinated controls and better traceability of firearms for civilian use. This will prevent legally manufactured and exported civilian firearms from being diverted into the illegal market. The proposal provides for the proper recording of firearms-related information. It clarifies the role of the licencing authorities and improves cooperation between law enforcement authorities (including customs) and licensing authorities. It also aims to systematise data collection about international movements of firearms, as well as seized arms. The rules aim to set stricter regulations for “semi-finished” firearms or components that can be converted into lethal firearms at home. The proposal also foresees an end-user certificate for the more dangerous firearms. At the same time the proposal aims to facilitate the legal trade of firearms for civilian use and reduce administrative burden for manufacturers, dealers and users. The proposed rules will set clear and common import, export, and transit procedures for firearms and simplify and digitalise procedures for hunters, sport shooters, and exhibitors. The proposal also sets a new EU electronic licensing system that will save applicants time and simplify the process for authorisations. The main changes brought by the Council The Council agreed with the main principles of the Commission’s proposal, underlining the need to strengthen the security of citizens. The Council ensured strong competences for national competent authorities in the text. It added a licensing procedure for temporary imports and exports of the firearms. Member states retained the possibility to keep their existing electronic national authorisation systems, as they long as they are interconnected with the electronic licencing system set up to digitalise the procedures for licensing. They also ensured a longer period for setting up and interconnecting national authorisation systems to the common electronic licensing system. The Council specified that the military firearms excluded from scope of the proposal concerning export would be those on the common military list of the European Union. Background It is estimated that 35 million illicit firearms were owned by civilians in the EU in 2017. This would correspond to 56% of the estimated total of firearms. The current firearms regulation lays down rules on exporting, importing and transporting firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. It implements Article 10, which deals with imports, exports and transit of firearms, of the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. The current regulation in force since 2012 does not apply to antique or deactivated firearms, or to firearms intended for military or police use. The regulation is complemented by an existing Firearms Directive that defines minimum common rules on the acquisition and possession of firearms in the EU, as well as on the transfer of firearms from one EU country to another. On 27 October 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a recast of the Firearms Regulation. The proposal includes new rules to improve the traceability of firearms and the exchange of information between national authorities by harmonising rules across EU countries. Next steps The Council is now ready to start negotiations with the European Parliament to agree on the final text. Once the Council and Parliament reach a provisional agreement, the regulation will need to be formally adopted by both institutions before it enters into force. Council negotiating mandate on the firearms regulation Firearms Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 Firearms Directive (EU) 2021/555 United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition