U.S.Department of State,update

Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid
01/24/2022
Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid
01/24/2022 04:00 PM EST
Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Deputy Secretary Wendy R. Sherman spoke today with OSCE Secretary General Helga Schmid to discuss Russia’s destabilizing buildup of military forces on Ukraine’s borders. They discussed ongoing efforts to urge Russia to pursue the path of diplomacy and de-escalation to end this crisis peacefully. Deputy Secretary Sherman reiterated strong U.S. support for Poland’s proposal, as OSCE Chair, for a revitalized security dialogue at the OSCE. The OSCE is an inclusive forum where all affected countries can discuss and address urgent and long-standing threats to European stability and security.


Travel of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to Kenya, Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and Israel
01/25/2022
Travel of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to Kenya, Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and Israel
01/25/2022 09:33 AM EST
Office of the Spokesperson

U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador David Satterfield will travel to Kenya, Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and Israel from January 24 to February 4, 2022. Special Envoy Satterfield will hold meetings with officials from respective governments and key stakeholders to promote democratic civilian rule in Sudan and to support peace and prosperity in the Horn of Africa.

This travel immediately follows his trips to Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Ethiopia where he accompanied Assistant Secretary Phee to advance democracy, peace, and stability in the Horn of Africa.


Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with Swiss State Secretary Leu
01/25/2022

Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with Swiss State Secretary Leu
01/25/2022 11:00 AM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman spoke with Swiss State Secretary Livia Leu today. Deputy Secretary Sherman and State Secretary Leu reaffirmed the strength of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Switzerland. The Deputy Secretary and State Secretary also discussed transatlantic security issues and the Deputy Secretary reiterated the United States’ unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russian aggression.


Secretary Blinken’s Call with UK Foreign Secretary Truss
01/25/2022
Secretary Blinken’s Call with UK Foreign Secretary Truss
01/25/2022 12:18 PM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with UK Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss to take stock of recent engagements to deter Russia from its troubling military build-up in and near Ukraine. The United States and the United Kingdom are coordinating with each other, as well as with NATO and European allies and partners, to encourage Russia to de-escalate tensions and commit to a path of diplomacy. The Secretary and Foreign Secretary Truss also discussed coordination to stand firmly against economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China, and how to reach a successful conclusion on talks with Iran on mutual return to implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability
01/26/2022
Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability
01/26/2022 02:56 PM EST

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Press Briefing Room

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Good afternoon, everyone.

Last week in Geneva, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and I met to discuss the crisis instigated by Russia’s military build-up on Ukraine’s borders and steps to de-escalate tensions and pursue diplomacy. Russia had previously outlined its concerns and proposals in writing, and last week I told Foreign Minister Lavrov that the United States would do the same.

Today, Ambassador Sullivan delivered our written response in Moscow. All told, it sets out a serious diplomatic path forward, should Russia choose it.

The document we’ve delivered includes concerns of the United States and our allies and partners about Russia’s actions that undermine security, a principled and pragmatic evaluation of the concerns that Russia has raised, and our own proposals for areas where we may be able to find common ground.

We make clear that there are core principles that we are committed to uphold and defend – including Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right of states to choose their own security arrangements and alliances.

We’ve addressed the possibility of reciprocal transparency measures regarding force posture in Ukraine, as well as measures to increase confidence regarding military exercises and maneuvers in Europe.

And we address other areas where we see potential for progress, including arms control related to missiles in Europe, our interest in a follow-on agreement to the New START treaty that covers all nuclear weapons, and ways to increase transparency and stability.

We’ve put these ideas forward because they have the potential – if negotiated in good faith – to enhance our security and that of our allies and partners while also addressing Russia’s stated concerns through reciprocal commitments.

Our response to Russia reflects what I said in Kyiv, Berlin, and Geneva last week. We’re open to dialogue, we prefer diplomacy, and we’re prepared to move forward where there is the possibility of communication and cooperation if Russia de-escalates its aggression toward Ukraine, stops the inflammatory rhetoric, and approaches discussions about the future of security in Europe in a spirit of reciprocity.

Our responses were fully coordinated with Ukraine and our European allies and partners, with whom we’ve been consulting continuously for weeks. We sought their input and incorporated it into the final version delivered to Moscow.

Additionally, NATO developed and will deliver to Moscow its own paper with ideas and concerns about collective security in Europe – and that paper fully reinforces ours, and vice versa. There is no daylight among the United States and our allies and partners on these matters.

We’ve shared our response paper with Congress, and I’ll be briefing Congressional leaders on this later today and consulting with them on our approach. As you know, there’s strong bipartisan interest and deep expertise on the Hill when it comes to Ukraine and Russia, and we very much appreciate having Congress as a partner as we move forward.

We’re not releasing the document publicly because we think that diplomacy has the best chance to succeed if we provide space for confidential talks. We hope and expect that Russia will have the same view and will take our proposals seriously.

I expect to speak to Foreign Minister Lavrov in the coming days after Moscow has had a chance to read the paper and is ready to discuss next steps.

There should be no doubt about our seriousness of purpose when it comes to diplomacy, and we’re acting with equal focus and force to bolster Ukraine’s defenses and prepare a swift, united response to further Russian aggression.

Three deliveries of U.S. defensive military assistance arrived in Kyiv this week, carrying additional Javelin missiles and other anti-armor systems, 283 tons of ammunition and non-lethal equipment essential to Ukraine’s front-line defenders. More deliveries are expected in the days to come. We have provided more defensive security assistance to Ukraine in the past year than in any previous year.

Last week, I authorized U.S. allies – including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – to provide U.S.-origin military equipment from their inventories for use by Ukraine.

Also last week, we notified Congress of our intent to deliver to Ukraine the Mi-17 helicopters currently held in Defense Department inventories, five of them.

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense announced on Monday that 8,500 U.S. service members currently stationed in Europe and the United States have been placed in heightened readiness – heightened readiness to deploy – to ensure that we’re able to support the NATO Response Force swiftly if it’s activated by the North Atlantic Council to harden the Allies’ eastern flank. Other NATO Allies have also announced steps they’re prepared to take, and we expect more in the coming days. We’ve taken this step out of prudence. We hope those forces don’t have to be activated for deployment, but if they are, we will be ready.

We’re also continuing to coordinate with our European allies and partners on severe economic sanctions to hold Moscow accountable for its actions. We’ve developed a high-impact, quick-action response that would inflict significant costs on the Russian economy and financial system.

As part of our response, we’re also prepared to impose export controls that will have a longer-term effect, denying Russia products that it needs to fulfill its strategic ambitions.

On top of all of that, our allies and partners are also stepping up to provide assistance to Ukraine in various and mutually reinforcing ways. As we have done many times before, the Alliance and individuals Allies are coming together to support our partners and to defend what should be inviolable principles that have helped provide unprecedented security, stability, and prosperity for decades in Europe and around the world.

Finally, we’re looking to support our allies and partners in dealing with the secondary negative consequences of Russia’s destabilizing acts.

For example, we know that Ukraine’s economy and financial position is being affected by this crisis. And just as we’re bolstering Ukraine’s security, so too are we looking for how we can support its economy beyond the significant assistance we’re already providing. Our European allies and partners are doing so as well, and that’s another matter that I’ll have an opportunity to discuss with Congress later this afternoon.

As we’re taking steps to ensure that the global energy supply isn’t disrupted – that too is an important focus – should Russia choose to weaponize its natural gas by cutting supply to Europe even more than it’s already done, we’re in discussions with governments and major producers around the world about surging their capacity. We’re engaged in detailed conversations with our allies and partners about coordinating our response, including how best to deploy their existing energy stockpiles. All this effort is aimed at mitigating price shocks and ensuring that people in the United States, Europe, and around the world have the energy they need no matter what Russia decides to do.

All told, our actions over the past week have sharpened the choice facing Russia now. We’ve laid out a diplomatic path. We’ve lined up steep consequences should Russia choose further aggression. We’ve stepped forward with more support for Ukraine’s security and economy. And we and our allies and partners are united across the board.

Now we’ll continue to press forward and prepare. It remains up to Russia to decide how to respond. We’re ready either way.

One final note before I take some questions.

Regarding American citizens in Ukraine: As you know, earlier this week, I authorized the voluntary departure of a limited number of U.S. employees and ordered the departure of many family members of embassy personnel from Ukraine.

This was a decision based on one factor only: the safety and security of our colleagues and their families. And given the continued massive build-up of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders, which has many indications of preparations for an invasion, these steps were the prudent ones to take.

I want to be clear that our embassy in Kyiv will remain open, and we continue to maintain a robust presence to provide diplomatic, economic, and security support to Ukraine.

The State Department has also issued an updated Travel Advisory due to the potential for security conditions to deteriorate rapidly and without warning if Russia invades or commits other destabilizing actions inside Ukraine.

Our message now for any Americans in Ukraine is to strongly consider leaving using commercial or other privately available transportation options. These options remain readily available. And the embassy may extend loans to those who can’t afford the cost of a commercial ticket.

While the State Department will always seek to provide consular services wherever possible, Russian military action would severely impact our ability to perform that work. And if Russia invades, civilians – including Americans still in Ukraine – could be caught in a conflict zone between combatant forces. The U.S. Government may not be in a position to aid individuals in these circumstances. This has long been the case in conflict zones around the world.

So while we don’t know whether Russia will continue its aggression toward Ukraine, either way, we have a responsibility to provide this notice to Americans there.

And with that, happy to take some questions.

MR PRICE: Matt.

QUESTION: Hi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I realize that you don’t want to get into the specifics of what is actually in this document and – although I’m sure I and my colleagues will continue to try to get them. But can you say more broadly – when you say that there are core principles that you’re committed to and to uphold and defend, does that mean that in this document you told the Russians point blank in writing that “no” is the answer to their demand for a formal bar on the expansion of NATO, the permanent exclusion of Ukraine, and the withdrawal of certain forces and equipment from Eastern Europe? Is that what this says? Can – is there anything different in this document than what we have heard publicly over the course of the last couple weeks?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Again, without going into the specifics of the document, I can tell you that it reiterates what we’ve said publicly for many weeks and, in a sense, for many years: that we will uphold the principle of NATO’s open door, and that’s, as I’ve said repeatedly in recent weeks, a commitment that we’re bound to. And so the document, as I said, makes very clear some of the basic principles that we are standing by, committed to, and will uphold, much of which has been stated in public, including by me in recent days and weeks. And that goes to NATO’s “Open Door” policy.

QUESTION: So you would say that it is accurate to say that there are no concessions in this —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: This isn’t about concessions —

QUESTION: Well, there is no change in the U.S. and NATO position in this document that —

SECRETARY BLINKEN: First of all, there is no change; there will be no change. Second, we reiterate the – that principle. Of course, it is for NATO, not the United States unilaterally, to discuss the “Open Door” policy. These are decisions that NATO makes as an Alliance, not the United States unilaterally. But from our perspective, I can’t be more clear: NATO’s door is open, remains open, and that is our commitment.

MR PRICE: Margaret.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any reason to believe then that the document that was submitted will in any way lessen the chance of Russian action, or was this just to show you tried?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Margaret, what we do in this document, besides laying out our core principles, besides sharing our concerns, the concerns of allies and partners about things that Russia is doing that we believe undermine security and stability, we also do lay out areas where we believe that together we could actually advance security for everyone, including for Russia, based on some of its stated concerns, as well, of course, as for us and for our allies and partners. And so there are a number of areas – again, based on what Russia has said – that I think would make a difference if done on a reciprocal basis and approached in good faith.

So, for example, as we’ve said, the placement of offensive missile systems in Ukraine, military exercises and maneuvers in Europe, potential arms control measures, greater transparency, various measures to reduce risks – all of these things would address, I think, mutual concerns, including concerns stated by Russia, and advance collective security.

So I think there is – there are important things to work with if Russia is serious about working with them. And that is up to President Putin. We’ll see how they respond. But there’s no doubt in my mind that if Russia were to approach this seriously and in a spirit of reciprocity, with the determination to enhance collective security for all of us, there are very positive things in this document that should be pursued. We can’t make that decision for President Putin. Only he can make it.

QUESTION: But (inaudible) you’ve been negotiating?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: We’ve said throughout – and we of course started this process with the conversations that took place in our Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia, between Russia and the United States, about 10 days ago at the NATO-Russia Council, at the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe – that again, we understand Russia has stated concerns about security. We have our own very clear concerns about security and the actions that Russia’s taking that undermine it, and we are prepared to discuss and, if appropriate, eventually negotiate steps to enhance everyone’s security. And I’ve laid out some of the areas where we think we could do that.

But right now, this is about the areas and ideas that we could pursue, and we’ll see how Russia responds.

MR PRICE: Ben.

QUESTION: Thank you. Secretary, have you considered that Russia is just buying time till they’re in a place to invade Ukraine, making you jump through hoops like hand-delivering written responses to questions that you’ve answered time and time again in the past? And meanwhile, they’re destabilizing Ukraine from within. The economy’s crumbling. You’re spending hundreds of millions of dollars shoring them up. At what point do you stop playing Russia’s game and take preemptive action now?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So, Ben, first, we’re, as you know, not standing still, and we can walk and chew gum at the same time. And that’s very much what we’ve been doing. So we’ve been clear to Russia that there are two paths: a diplomatic one but also a path of defense and deterrence, and if Russia chooses aggression, a path that will lead to massive consequences.

And so even as we’ve been engaging in the diplomacy, which is my job and responsibility, we have been very resolutely preparing for Russia to take the other path, the path of aggression. And as I laid out, the work that we’ve done over the past couple of months in bringing allies and partners together around massive consequences for Russia – should it renew its aggression – and the very detailed work that’s been done on that, the shoring up of —

QUESTION: But they are being aggressive now – sorry.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Let me finish what (inaudible) and then come back to you – the shoring up in very significant ways of our support for Ukraine, including the defensive military support, the draw-down that the president issued in December, which has now – is now being delivered to Ukraine, the additional steps to make sure that defensive military assistance was being made available to Ukraine, including the authorizations that I signed a week ago to allow other countries that have U.S.-origin military equipment to share it with Ukraine, the work we’re doing to bolster Ukraine’s economy, the work we’re doing to shore up Europe on energy if there are disruptions as a result of conflict, and of course the orders that the President gave, the Secretary of Defense gave earlier this week to make sure that we are fully prepared on a moment’s notice to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank in the event of renewed Russian aggression – all of those things have been happening very deliberately and effectively over the last many weeks.

So these two paths – and the approach that we’ve taken, these are mutually reinforcing. The work that we’re doing on defense, on deterrence, bringing allies and partners together, I think reinforces our diplomacy. And at the same time, it’s very important that we pursue the diplomacy whether or not – you may well be right – that Russia’s not serious about this at all.

But we have an obligation to test that proposition, to pursue the diplomatic path, to leave no diplomatic stone unturned, because for sure it’s far preferable to resolve these differences peacefully consistent with our principles than it would be to have renewed aggression, renewed conflict, and everything that will follow from that. But the point is we’re prepared either way.

MR PRICE: Humeyra.

QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. I just want to ask you a little bit about the unified approach with Europe. What do you make of Germany’s stance? For example, they ruled out sending lethal weapons to Ukraine, they prevented Estonia from delivering arms, and today there was news out that they are sending helmets to Ukraine, a delivery Kyiv mayor said was a joke. Would you say that you’re happy or satisfied with Germany sending helmets to Ukraine instead of arms shipments?

And if I may just ask about President’s comments yesterday. He said that he would consider sanctioning Putin personally if he decides to invade. How advanced are these plans? And then again, going back to unity with Europe, has the United States discussed this with Europe and are they on board? Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: First, let me say as a general matter, and I – at the risk of patting ourselves on the shoulder, I have to say I was struck when I spoke to the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union a couple of days ago that partner after partner – this was in the EU context, but I’ve heard the same thing at NATO – referenced the – and the word that was used was “unprecedented” coordination and consultation with allies and partners on this issue and on this challenge. And one result of that unprecedented coordination and consultation is, as I see it, very strong solidarity in terms of the consequences that will befall Russia if it renews aggression against Ukraine. And that is across the board, and that includes Germany.

And I was just in Germany just – as you know very well, meeting with Chancellor Scholz and spending a lot of time with my German counterpart, Foreign Minister Baerbock. And as I said before, I’m absolutely confident in German solidarity in being with – together with us and other allies and partners in confronting renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Now, look, different countries have different authorities. They have different capabilities. They have different areas of expertise. And we’re bringing all of those to bear, but doing it in a way that is complementary, and it speaks to the shared commitment that we have to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its sovereignty, and its independence.

When it comes to sanctions, I think, as you heard the President say, everything is on the table. I can tell you this: The steps that we will take together swiftly will go directly to things that President Putin cares deeply about, including Russia’s ability to engage economically and financially, including its ability to develop technology for the sectors that it cares most about, like defense, like high-tech, and, as the President said, everything is on the table, and I’ll leave it at that.

MR PRICE: Take a final question from Kylie.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I’m just wondering if this document should be considered a proposal from President Biden to President Putin. And if you can also shine a little bit of light on President Biden’s role in crafting this message.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Sure. Kylie, again, the document that we’ve shared with Russia today is – does a few things.

First and foremost, it states very clearly the principles that we’re committed to and that we will defend one way or the other.

Second, it lays out our own concerns and allied concerns about actions that Russia has taken, is taking, not just with regard to Ukraine but more broadly in the European theater, that we believe undermine security.

Third, it addresses concerns that Russia raised in the document that it provided to us a couple of weeks ago.

And finally, it suggests areas where, based on reciprocity, we believe we could advance our collective security, again in ways that address our concerns and in ways that address some of Russia’s concerns. That’s what this does. This – it’s not a formal negotiating document. It’s not explicit proposals. It lays out the areas and some ideas of how we can – together, if they’re serious – advance collective security.

President Biden was intimately involved in this document. We’ve reviewed it with him repeatedly over the last weeks, just as we were getting, as you know, comments, input, ideas from allies and partners. It was vital that we work on this document even though it goes to bilateral matters, and what NATO is providing presumably goes to the – some broader issues that involve NATO and Russia. But allies and partners were intimately involved as well. And we took on board many of the comments they’ve made and integrated them into the document. But the President has been deeply involved in this from the get-go reviewing various drafts of the proposal, making his own edits, and of course blessing the final document that was delivered to Russia today.

MR PRICE: Thank you.

QUESTION: And just to follow-up on that, given that Biden himself, U.S. Biden administration officials have said a invasion is potentially imminent, the stakes are incredibly high here, and you guys have also said that Putin is the decision maker.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: So why not address this directly to him given the situation you’re facing right now?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: I’m not sure what you mean by address it directly to him. This is a document that was prepared on behalf of the United States by its government being delivered to Russia and to its government, upon which President Putin presides. I have no doubt that our Russian counterparts and my counterpart, Foreign Minister Lavrov, will share the document with President Putin. And —

QUESTION: And everyone else.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: — putting things in – perhaps everyone else. (Laughter.) You may be right. And of course, it’s – these are also complex issues, and putting things in writing is also a good way – as we do all the time across the board – is a good way to make sure we’re as precise as possible and the Russians understand our positions, our ideas as clearly as possible. Right now the document is with them and the ball is in their court. We’ll see what we do. As I’ve said repeatedly, whether they choose the path of diplomacy and dialogue, whether they decide to renew aggression against Ukraine, we’re prepared either way. Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks, everyone.

QUESTION: Thank you.


Desarmando a desinformação
01/26/2022
Desarmando a desinformação
01/26/2022 03:18 PM EST


Desarmando a desinformação: nossa responsabilidade compartilhada


“Há verdades e há mentiras. Mentiras contadas para obter poder e lucro. E cada um de nós tem um dever e uma responsabilidade como cidadãos, como americanos e, especialmente, como líderes, líderes que se comprometeram a honrar nossa Constituição e proteger nossa nação, defender a verdade e derrotar as mentiras.”Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
PRESIDENTE DOS ESTADOS UNIDOS

A desinformação é uma das armas mais importantes e de longo alcance do Kremlin. A Rússia tem operacionalizado o conceito da competição adversária perpétua no ambiente da informação incentivando o desenvolvimento de um ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda. Esse ecossistema cria e dissemina narrativas falsas a fim de fazer avançar estrategicamente os objetivos políticos do Kremlin. Não há assunto fora dos limites para esse mar de falsidades. Tudo, desde os direitos humanos e política ambiental até assassinatos e campanhas de bombardeio fatais contra civis são alvos justos na cartilha maligna da Rússia.

A verdade desarma as armas de desinformação da Rússia. O Kremlin cria e espalha desinformação em uma tentativa de confundir e atribular as pessoas sobre as ações reais da Rússia na Ucrânia, na Geórgia e em outras partes da Europa. Como a verdade não está a favor do Kremlin, os serviços de inteligência da Rússia criam, encarregam e influenciam sites que se passam por agências de notícias visando propagar mentiras e semear discórdia. A desinformação é um meio rápido e bastante barato de desestabilizar sociedades e preparar o terreno para uma possível ação militar. Apesar de ter sido exposta inúmeras vezes por se engajar nessas atividades malignas, a Rússia continua a trabalhar contra as normas internacionais e a estabilidade global.


“Nós vemos um esforço significativo para fazer propaganda contra a Ucrânia, a Otan e os Estados Unidos. Isso inclui operações malignas em mídias sociais, o uso de meios de comunicação delegados on-line abertos e encobertos, a infecção de desinformação nas programações de TV e rádio, a realização de conferências destinadas a influenciar os participantes a acreditarem falsamente que a Ucrânia — e não a Rússia — é a culpada pelo aumento das tensões na região, e pela alavancagem de operações cibernéticas visando desfigurar os meios de comunicação e conduzir operações ‘hackear e liberar’ — isto é, hackear e, em seguida, liberar dados e comunicações privadas.”Antony J. Blinken
SECRETÁRIO DE ESTADO
Informativos
Fato versus ficção: desinformação russa sobre a Ucrânia

20 DE JANEIRO DE 2022

O Kremlin tem lançado campanhas de desinformação generalizadas, prendido jornalistas, fechado meios de comunicação independentes e atacado sua oposição.
As cinco principais narrativas persistentes de desinformação da Rússia

20 DE JANEIRO DE 2022

A Rússia há muito tempo explora o efeito da “ilusão da verdade”: quando uma mentira é repetida com tanta frequência que as pessoas começam a acreditar nela. Compreender esse efeito pode ajudá-lo a evitar cair nele.
Relatórios
Mídia financiada pelo Kremlin: o papel da RT e da Sputnik no ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda

20 DE JANEIRO DE 2022

Os meios de comunicação russos financiados e dirigidos pelo Estado, como a RT e a Sputnik, exercem um papel crucial na forma como a Rússia usa a desinformação a fim de fazer avançar sua política externa. Esses veículos financiados e dirigidos pelo Estado disseminam narrativas russas ao público estrangeiro, e amplificam regularmente o conteúdo de outros pilares do ecossistema de desinformação da Rússia, inclusive sites associados a serviços de inteligência da Rússia. O relatório “Mídia financiada pelo Kremlin: o papel da RT e da Sputnik no ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda” do Centro de Engajamento Global do Departamento de Estado expõe organizações controladas pelo Kremlin que se disfarçam de mídia independente.
Pilares do ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda da Rússia

AGOSTO DE 2020

O Centro de Engajamento Global do Departamento de Estado divulgou o relatório “Pilares do ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda da Rússia” em agosto de 2020. O relatório descreve os cinco pilares do ecossistema de desinformação e propaganda da Rússia, e a maneira como esses pilares trabalham juntos visando criar um efeito multiplicador de mídia. Em particular, ele detalha o modo como as táticas de um pilar, fontes intermediárias (proxy), interagem entre si com o intuito de para elevar conteúdos maliciosos e criar uma ilusão de credibilidade. O relatório também está disponível em francês, espanhol, português, russo e árabe.
Relatórios de combate à desinformação

Os relatórios de combate à desinformação do Centro de Engajamento Global resumem as lições aprendidas sobre a desinformação e como combatê-la com base nas experiências de profissionais da linha de frente no combate à desinformação, em prol daqueles que são recém-engajados nessa questão. Edições anteriores dos relatórios estão listadas abaixo e estão disponíveis também em espanhol, russo and francês.
Explorando medos primários

13 DE JANEIRO DE 2022

Este relatório se concentra em como e por que o medo é usado na desinformação, além de mostrar que salientar os medos irracionais das pessoas pode ajudar a combater essas narrativas falsas.
Deturpando fatos sobre o assassinato de Nemtsov e as tentativas de assassinato de Navalny e Skripal

4 DE OUTUBRO DE 2021

Provas documentais sobre as instruções dadas à fábrica de trolagem Agência de Pesquisa na Internet (IRA) após o assassinato de Nemtsov, e extensas alegações de propaganda/desinformação após os envenenamentos de Skripal e Navalny.
Os objetivos e as principais táticas da desinformação da Rússia

23 DE AGOSTO DE 2021

Os objetivos gerais são manipular e enfraquecer os adversários. As principais táticas para enfraquecer os adversários são desacreditá-los, dividi-los, desarmá-los e desmoralizá-los. As autoridades russas valorizam a desinformação por seus efeitos cumulativos de longo prazo.
O extraordinário alcance e amplitude da propaganda e da desinformação russas

7 DE JUNHO DE 2021

Uma análise abrangente de como a Rússia provavelmente segmenta os públicos-alvo e cria temas para cada um deles, com base em uma análise aprofundada do Departamento de Comunicação Estratégica das Forças Armadas Lituanas e análises da ONG lituana Debunk EU (Desmascarar a UE, em tradução livre), que pode servir como um modelo para outros governos ou organizações interessadas em conduzir análises semelhantes para seus países.
O que podemos aprender com o Grupo de Trabalho de Medidas Ativas?

1 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2020

Atribui-se amplamente ao Grupo de Trabalho de Medidas Ativas interagências do governo dos EUA ter feito com que os soviéticos parassem com a desinformação grosseira, aberta e antiamericana no final da década de 1980. O relatório examina os fatores para seu sucesso, com lições que podem ser úteis hoje.
Desinformação clandestina e agentes de influência

23 DE MARÇO DE 2021

Provas documentais de arquivos da KGB sobre como a KGB tentou influenciar as decisões de governos estrangeiros no início dos anos 1980 fornecem informações irrepreensíveis sobre este aspecto pouco conhecido de desinformação. Mensageiros controlados pela KGB tentaram convencer líderes estrangeiros que se eles seguissem as políticas contra a União Soviética, isso criaria “cenários de pesadelo” para eles. Não há razão para crer que os mesmos métodos não são usados hoje.
Construindo uma rede internacional de desinformação

10 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2020

Como a Fundação de Cultura Estratégica dirigida pelo Serviço de Inteligência Estrangeira (SVR) fez parceria com o Global Research (site de extrema-esquerda do Canadá) e o The 4th Media (site obscuro de Pequim), para começar a criar um sistema internacional de desinformação no início dos anos 2010.
Usando revistas digitais pseudoacadêmicas para amplificar vozes marginais

28 DE SETEMBRO DE 2020

Como o Serviço de Inteligência Estrangeira (SVR) usa uma revista digital pseudoacadêmica, Fundação de Cultura Estratégica, visando amplificar as opiniões de vozes marginais no Ocidente.
O coronavírus e a desinformação: a Rússia permanece fiel à forma

27 DE MAIO DE 2020

Alegações falsas por parte da Rússia e da China de que o coronavírus é uma arma biológica dos EUA dão seguimento a 70 anos de alegações falsas de guerra biológica dos EUA.
O que funciona no desmascaramento

14 DE ABRIL DE 2020

Dicas sobre desmascaramento, a importância de desacreditar, contar histórias, reconhecer o poder das associações; como a verdade compete melhor com mentiras.
O mito de que desmascarar não funciona

25 DE MARÇO DE 2020

A descoberta errônea da ciência social que prejudicou os esforços de combate à desinformação a partir de 2007.
Três maneiras de combater a desinformação

11 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2020

Há três maneiras básicas de combater a desinformação: 1) refutar alegações de desinformação antes que elas se consolidem, conforme é feito na Lituânia; 2) uma abordagem de “contra-alegações”, na qual se tenta corrigir percepções errôneas depois de estabelecidas; 3) uma abordagem de “contramarcas”, que enfatiza expor as más ações do desinformante como forma de desacreditar suas falsas alegações.
Um sistema de combate à desinformação que funciona

8 DE JANEIRO DE 2020

Como ONGs lituanas usam algoritmos, pesquisadores voluntários e fortes contatos da mídia para monitorar, pesquisar e desmascarar a desinformação antes que seja amplamente disseminada.



Разоблачение дезинформации
01/26/2022
Разоблачение дезинформации
01/26/2022 03:29 PM EST


Разоблачение дезинформации: наша общая ответственность


“Есть правда, а есть ложь. Ложь ради власти и прибыли. И у каждого из нас есть долг и ответственность – как граждан, как американцев и особенно как лидеров, лидеров, которые обязаны чтить нашу Конституцию и защищать наш народ – защищать правду и опровергать ложь”.ДЖОЗЕФ БАЙДЕН
ПРЕЗИДЕНТ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ

Дезинформация – одно из самых важных “дальнобойных орудий” Кремля. Россия реализовала концепцию постоянной враждебной конкуренции в информационной среде, создала систему дезинформации и пропаганды. Для стратегического продвижения политических целей Кремля эта система продуцирует и распространяет лживые нарративы. В потоке лжи нет запретных тем. Объектом пропагандистской стратегии России выступают и права человека, и экологическая политика, и информация о гибели гражданского населения в результате бомбардировок.

Правда обезвреживает дезинформационное оружие России. Кремль создает и распространяет дезинформацию, пытаясь запутать людей и ввести их в заблуждение относительно настоящих действий России в Украине, Грузии и других европейских странах. Поскольку факты не на стороне Кремля, российские разведслужбы целенаправленно создают специальные веб-сайты, которые выдают себя за новостные агентства, распространяют ложь и сеют раздор. Дезинформация является быстрым и относительно дешевым способом дестабилизации общества и подготовки почвы для потенциальных военных действий. Несмотря на то, что Россию бесчисленное количество разоблачали в этой злонамеренной деятельности, идущей вразрез с международными нормами и поддержанием глобальной стабильности, она продолжает ее.


“Мы видим значительные пропагандистские усилия, направленные против Украины, НАТО и США. Они включает в себя злонамеренные операции в социальных сетях, использование открытых и скрытых подставных интернет-СМИ, отравленные дезинформацией телевизионные и радиопрограммы, проведение конференций, имеющих целью заставить участников поверить в то, что Украина, а не Россия, виновата в усилении напряженности в регионе, а также использование кибератак для нарушения работы средств массовой информации и проведение операций ‘взлом-публикация’, кода взламываются, а затем делаются достоянием гласности персональные данные и сообщения”.ЭНТОНИ БЛИНКЕН
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ СЕКРЕТАРЬ
Информационные бюллетени
Факты против вымысла: российская дезинформация об Украине

20 ЯНВАРЯ 2022 ГОДА

Кремль развязал крупномасштабную кампанию дезинформации, бросает в тюрьмы журналистов, закрывает независимые СМИ и преследует оппозицию.
Пять наиболее устойчивых дезинформационных нарративов России

20 ЯНВАРЯ 2022 ГОДА

Россия давно использует эффект “иллюзии правды”, когда ложь повторяется так часто, что люди начинают ей верить. Понимание этого поможет вам не “попасться на удочку”.
Доклады
СМИ, финансируемые Кремлем: роль RT и Sputnik в российской экосистеме дезинформации и пропаганды

20 ЯНВАРЯ 2022 ГОДА

Российские государственные и управляемые государством СМИ, такие как RT и Sputnik, играют главную роль в российских внешнеполитических кампаниях дезинформации. Эти финансируемые и управляемые государством СМИ транслируют российский нарратив для зарубежной аудитории и регулярно распространяют контент других основных элементов российской дезинформационной системы, в том числе веб-сайтов, связанных с российскими спецслужбами. В отчете Центра глобального взаимодействия Государственного департамента “СМИ, финансируемые Кремлем: роль RT и Sputnik в российской экосистеме дезинформации и пропаганды” разоблачаются контролируемые Кремлем организации, которые маскируются под независимые средства массовой информации.
Основные элементы экосистемы российской дезинформации и пропаганды

20 АВГУСТА 2022 ГОДА

В августе 2020 года Центр глобального взаимодействия Государственного департамента опубликовал отчет “Основные элементы российской экосистемы дезинформации и пропаганды”. В отчете описываются пять основных элементов российской экосистемы дезинформации и пропаганды и механизм их взаимодействия с целью создания эффекта СМИ-мультипликатора. В частности, в отчете подробно объясняется, каким образом прокси-источники взаимодействуют с другими элементами системы, расширяя вредоносный контент и создавая иллюзию достоверности. Отчет доступен также на арабском, испанском, португальском и русском языках.
Противодействие дезинформации

Информационные выпуски Глобального центра взаимодействия, посвященные борьбе с дезинформацией, обобщают практику противодействия дезинформации и применения различных способов такого противодействия, используя опыт ведущих специалистов в этой области. Заметки будут полезны тем, кто только начинает знакомиться с этой проблемой. Ниже перечислены предыдущие “Выпуски” (доступны также на испанском, русском и французском языках).
Игра на основных страхах

13 ЯНВАРЯ 2022 ГОДА

В этом выпуске основное внимание уделяется объяснению того, каким образом и с какой целью в дезинформации используется страх, и показывается, как противостоять эксплуатации иррациональных страхов.
Освещение в СМИ фактов убийства Немцова и покушений на убийство Навального и Скрипаля

4 ОКТЯБРЯ 2021 ГОДА

Документальные свидетельства об инструкциях по активизации пропаганды/дезинформации, которые после убийства Немцова и отравления Скрипаля и Навального давались “фабрике троллей” – Агентству интернет-исследований (ИРА).
Цели и основные тактические приемы российской дезинформации

23 АВГУСТА 2021 ГОДА

Общие цели – манипулирование и ослабление противников. Основными тактическими приемами ослабления противников являются их дискредитация, разделение, разоружение и деморализация. Российские власти распространяют дезинформацию, считая, что она дает долгосрочный суммарный эффект.
Крупномасштабная и всеохватывающая российская пропаганда и дезинформация

7 ИЮНЯ 2021 ГОДА

Всесторонний анализ действий России по изучению состава вероятной целевой аудитории и разработке тематики для каждого ее сегмента, основанный на результатах детальных исследований, проведенных Департаментом стратегических коммуникаций Вооруженных сил Литвы и литовской неправительственной организацией Debunk EU, который может служить образцом для других правительственных и неправительственных организаций, заинтересованных в проведении подобных исследований в своих странах.
Тайная дезинформация и агенты влияния

23 МАРТА 2021 ГОДА

Документальные свидетельства из архивов КГБ о том, как в начале 1980-х годов КГБ пытался повлиять на процесс принятия решений иностранными правительствами, являются важным источником данных об этом малоизвестном аспекте дезинформации. Лица, посланные и контролируемые КГБ, пытались убедить иностранных лидеров в том, что, если они будут проводить политику, направленную против Советского Союза, это повлечет за собой “кошмарные сценарии”. Нет оснований полагать, что сегодня не используются те же самые методы.
Что мы можем заимствовать из опыта деятельности Рабочей группы по активным мерам

1 ДЕКАБРЯ 2020 ГОДА

Межведомственная рабочая группа по активным мерам правительства США широко известна тем, что в результате ее деятельности в конце 1980-х годов Советский Союз прекратил нацеленную против США грубую дезинформацию. В выпуске проанализированы факторы этого успеха и показаны уроки, которые могут представлять интерес и сегодня.
Создание международной сети дезинформации

10 НОЯБРЯ 2020 ГОДА

О том, как в начале 2010-х годов управляемый Службой внешней разведки России (СВР) Фонд стратегической культуры объединился с Global Research (крайне левым веб-сайтом в Канаде) и The 4th Media (малоизвестным веб-сайтом в Пекине), чтобы создать международную систему дезинформации.
Использование псевдоакадемических онлайн-журналов для поддержки маргинальных мнений

28 СЕНТЯБРЯ 2020 ГОДА

Как СВР использует псевдоакадемический онлайн-журнал Фонда стратегической культуры для поддержки маргинальных мнений на Западе.
Коронавирус и дезинформация: Россия не меняет свои методы

27 МАЯ 2020 ГОДА

Ложные обвинения в адрес США со стороны России и Китая в том, что коронавирус является американским биологическим оружием, стали продолжением распространяемых в течение 70 лет лживых утверждений о биологической войне, которую ведут Соединенные Штаты.
Что важно для разоблачения лжи

14 АПРЕЛЯ 2020 ГОДА

Советы по разоблачению лжи и дискредитации, правдивые истории, признание силы ассоциаций: как с помощью правды лучше всего противостоять лжи.
Миф о невозможности разоблачения лжи

25 МАРТА 2020 ГОДА

Доказывается ошибочность сделанного в 2007 году некоторыми представителями общественных наук вывода о бесполезности противодействия дезинформации.
Три способа борьбы с дезинформацией

11 ФЕВРАЛЯ 2020 ГОДА

Есть три основных способа противодействия дезинформации: 1) опровержение ложных заявлений до того, как они успеют закрепиться в общественном мнении, как это делается в Литве; 2) подход “контробвинения”, когда пытаются исправить неверные представления после того, как они уже установились; 3) подход “контр-бренд”, когда основное внимание уделяется разоблачению неправомерных действий дезинформатора и таким образом дискредитируются его ложные заявления.
Эффективная система противодействия дезинформации

8 ЯНВАРЯ 2020 ГОДА

Как литовские НПО применяют алгоритмы, работают с волонтерами-исследователями и устанавливают прочные контакты со СМИ для мониторинга, проведения исследований и разоблачения дезинформации – до того, как она успевает широко распространиться.


Désamorcer la désinformation
01/26/2022
Désamorcer la désinformation
01/26/2022 03:28 PM EST


Désamorcer la désinformation : notre responsabilité partagée


« Il y a la vérité et il y a les mensonges, les mensonges dits pour le pouvoir et le profit. Et chacun de nous a le devoir et la responsabilité, en tant que citoyens, en tant qu’Américains, et surtout en tant que dirigeants, de dirigeants qui se sont engagés à honorer notre Constitution et à protéger notre nation, de défendre la vérité et de vaincre les mensonges. »JOSEPH BIDEN
PRÉSIDENT DES ÉTATS-UNIS

La désinformation est l’une des armes du Kremlin les plus importantes et à la portée la plus vaste. La Russie a mis en œuvre le concept d’antagonisme perpétuel dans l’environnement de l’information en encourageant le développement d’un écosystème de désinformation et de propagande. Cet écosystème crée et diffuse des informations erronées dans le but de promouvoir stratégiquement les objectifs du Kremlin. Ce flux ininterrompu de contre-vérités n’exclut aucun sujet. Des droits humains à la politique environnementale, en passant par les assassinats et les campagnes de bombardements meurtriers de civils, tout est considéré comme cible légitime par la stratégie malveillante de la Russie.

La vérité désamorce les armes de la désinformation russe. Le Kremlin crée et propage de la désinformation dans l’intention d’induire en erreur et de dérouter les gens à propos de ses véritables actions en Ukraine, en Géorgie et ailleurs en Europe. La vérité n’étant pas favorable au Kremlin, les services russes du renseignement créent, dirigent et influencent des sites Web, qui se présentent comme des organes de presse, pour répandre des mensonges et semer la discorde. La désinformation est un moyen rapide et peu coûteux de déstabiliser les sociétés et de préparer le terrain à d’éventuelles actions militaires. Bien que ses activités malveillantes de ce type aient été démasquées à de nombreuses reprises, la Russie continue de défier les normes internationales et la stabilité mondiale.


« Nous observons des activités importantes destinées à promouvoir de la propagande contre l’Ukraine, l’OTAN et les États-Unis. Cela comprend des opérations malveillantes sur les médias sociaux, l’utilisation de médias en ligne ouvertement ou secrètement soutenus par la Russie, la diffusion de désinformation dans les programmes de télévision et de radio, l’organisation de conférences destinées à faire croire aux participants que l’Ukraine – et non la Russie – est responsable de l’aggravation des tensions dans la région, et l’utilisation de cyberattaques pour défigurer des sites de médias et mener des opérations de « piratage et diffusion », c’est-à-dire de piratage de sites, suivi de la diffusion de données et de communications privées.ANTONY BLINKEN
SECRÉTAIRE D’ÉTAT
Fiches documentaires
Faits et fiction : la désinformation russe sur l’Ukraine

20 JANVIER 2022

Le Kremlin lance de vastes campagnes de désinformation, emprisonne des journalistes, oblige des organes de presse indépendants à fermer et attaque ses opposants.
Les cinq principaux messages de désinformation constants de la Russie

20 JANVIER 2022

La Russie exploite depuis longtemps l’effet d’« illusion de la vérité » : quand un mensonge est répété si souvent que les gens commencent à y croire. Comprendre cet effet peut vous aider à éviter de vous faire duper.
Rapports
Les médias financés par le Kremlin : le rôle de RT et de Sputnik dans l’écosystème de désinformation et de propagande de la Russie

20 JANVIER 2022

Les médias publics russes gérés par l’État, comme RT et Sputnik, jouent un rôle crucial dans la stratégie de désinformation mise en œuvre par la Russie pour promouvoir sa politique étrangère. Ces organes de presse financés et dirigés par l’État diffusent des messages pro-russes auprès du public étranger et reprennent régulièrement les contenus d’autres piliers de l’écosystème de désinformation russe, comme les sites web associés aux services russes du renseignement. Le rapport du Global Engagement Center du département d’État, intitulé Kremlin-Funded Media: RT and Sputnik’s Role in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem (Les médias financés par le Kremlin : Le rôle de RT et de Sputnik dans l’écosystème russe de désinformation et de propagande), dénonce les organisations contrôlées par le Kremlin qui se font passer pour des médias indépendants.
Les piliers de l’écosystème de désinformation et de propagande de la Russie

AOÛT 2020

Le Global Engagement Center du département d’État a publié le rapport « Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem » en août 2020. Le rapport décrit les cinq piliers de l’écosystème de désinformation et de propagande de la Russie et la manière dont ces piliers se conjuguent afin de créer un effet multiplicateur sur les médias. Il détaille en particulier comment les tactiques d’un de ces piliers, en l’occurrence les sources mandatées, se complètent pour promouvoir des contenus malveillants et créer l’illusion de la crédibilité. Le rapport est également disponible en espagnol, en portugais, en russe et en arabe.
Les dépêches anti-désinformation

Les dépêches anti-désinformation du Global Engagement Center résument les leçons apprises sur la désinformation et les moyens de la contrecarrer en se fondant sur l’expérience de professionnels de la lutte contre la désinformation, au profit de ceux qui se s’intéressent depuis peu à cette question. Les éditions précédentes des dépêches sont répertoriées ci-dessous et sont également disponibles en espagnol, en russe et en français.
Exploiter les peurs innées

13 JANVIER 2022

Cette dépêche explique comment et pourquoi la peur est utilisée dans la désinformation, et elle montre qu’on peut contrer les fausses informations en faisant ressortir la nature irrationnelle de ces peurs.
Un exemple de manipulation : le meurtre de Nemtsov et les tentatives de meurtre contre Navalny et Skripal

4 OCTOBRE 2021

Preuves documentaires des instructions données à l’Internet Research Agency (IRA), une usine à trolls, à la suite du meurtre de Nemtsov, et de la propagande/désinformation à grande échelle à la suite des empoisonnements de Skripal et de Navalny.
Les buts et principales tactiques de désinformation de la Russie

23 AOÛT 2021

Globalement, l’objectif est de manipuler et d’affaiblir des adversaires. Les principales tactiques pour affaiblir les adversaires consistent à les discréditer, les diviser, les désarmer et les démoraliser. Les autorités russes comptent sur les effets cumulatifs à long terme de la désinformation.
La portée et l’ampleur extraordinaires de la propagande et de la désinformation russes

7 JUIN 2021

Une analyse minutieuse de la manière dont la Russie semble segmenter les publics cibles et élaborer des thèmes pour chacun d’eux, basée sur un examen approfondi effectué par le département de communication stratégique des forces armées lituaniennes et des études de l’ONG lituanienne Debunk EU, et qui peut servir de modèle à d’autres gouvernements ou organisations souhaitant effectuer ce type d’analyse pour leur pays.
Désinformation clandestine et agents d’influence

23 MARS 2021

Des preuves documentaires provenant des archives du KGB sur la façon dont ce service de renseignement tentait d’influencer les décisions de gouvernements étrangers au début des années 1980 fournissent des informations irréprochables sur cet aspect peu connu de la désinformation. Les messagers contrôlés par le KGB s’efforçaient de convaincre les dirigeants étrangers que, s’ils poursuivaient des politiques auxquelles l’Union soviétique s’opposait, ils s’exposaient à des « scénarios cauchemardesques ». Il n’y a aucune raison de croire que ces mêmes méthodes ne sont pas utilisées aujourd’hui.
Que retenir du Groupe de travail sur les mesures actives ?

1ER DÉCEMBRE 2020

On s’accorde largement à dire que le Groupe de travail interagences du gouvernement américain sur les mesures actives est ce qui a amené les Soviétiques à cesser leur désinformation antiaméricaine grossière et manifeste à la fin des années 1980. Cette dépêche examine les facteurs de son succès et en tire des leçons qui peuvent être utiles aujourd’hui.
Construire un réseau international de désinformation

10 NOVEMBRE 2020

Comment la Strategic Culture Foundation, dirigée par le SVR, s’est associée à Global Research (un site Web d’extrême gauche au Canada) et à The 4th Media (un site Web obscur à Beijing), pour commencer à construire un système de désinformation à l’échelle internationale au début des années 2010.
Utilisation de revues en ligne pseudo-académiques pour amplifier les voix marginales

28 SEPTEMBRE 2020 

Comment le Service de renseignement extérieur russe (SVR) utilise une revue en ligne pseudo-académique, la Strategic Culture Foundation, pour amplifier en Occident les opinions d’une frange marginale du public.
Le coronavirus et la désinformation : la Russie reste fidèle à elle-même

27 MAI 2020

Les allégations russes et chinoises selon lesquelles le coronavirus serait une arme biologique américaine
Le débunking qui marche

14 AVRIL 2020

Des conseils sur la manière de réfuter les informations fallacieuses, l’importance de discréditer, de présenter des récits, de reconnaître le pouvoir des associations ; comment la vérité est la meilleure arme contre le mensonge.
Le mythe selon lequel le débunking ne marche pas

25 MARS 2020

La conclusion erronée des sciences sociales qui a entravé la lutte contre la désinformation à partir de 2007.
Trois façons de contrer la désinformation

11 FÉVRIER 2020

Il existe trois moyens fondamentaux de contrer la désinformation : 1) réfuter les éléments de désinformation avant qu’ils ne prennent racine, comme cela se fait en Lituanie ; 2) s’en prendre aux allégations elles-mêmes, autrement dit essayer de corriger les perceptions erronées une fois qu’elles ont pris racine ; 3) s’en prendre à la marque, autrement dit exposer les méfaits du désinformateur comme moyen de discréditer ses affirmations fallacieuses.
Un système de contre-désinformation qui marche

8 JANVIER 2020

Comment des ONG lituaniennes utilisent des algorithmes, des chercheurs bénévoles et de solides contacts parmi les médias pour surveiller l’apparition d’éléments de désinformation, les analyser et les réfuter avant qu’ils ne se propagent comme un feu de brousse.



غلط معلومات کو بے اثر بنانا
01/26/2022
غلط معلومات کو بے اثر بنانا
01/26/2022 04:19 PM EST


ہماری مشترکہ ذمہ داری:غلط معلومات کو
بے اثر بنانا


“دنیا میں سچ ہوتے ہیں اور جھوٹ ہوتے ہیں۔ جھوٹ اقتدار اور منافعے کی خاطر بولے جاتے ہیں۔ شہریوں کی حیثیت سے، امریکیوں کی حیثیت سے، اور خاص طور پر ایسے لیڈروں کی حیثیت سے جنہوں نے اپنے آئین کا پاس کرنے اور اپنی قوم کی حفاظت کرنے کا عہد کر رکھا ہے، ہم سب کا یہ فرض اور ذمہ داری بنتی ہے کہ ہم سچ کا دفاع کریں اور جھوٹ کو شکست دیں۔”جوزف آر بائیڈن جونیئر
امریکہ کے صدر

غلط معلومات پھیلانے کا شمار کریملن کے سب سے اہم اور دور رس ہتھیاروں میں ہوتا ہے۔ روس نے غلط معلومات اور پروپیگنڈے کے ایک ماحولیاتی نظام کی تشکیل کی حوصلہ افزائی کرتے ہوئے معلومات کے ماحول میں دائمی مخاصمانہ مقابلے کے تصور کو عملی شکل دی ہے۔ یہ ماحولیاتی نظام کریملن کے پالیسی اہداف کو تزویراتی انداز سے فروغ دینے کے لیے جھوٹے بیانیے گھڑتا اور پھیلاتا ہے۔ جھوٹ کے اس منبعے کے لیے کوئی موضوع ممنوع نہیں ہے۔ انسانی حقوق اور ماحولیاتی پالیسی سے لے کر قتل وغارت گری اور شہریوں کو ہلاک کرنے والی بمباریوں کی مہموں تک، روس کی مذموم اصولوں کی کتاب کے مطابق ہر چیز جائز ہے۔

چونکہ سچ کریملن کے حق میں نہیں ہوتا اس لیے روس کی انٹیلی جنس سروسز ایسی ویب سائٹیں بناتی ہیں، انہیں ذمہ داریاں سونپتی ہیں اور ان پر اثر انداز ہوتی ہیں جو جھوٹ پھیلانے اور اختلاف کے بیج بونے کے لیے خبررساں اداروں کا روپ دھارے ہوتی ہیں۔ غلط معلومات معاشروں کو غیر مستحکم کرنے اور ممکنہ فوجی کارروائی کے لیے زمین ہموار کرنے کا ایک تیز اور کافی حد تک سستا طریقہ ہیں۔ لاتعداد بار ان مذموم سرگرمیوں میں روس کے ملوث ہونے کے انکشافات کے باوجود، روس بین الاقوامی اصولوں اور عالمی استحکام کے خلاف کام کرنا جاری رکھے ہوئے ہے۔


“یوکرین، نیٹو اور امریکہ کے خلاف پروپیگنڈہ کرنے کی اچھی خاصی کوششیں ہمارے دیکھنے میں آ رہی ہیں۔ اس میں سوشل میڈیا کی مذموم کارروائیاں، میڈیا کے آن لائن پراکسی اداروں کا سرعام اور خفیہ استعمال، ٹی وی اور ریڈیو پروگراموں میں غلط معلومات پھیلانا، اور ایسی کانفرنسوں کی میزبانی کرنا جن کا مقصد شرکاء پر اس جھوٹ پر یقین دلانے کے لیے اثر انداز ہونا ہوتا ہے کہ خطے میں بڑھتی ہوئی کشیدگی کا قصوروار یوکرین ہے، روس نہیں، میڈیا آؤٹ لیٹس کو بدنام کرنے اور ‘ہیک اینڈ ریلیز’ یعنی نجی ڈیٹا اور خط و کتابت چوری کرنے اور بعد میں انہیں جاری کرنے کے لیے سائبر کاروائیاں شامل ہیں۔”اینٹونی بلنکن
وزیر خارجہ
حقائق نامے
حقیقت بمقابلہ افسانہ: یوکرین کے بارے میں روس کا غلط معلومات پھیلانا

2022 جنوری 20

کریملن نے بڑے پیمانے پر غلط معلومات پھیلانے کی مہمیں شروع کر رکھی ہیں، صحافیوں کو قید کیا ہوا ہے، میڈیا کے آزاد اداروں کو بند کر دیا ہے اور اپنے ہاں اپوزیشن پر حملے کیے ہیں۔
روس کےغلط معلومات پھیلانے کے چوٹی کے پانچ مسلسل بیانیے

2022 جنوری 20

روس ایک طویل عرصے سے “سچائی کے وہمے” کے اثر کا یعنی جھوٹ کو اتنے تواتر سے بولا جائے کہ لوگ اس پر یقین کرنے لگیں، استحصال کرتا چلا آرہا ہے۔ اس کے اثر کو سمجھنا آپ کو اس کے چکر میں آنے میں بچنے میں مدد کر سکتا ہے۔
رپورٹیں
کریملن کی مالی امداد سے چلنے والا میڈیا: آر ٹی اور سپتنک کا روس کے غلط معلومات پھیلانے اور پراپیگنڈے کے ماحول میں کردار

2022 جنوری 20

آر ٹی اور سپتنک جیسے روس کی سرکاری ملکیت اور ریاستی ہدایات کے تحت چلنے والے میڈیا کے ادارے اِن فیصلوں میں اہم کردار ادا کرتے ہیں کہ روس کو اپنی خارجہ پالیسی کو آگے بڑھانے کے لیے غلط معلومات کا کس طرح استعمال کرنا ہے۔ سرکاری ملکیت اور ریاستی ہدایات کے تحت چلنے والے یہ ادارے روسی بیانیے کو غیر ملکی سامعین تک پھیلاتے ہیں، اور روسی انٹیلی جنس سروسز سے وابستہ ویب سائٹوں سمیت روس کے غلط معلومات کے ماحول کے دیگر ستونوں کے مواد کو باقاعدگی سے بڑہاوا دیتے ہیں۔ محکمہ خارجہ کے گلوبل انگیجمنٹ سینٹر کی ” کریملن کی مالی امداد سے چلنے والا میڈیا: آر ٹی اور سپتنک کا روس کے غلط معلومات پھیلانے اور پراپیگنڈے کے ماحول میں کردار” کے عنوان سے جاری کی جانے والی رپورٹ کریملن کے زیر کنٹرول ایسی تنظیموں کو بے نقاب کرتی ہے جو آزاد میڈیا کا روپ دھارے ہوئے ہیں۔
غلط معلومات پھیلانے اور پراپیگنڈے کے ماحول کے روسی ستون

اگست 2020

محکمہ خارجہ کے گلوبل انگیجمنٹ سینٹر نے اگست 2020 میں “غلط معلومات پھیلانے اور پراپیگنڈے کے ماحول کے روسی ستون” کے عنوان سے ایک رپورٹ جاری کی۔ اس رپورٹ میں روس کے غلط معلومات اور پروپیگنڈے کے ماحولیاتی نظام کے پانچ ستونوں کا خاکہ پیش کیا گیا ہے اور یہ بتایا گیا ہے کہ میڈیا میں گہرا اثر پیدا کرنے کے لیے یہ ستون کس طرح کام کرتے ہیں۔ اس رپورٹ میں خاص طور پر یہ تفصیلات بیان کی گئی ہیں کہ کسی ایک ستون کے حربے، پراکسی ذرائع، بدنیتی پر مبنی مواد کو نمایاں کرنے اور جھوٹ کا یقین دلانے کے لیے دوسرے ستونوں کے ساتھ مل کر کس طرح کام کرتے ہیں۔ یہ رپورٹ فرانسیسی، ہسپانوی، پرتگالی، روسی اور عربی زبانوں میں بھی دستیاب ہے۔
غلط معلومات کے خاتمے سے متعلق مضامین

گلوبل انگیجمنٹ سینٹر کے غلط معلومات کے توڑ کے مضامین میں سیکھے گئے اسباق کا خلاصہ بیان کیا جاتا ہے اور اس مسئلے پر کام کرنے والے نوواردوں کے فائدے کے لیے غلط معلومات کے توڑ کے لیے اگلی صفوں میں کام کرنے والوں کے تجربات کی بنیاد پر بتایا جاتا ہے کہ ان کا مقابلہ کیسے کیا جائے۔ مضامین کے گزشتہ ایڈیشنوں میں مندرجہ ذیل مضامین شامل ہیں اور یہ ہسپانوی، روسی اور فرانسیسی زبانوں میں دستیاب ہیں۔
بنیادی خوفوں سے ناجائز فائدہ اٹھانا

جنوری 2022 13

یہ مضمون اس بات پر توجہ مرکوز کرتا ہے کہ خوف کو غلط معلومات پھیلانے میں کس طرح اور کیوں استعمال کیا جاتا ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ یہ بھی دکھایا گیا ہے کہ لوگوں کے غیر معقول خوف کی نشاندہی کرنے سے اِن جھوٹے بیانیوں کا مقابلہ کرنے میں مدد مل سکتی ہے۔
نیمسٹوف کے قتل اور ناوالنی اور سکریپال کو قتل کرنے کی کوششوں کو غلط رنگ دینا

اکتوبر2021 4

اس میں نیمسٹوف کے قتل کے بعد انٹرنیٹ ریسرچ ایجنسی (آئی آر اے) کی ٹرول فیکٹری کو دی گئیں ہدایات کے بارے میں دستاویزی ثبوت، اور سکریپال اور ناوالنی کو زہر دینے کے بعد شدید قسم کے پروپیگنڈہ/غلط معلومات پھیلانے کے دعوے بیان کیے گئے ہیں۔
روس کے غلط معلومات پھیلانے کے بڑے بڑے ہتھکنڈے

اگست 2021 23

روس کے بنیادی اہداف مخالفین کو استعمال کرنا اور انہیں کمزور کرنا ہیں۔ مخالفین کو کمزور کرنے کے اہم حربوں میں ان کو بدنام کرنا، انہیں تقسیم کرنا، غیر مسلح کرنا اور اُن کے حوصلے پست کرنا شامل ہیں۔ روسی حکام غلط معلومات کے پھیلانے کو اس کے طویل مدتی، اور مجموعی اثرات کی وجہ سے اہمیت دیتے ہیں۔
روسی پروپیگنڈے اور غلط معلومات کا غیر معمولی دائرہ اور وسعت

جون 2021 7

یہ لیتھوینیائی مسلح افواج کے سٹریٹیجک کمیونیکیشن ڈیپارٹمنٹ کے مفصل تجزیے اور لیتھوینیائی این جی او ‘ ڈی بنک ای یو’ کے تجزیوں کی بنیاد پراِن امور کا ایک جامع تجزیہ ہے کہ روس کس طرح ممکنہ سامعین کو علیحدہ گروپوں میں تقسیم کر کے ہدف بناتا ہے اور ہر ایک گروپ کے لیے انفرادی مرکزی موضوعات تیار کرتا ہے۔ یہ تجزیہ اُن دیگر حکومتوں یا تنظیموں کے لیے ایک سانچے کا کام دے سکتا ہے جو اپنے ممالک کے لیے اسی طرح کے تجزیے کرنے میں دلچسپی رکھتے ہیں۔
خفیہ طور پر غلط معلومات پھیلانا اور اثرونفوذ کے حامل عناصر

مارچ 2021 23

کے جی بی کی پرانی دستایزات سے حاصل والے ثبوتوں سے پتہ چلتا ہے کہ کے جی بی نے 1980 کی دہائی کے اوائل میں کس طرح غیر ملکی حکومتوں کے فیصلوں پر اثرانداز ہونے کی کوششیں کیں۔ نظروں سے اوجھل رہنے والے یہ ثبوت غلط معلومات کے بارے میں ناقابل تردید معلومات فراہم کرتے ہیں۔ کے جی بی کے زیر کنٹرول پیامبروں نےغیر ملکی رہنماؤں کو اس بات پر قائل کرنے کی کوششیں کیں کہ اگر وہ سوویت یونین مخالف پالیسیوں پر عمل کریں گے تو انہیں”خوفناک نتائج” کا سامنا کرنے پڑے گا۔ اس بات پر آج بھی یقین نہ کرنے کی کوئی وجہ نہیں کہ آج کل وہی طریقے استعمال نہ کیے جاتے ہوں۔
ہم فعال اقدامات کے ورکنگ گروپ سے کیا سیکھ سکتے ہیں؟

یکم دسمبر 2020

اکثریتی طور پرامریکی حکومت کے فعال اقدامات کے بین الاداراتی گروپ کے سر یہ سہرا باندھا جاتا ہے کہ اس نے 1980 کی دہائی کے اواخر میں سوویت یونین کی گھٹیا، کھلم کھلی، اور امریکہ مخالف غلط معلومات کو روکا۔ اس مضمون میں اس گروپ کی کامیابی کا جائزہ لینے کے ساتھ ساتھ اُن اسباق کا ذکر بھی کیا گیا ہے جو آج کارآمد ثابت ہو سکتے ہیں۔
غلط معلومات پھیلانے کا بین الاقوامی نیٹ ورک بنانا

2020 نومبر 10

اس مضمون میں بتایا گیا ہے کہ 2010 کی دہائی کے اوائل میں غلط معلومات پھیلانے کے ایک بین الاقوامی نظام کی تشکیل کی خاطرایس وی آر کے زیرکنٹرول سٹریٹیجک کلچر فاؤنڈیشن نے گلوبل ریسرچ (کینیڈا میں قائم ایک انتہائی بائیں بازو کی ویب سائٹ) اور دا فورتھ (بیجنگ میں قائم ایک گمنام ویب سائٹ) کے ساتھ کس طرح شراکت کاری کی۔
غیر اہم باتوں کو پھیلانے کے لیے جعلی آن لائن جرائد کا استعمال

ستمبر 2020  28

اس مضمون میں بتایا گیا ہے کہ روسی فارن انٹیلی جنس سروس (ایس وی آر) ایک جعلی آن لائن جریدے ‘سٹریٹیجک کلچر فاؤنڈیشن’ کے ذریعے مغرب میں اٹھنے والی غیر اہم آوازوں کو کس طرح بڑہاوا دیتی ہے۔
کورونا وائرس اور غلط معلومات پھیلانا: روس اپنا اصلی رنگ دکھا رہا ہے

مئی 2020 27

روس اور چین کے جھوٹے دعوے کہ کورونا وائرس ایک امریکی حیاتیاتی ہتھیار ہے، امریکی حیاتیاتی جنگ کے 70 سال پرانے جھوٹے دعووں کا تسلسل ہے۔
جھوٹ کو بے نقاب کرنے میں کیا چیز کارآمد ہوتی ہے

اپریل 2020 14

اس میں جھوٹ کو بے نقاب کرنے کے گُر، بدنام کرنے کی اہمیت، کہانیاں سنانا، انجمنوں کی طاقت کو پہچاننا؛ سچ کے جھوٹ کا بہترین مقابلہ کرنے کے طریقوں کا ذکرکیا گیا ہے۔
یہ افسانہ کہ جھوٹ کو بے نقاب کرنے کا کوئی فائدہ نہیں

مارچ 2020 25

اس میں سماجی سائنس کی اُس غلط دریافت کی بات کی گئی ہے جس سے2007 سے جھوٹ کو بے نقاب کرنے کی کوششوں میں رخنے پڑنے شروع ہوئے۔
غلط معلومات کے پھیلاؤ کا مقابلہ کرنے کے تین طریقے

فروری 2020 11

غلط معلومات کا مقابلہ کرنے کے تین بنیادی طریقے ہیں: 1) جیسا کہ لیتھوینیا میں کیا جاتا ہے،غلط معلومات کے پھیلنے سے پہلے اُن میں کیے جانے والے دعووں کی تردید کرنا؛ 2) “جوابی الزام” کا ایک ایسا لائحہ عمل جس میں غلط فہمیوں کے جڑ پکڑنے کے بعد غلط فہمیوں کو دور کرنے کی کوشش کی جاتی ہے؛ 3) “کاؤنٹر برانڈ” کا ایک ایسا لائحہ عمل جو گمراہ کن معلومات پھیلانے والے کے جھوٹے دعوؤں کو ختم کرنے کے طریقے کے طور پر اُس کی غلط حرکتوں کو بے نقاب کرنے پر زور دیتا ہے۔
غلط معلومات کے پھیلاؤ کا مقابلہ کرنے کا کامیاب نظام

جنور2020 8

لیتھوینیائی این جی اوز غلط معلومات کے وسیع پیمانے پر پھیلاؤ سے قبل، ان پر نظر رکھنے، تحقیق کرنے اور انہیں بے نقاب کرنے کی خاطر الگورتھم، رضا کار محققین، اور میڈیا کے ساتھ مضبوط تعلقات کے استعمال کے طریقے اپناتی ہیں۔



解除虚假信息
01/26/2022


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解除虚假信息
01/26/2022 04:38 PM EST


解除虚假信息：我们共同的责任


“事实和谎言同时存在。制造谎言是为了谋权谋利。我们每个人都有义务和责任，作为公民、作为美国人，特别是作为领导者——承诺尊崇我们的宪法并保护我们的国家的领导者——来捍卫事实并击溃谎言。”约瑟夫·拜登
美利坚合众国总统

虚假信息是克里姆林宫最重要、触及面最广的武器之一。俄罗斯通过助长建立一个虚假信息和宣传鼓吹的生态系统，已在信息环境中操作运用无休止的对抗性竞争的概念。这个生态系统制造并散布虚假言论，以便从战略上推进克里姆林宫的政策目标。对于这个狂喷虚假信息的水龙头，没有任何禁区是不能涉及的。从人权和环境政策，直到谋杀事件和杀害平民的轰炸行动，所有这些都是俄罗斯的恶意伎俩所指向的目标。

事实能够缴除俄罗斯的虚假信息武器。克里姆林宫制造并散布虚假信息，企图让人们对于俄罗斯在乌克兰、格鲁吉亚和欧洲其他地区的真实行径产生疑惑并受到威吓。因为事实并不在克里姆林宫一边，俄罗斯的情报部门设立、责令并影响假冒新闻机构的网站，让它们散布谎言并挑拨离间。虚假信息是一种制造社会动荡并为可能采取军事行动做铺垫的快速的、廉价的方式。尽管已被无数次揭露从事这些恶意活动，俄罗斯仍继续采取与国际规范和全球稳定背道而驰的行径。


“我们目睹了针对乌克兰、北约组织和美国推动宣传鼓吹的重大行动。这包括恶意的社交媒体操作、公开及隐蔽地使用在线代理媒体，在电视和广播节目中掺加虚假信息，主办各种会议以影响与会者，导致他们错误地以为乌克兰——而不是俄罗斯——应对该地区日益紧张的局势负责，并利用网络活动来污损媒体并采取‘黑入与泄露’行动——即进行黑客攻击，然后泄露私人数据和通信内容。”安东尼·布林肯
国务卿
事实简报
事实与谎言：俄罗斯炮制关于乌克兰的虚假信息

2022年1月20日

克里姆林宫大肆发动了虚假信息行动，关押了新闻工作者，关闭了独立媒体机构，并攻击了反对派人士。
俄罗斯持续散布的五大虚假信息言论

2022年1月20日

俄罗斯长期以来一直在利用“真相错觉”效应：当一个谎言重复的次数多了，人们就会开始相信它。明白这种效应能够帮助你避免上当。
报告
克里姆林宫出资运营的媒体：RT和俄罗斯卫星通讯社在俄罗斯的虚假信息和宣传生态系统中的作用

2022年1月20日

由俄罗斯国家所有及受国家指令的媒体，例如RT和俄罗斯卫星通讯社（Sputnik），在俄罗斯如何利用虚假信息来推动其对外政策中发挥着关键作用。这些由国家出资运营、接受国家指令的媒体向外国受众散布俄罗斯的言论，并经常性地放大来自俄罗斯的虚假信息生态系统的其他几大部分的内容，其中包括同俄罗斯情报部门有关联的网站。美国国务院全球接触中心（Global Engagement Center）的报告《克里姆林宫出资运营的媒体：RT和俄罗斯卫星通讯社在俄罗斯的虚假信息和宣传生态系统中的作用》（Kremlin-Funded Media: RT and Sputnik’s Role in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem）曝光了假冒独立媒体的由克里姆林宫控制的各种组织。
俄罗斯的虚假信息和宣传生态系统中的支柱

2020年8月

美国国务院全球接触中心于2020年8月发布了《俄罗斯的虚假信息和宣传生态系统中的支柱》（Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem）。这份报告概述了俄罗斯的虚假信息和宣传生态系统中的五个支柱，以及这些支柱如何相互勾结以制造一种媒体乘数效应。报告特别详述了其中一个支柱——代理信息源——如何利用种种伎俩相互勾结，以提升恶意内容并制造一种可信性的错觉。这份报告还有西班牙语、葡萄牙语、俄语和阿拉伯语版本。
反虚假信息通讯

全球接触中心的《反虚假信息通讯》（Counter Disinformation Dispatches）综合有关虚假信息的各种情况以及一线反虚假信息人员的经验方法，使之有益于新接触这个问题的人士。以下是过去的数期《通讯》，它们也有西班牙文、俄文和法文版。
利用本能恐惧

2022年1月13日

本期通讯谈虚假信息利用人们恐惧的方式及原因，并显示，向人们指出那些恐惧的非理性可以有助于抵制荒谬言论。
炒作谋杀涅姆佐夫事件和谋杀纳瓦尔尼和斯克里帕尔未遂事件

2021年10月4日

显示在涅姆佐夫被谋杀后喷子工厂互联网研究机构（Internet Research Agency , IRA）得到指示的文件证据，以及在纳瓦尔尼和斯克里帕尔中毒事件后的大量宣传/虚假信息说法。
俄罗斯虚假信息的目的和主要手段

2021年8月23日

总体目标是操纵和削弱对手。削弱对手的主要手段是毁誉、分裂、松懈斗志和瓦解士气。俄罗斯当局重视虚假信息的长期累积效应。
俄罗斯宣传和虚假信息的范围和广度非凡

2021年6月7日

对俄罗斯如何极可能将受众分门别类并对他们采用有针对性的主题作出全面分析，它是基于立陶宛武装部队战略通讯部（Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department）的一项深入分析以及立陶宛非政府组织Debunk EU的分析，这些可作为其他政府或有兴趣的机构对各自国家进行类似分析的模式。
暗中虚假信息和特工散布影响

2021年3月23日

从克格勃（KGB）档案中得到的有关克格勃在1980年代初如何力图影响外国政府的文件证据，提供了鲜为人知的关于虚假信息的无可辩驳的信息。克格勃控制的信使力图使外国领导人相信，如果他们采取苏联反对的政策，将会给他们造成“噩梦般的情形”。没有理由认为今天没有在使用同样手法，
我们能够从积极措施工作组学到什么？

2020年12月1日

普遍认为，美国政府的积极措施工作组（ Active Measures Working Group）在1980年代末对制止苏联赤裸裸和公开的反美虚假信息立下功劳。《通讯》审视了它的成功因素以及可能对今天有用的借鉴。
建立国际虚假信息网

2020年11月10日

俄罗斯联邦对外情报局（SVR）指使下的战略文化基金（Strategic Culture Foundation）同全球研究（Global Research）（设在加拿大的一个极左翼网站）和第四媒体（The 4th Media）（设在北京的一个不显眼的网站）合作，在2010年初开始建立国际虚假信息系统。
用伪学术在线期刊扩大偏激声音

2020年9月28日

俄罗斯联邦对外情报局如何用一个伪学术在线期刊，战略文化基金会（Strategic Culture Foundation），在西方扩大偏激声音。
新冠病毒和虚假信息：俄罗斯一如既往

2020年5月27日

俄罗斯和中国散布的新冠病毒是美国生物武器的谬论与70年来有关美国生物武器的谬论一脉相承。
有效的揭穿方法 

2020年4月14日

揭穿谎言的技巧，证假、讲述情况的重要作用，认识联合的力量；真相如何最有效地与谎言竞争。
关于揭穿无效的不实之词

2020年3月25日

在2007年出现的错误的社会学结论妨碍反虚假信息的努力。
反虚假信息的三种方式

2020年2月11日

反虚假信息的三种基本方式是：1）在虚假信息站住脚之前予以驳斥，如立陶宛所做的那样；2）以“反陈述”方式在错误观念已成立后努力纠正；3）以“反标榜”方式暴露散布虚假信息者的不轨行为，使其谬论失信。
有效力的反虚假信息系统

2020年1月8日

立陶宛非政府组织通过演算法、志愿研究员和强大的媒体关系，监视、调查和在虚假信息广泛流传之前予以揭穿。



Continuing Human Rights Concerns Regarding the Russian Federation’s Republic of Chechnya
01/27/2022

Continuing Human Rights Concerns Regarding the Russian Federation’s Republic of Chechnya
01/27/2022 09:55 AM EST



Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

The United States is troubled by continuing reports of abductions and arbitrary detentions carried out by authorities in Russia’s Republic of Chechnya, including dozens of reported abductions and arbitrary detentions in recent weeks targeting the relatives of Chechen human rights defenders and dissidents. In addition to cases within Chechnya, there have been numerous instances of individuals being detained in other parts of the Russian Federation and forcibly transferred to Chechnya, such as Zarema Musayeva, the mother of human rights lawyer Abubakar Yangulbayev. Musayeva was taken from Nizhny Novgorod last week. We call for the immediate release of all who have been unjustly detained. We are also concerned by reports that Chechen authorities are using such pressure tactics against the relatives in Chechnya of dissidents living outside the Russian Federation. Such acts, which harm entire families, is an especially pernicious form of repression.

We reject Chechnya Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s baseless attempts to malign human rights defenders and independent journalists and we urge him to end authorities’ targeting of those who dissent, LGBTQI+ persons, members of religious and ethnic minority groups, and others, including through reprisals against their family members. We call on Russian federal authorities to refrain from enabling repressive acts, including acts of transnational repression, originating in Chechnya and to bring those responsible for continuing egregious human rights violations in Chechnya to justice consistent with the law of the Russian Federation and Russia’s international human rights obligations.




U.S.-Europe Joint Statement on Afghanistan
01/27/2022

U.S.-Europe Joint Statement on Afghanistan
01/27/2022 11:49 AM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and Norway on the occasion of meeting in Oslo, Norway to discuss the situation in Afghanistan.

Begin Text:

Special Representatives and Special Envoys of the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Oslo on 24 January 2022 to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, including sessions with representatives of the Taliban and civil society actors. The Special Envoys and Special Representatives:
Focused on the urgency in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and highlighted necessary steps to help alleviate the suffering of Afghans across the country. Participants recognized steps taken to ease access for humanitarian workers, male and female, while also expressing concern that there are still certain impediments in place, and participants also reiterated the importance of swiftly removing all conditions and obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Raised the importance of respect for human rights and the strong need for an inclusive and representative political system to ensure stability and a peaceful future for Afghanistan.
Urged the Taliban to do more to stop the alarming increase of human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions (to include recent detentions of women’s rights activists), forced disappearances, media crackdowns, extra-judicial killings, torture and prohibitions on women and girls’ education, employment and freedom to travel without a male escort.
Noted with grave concern the absence from, and limitations on access to, secondary schools for girls in many parts of the country and underscored the importance of higher education for women as well as job opportunities for women in all fields. Welcomed the Taliban’s public pledges that all women and girls can access schools at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) when schools across the country reopen in March but emphasized the need for practical, budgetary and technical preparations to ensure this becomes a reality.
Reaffirmed our expectation that the Taliban will uphold their commitments on counterterrorism and drug trafficking.
Noted that our governments are expanding relief operations, helping prevent the collapse of social services and supporting the revival of Afghanistan’s economy. Participants noted the importance of increasing cash liquidity and support to the banking sector in order to help stabilize the Afghan economy. Participants further pressed for the development of a transparent, sound strategy to restore confidence in the financial sector.
Made clear that their meetings with the Taliban in no way implied any sense of official recognition or legitimization of the interim government announced by the Taliban in September 2021.
Welcomed updates from the women and civil society actors and the Taliban representatives on the status of their conversations on 23 January and expressed expectations that the Taliban will follow up on concerns put forward by the other Afghans. Participants also emphasized that the source of domestic legitimacy for any future government of Afghanistan will be the Afghan people themselves.
Listened carefully and with concern to the assessments by the Afghan women and other civil society actors of the present situation in Afghanistan, including the human rights environment (particularly women’s rights), as well as to descriptions of the grave economic and social challenges facing the country.
Thanked Norway for its gracious hosting of these important meetings.




U.S. Special Envoy Lenderking Returns from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Muscat, and London
01/28/2022

U.S. Special Envoy Lenderking Returns from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Muscat, and London
01/28/2022 01:49 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

U.S. Special Envoy Tim Lenderking met with partners in coordination with the UN Special Envoy during his trip to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Muscat, and London. The Special Envoy focused his engagements on the urgent need for de-escalation and protection of civilians, including detained U.S. and UN Yemeni staff in Sana’a, bringing the parties together to support a UN-led inclusive peace process, intensifying efforts to improve economic stability, and pressing for action to improve humanitarian access and address the fuel crisis. Special Envoy Lenderking continued to raise the U.S. government’s deepening concern regarding humanitarian funding gaps as aid organizations are forced to cut assistance to millions of Yemenis. The UN estimates that they will need $3.9 billion in 2022 to meet the needs of Yemenis.

During separate conversations in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Muscat, Special Envoy Lenderking reiterated the U.S. government’s unwavering commitment to supporting the defense of their territories, their citizens, and the thousands of U.S. citizens residing in the region whose safety is the top U.S. national security priority. The Special Envoy also emphasized the U.S. government’s condemnation of the recent Houthi attacks against the UAE and Saudi Arabia that killed civilians, and deep concern about recent reports of civilian casualties from Coalition airstrikes in Yemen. Special Envoy Lenderking stressed the responsibility of all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law, including those related to protection of all civilians.

While in London, the Special Envoy participated in a Quint meeting with representatives from Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the UK. UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg joined the Quint to discuss ways to advance a durable political resolution to the conflict. UN Humanitarian Coordinator David Gressly also briefed during the Quint meeting in detail about the impact of the fighting on the Yemeni people. During these meetings, Special Envoy Lenderking stressed the U.S. government’s concern with the profound impact of the recent military escalation on civilians. The Special Envoy also reemphasized the urgent need to bring the parties together to engage constructively in UN-led political talks and to alleviate the suffering of the people in Yemen.

Special Envoy Lenderking urges the parties to de-escalate, seize opportunities for peace in 2022, and cooperate with the international community as we try to help create the space for Yemenis to dialogue and determine their own future.

For any questions, please contact Vanessa Vidal at NEA-press@state.gov and follow us on Twitter @StateDept_NEA.




Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with French, German, Italian and UK Counterparts
01/28/2022
Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Call with French, German, Italian and UK Counterparts
01/28/2022 02:40 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Yesterday, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman spoke with French MFA Secretary General Francois Delattre, German MFA State Secretary Andreas Michaelis, Italian MFA Secretary General Ettore Sequi, and UK Minister of State for Middle East, North Africa and North America James Cleverly. The participants discussed the U.S. and NATO written responses to Russia, the Normandy format meeting held in Paris on January 26, and our ongoing commitment to diplomacy. They agreed on the importance of continued close coordination and unity in the face of Russia’s unprovoked military buildup on Ukraine’s borders and reaffirmed that any further military incursion into Ukraine will be met with swift, severe, and coordinated consequences.




Under Secretary Fernandez’s Travel to Lithuania and Belgium
01/28/2022
Under Secretary Fernandez’s Travel to Lithuania and Belgium
01/28/2022 03:05 PM EST



Office of the Spokesperson

Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose W. Fernandez will travel to Vilnius, Lithuania, January 30 – February 1, and to Brussels, Belgium, February 2-4, 2022. During his visit to Vilnius, Under Secretary Fernandez will meet with senior government officials to discuss U.S.-Lithuania relations, opportunities for deepening bilateral economic cooperation, and our shared commitment to rules-based policies that encourage responsible, sustainable economic development. The Under Secretary will also discuss the United States’ continuing strong support for Lithuania in the face of political pressure and economic coercion from the People’s Republic of China.

The U.S. delegation led by Under Secretary Fernandez will include senior leaders from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) to discuss the implementation of the recently signed $600 million memorandum of understanding to expand opportunities for U.S. exporters and Lithuanian buyers in areas such as high-tech manufacturing, business services, and renewable energy.

In Brussels, the Under Secretary will meet with EU officials to discuss issues of common concern, including countering economic coercion and deepening and expanding transatlantic trade and investment through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC).

In both capitals, Under Secretary Fernandez will discuss collaboration to deliver a positive economic agenda that increases prosperity for the people of the United States, Lithuania, and the entire European Union.